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1Introduction
In August 2017, the Swiss Federal Railways (SBB) was launching a campaign
by means of which passengers should gain more attention for additional trains
during rush hour. Between 6 a.m. and 8 a.m. employees dressed with a fox tail
and fox ears had to walk around on platforms with posters that indicated when
and where the additional trains leave. The idea of the SBB was that passengers
who use these additional trains are sly foxes and vixens because these trains are
less crowded than the normal ones. Now, the SBB was particularly looking for
female employees who would disguise as a vixen and stand on the platform.1
They advertised this job on the online platform of the University of Zurich and
ETH Zurich as follows: “Affable young women wanted for SBB-campaign! For
our “commute cleverly” campaign we are looking for affable and confident young
women. Your job is to bring commuters attention to alternative rail connections. In
order to do so, you, disguised as a “sly vixen”, hold up a poster and walk around
on the platform. That’s it—all it needs is a little confidence. For two hours of
effort, employees get paid CHF 150.” (Heininger & Hartmann, 2017).
This employment ad triggered a little shitstorm. The fact the SBB was particu-
larly looking for sly vixens and not also sly foxes was perceived as sexist. While
the women’s organisation Terre des Femmes Switzerland described the campaign
as questionable, Tamara Funiciello, leader of the social democratic youth party
(JUSO) used more drastic words. For her, the campaign was beneath contempt
and a demonstration of how sexist Swiss society still is. Moreover, Funiciello
stated that such campaigns would foster gender stereotypes. The whole debate
received quite some media response. Several Swiss newspapers such as Blick
(Heininger & Hartmann, 2017), Tagesanzeiger (Lehmann, 2017), Handelszeitung
1 Unlike in English, the Germanword for vixen (Füchsin) has no other meaning than the name
of the animal.
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(Iseli, 2017), or Watson (sda, 2017) reported on it. The SBB replied that sly foxes
can of course apply for the job as well. The reason why they particularly addres-
sed women was that the sly foxes and vixens have to wear a hairband (on which
the fox ears are mounted) and they thought that women can wear these better
(Iseli, 2017; Heininger & Hartmann, 2017).
While Funiciello and Terre des Femmes Switzerland perceived the campaign
and its application procedure as sexist, many readers of the abovementioned
newspapers apparently had a different opinion. The comments of the articles
reveal quite a nuanced analysis of the topic. First of all, against whom was this
campaign discriminatory? On one hand, it could be argued that it discriminated
against women because only they would walk around on the platform, wea-
ring these rather silly costumes. So, the campaign particularly ridiculed women.
Moreover, at the moment of the debate, the precise costumes had not yet been
presented to the public. Therefore, it was unclear whether the costumes would
emphasis women’s sexiness. If that had been the case, the campaign would not
only have ridiculed but also objectivised women. Yet, because the costumes were
very benign the reproach of objectivisation of women got more or less obso-
lete. The only argument that remained was that fox ears could remind people
of playboy bunnies that normally wear bunny ears and are a symbol of female
objectivisation. Furthermore, the mere fact that women disguise as vixens and
walk around on platforms is evocative of older sexist ad campaigns, which makes
this campaign at least questionable. On the other hand, it could also be argued
that it discriminated against men because they were excluded from the recruitment
process. CHF 150 for two hours of work is a very fair hourly wage, especially
for students. So, it is discriminatory that only women got the chance to apply for
the job.
Then, Funiciello said that such campaigns would foster gender stereotypes.
Yet, she did not articulate which gender stereotypes the campaign fostered. In Ger-
man, sly vixens is positively connoted. Thus, to describe a woman as a sly vixen
is in most contexts not a depreciation but rather a compliment. Terre des Femmes
confirms this impression and notes that vixens stand for astuteness, which they
perceive as a positive characteristic (sda, 2017).2 So, if any, sly vixens would
establish a positive female stereotype. Maybe, Funiciello wanted to indicate that
holding a poster for two hours in a vixen costume is an undemanding/ridiculous
job. Consequently, if only women would do it, the picture could be portrayed that,
compared to men, women are more willing to do such undemanding/ridiculous
2 The German adjective (schlau) that is usually used in combination with foxes and vixens is
more positively connoted than sly or cunning and more comparable to astute.
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jobs. This would lead to a negative female stereotype. Yet, the fact that only
women do the job could also suggest that men consider themselves too good for
it. Such an interpretation comprises a rather negative stereotype of men: They are
arrogant (the job is beneath their dignity) and lazy (the job is too inconvenient).
Ultimately, the SBB not only wanted to particularly recruit young women but
young academic women. To be fair, it is unknown whether they exclusively adver-
tised the job on the online platform of the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich.
However, all newspapers wrote that the SBB are looking for young female aca-
demics. Astonishingly, no reporter or politician said that this recruitment strategy
discriminates against non-academics. In order to do this job, you certainly do not
need an academic background. So, there is no reason why the SBB particularly
looked for academics. It might be objected that such a job is typically done by
students because often they are short of money and therefore happy about some
additional income. So, you probably find more applicants among students than
among some other group as for example bankers. Nevertheless, there certainly
are non-academics that are as happy about the additional income the job provides
as academics. So, if the SBB really exclusively recruited academics, they would
have systematically excluded all non-academics, which can be seen as an act of
discrimination against non-academics.
We see that the whole topic is rather complex. It is unclear whether the cam-
paign discriminates against women, who might be ridiculed and objectivised
because of the vixen costume, against men because the employment ad parti-
cularly asks for women, or against non-academics because the SBB published the
ad on the platforms of two universities. Moreover, it cannot be said with certainty
whether the costume that the sly vixens had to wear and the job they had to do
reinforced female stereotypes. And even if they did, we do not know whether
these stereotypes would be positive or negative. Nonetheless, this sly vixen inci-
dent clearly demonstrates two circumstances: (1) Our society is very sensitised
for possibly discriminatory acts, which would immediately receive harsh criti-
que; (2) At least sometimes there is no consensus about whether an act truly is
discriminatory and about who the victims of discrimination are.
These two circumstances are not only observable in case of humans that
behave in a possibly discriminatory way but also in case of machines or algo-
rithms that “behave” in a possibly discriminatory way. Only recently, several news
and scientific articles have been published that cover that topic (e.g. Wolfangel,
2018; Gratwohl, 2018; Steinharter & Maisch, 2018; Frisse, 2019; Kleinberg et al.,
2019; Williams et al., 2018). For example, the title of Eva Wolfangel’s article is
“programmed racism”, which implies that, just like humans, algorithms (or more
precisely their output) can be racist and thus discriminatory. In order to illustrate
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this, she uses among others the example of an algorithm that screens job appli-
cants and in so doing is programmed not to consider skin colour. Now, through
machine learning, the algorithm has found a positive correlation between fluctua-
tion rate and how far away someone lives from her workplace. Consequently, the
algorithm recommends applicants who live close to their workplace.3 According
to the article, this disadvantages black people because they are more likely to live
in suburbs (and thereby further away from the workplace) than those of other skin
colour. This is why the author writes that the algorithm’s output is racist and thus
discriminates against black people.
The message of Wolfangel is unambiguous: Such algorithms are not only dis-
criminatory but also dangerous and illegitimate. She finishes the article by writing
that at the end of the debate, we might come to the conclusion that after all it is
still better if not machines but humans pass judgements on humans; mistakes
included. Yet, as in case of the sly vixen campaign, not all readers agree with
her argument of racist algorithms. Regarding the applicant screening algorithm
mentioned above, some write in their comments that it simply found a correlation
between two variables. The fact that one of these two variables also correlates with
skin colour does not make the algorithm’s output racist and thus discriminatory.
This whole debate about whether algorithms can be discriminatory and should
be legally examined and forbidden if necessary is gaining more and more momen-
tum. This is particularly true for the U.S., where algorithms are already used for
several years in different areas such as to assess a criminal defendant’s likelihood
of becoming a recidivist (Larson et al., 2016) or to identify potential criminal acti-
vity (Kartheuser, 2018). Yet, also in European countries such as Germany or Swit-
zerland, the debate about discriminatory algorithms has been launched as multiple
news articles demonstrate (Wolfangel, 2018; Gratwohl, 2018; Steinharter &
Maisch, 2018; Frisse, 2019). So, it can be expected that beside our already
existing sensitivity of human discrimination we will also develop (or amplify)
a sensitivity of algorithmic discrimination.
The fact that our society is very sensitised (and seems to get even more sensiti-
sed) for possible discriminatory acts is an incredibly great achievement. 200 years
ago, in the U.S., slavery and thereby inconceivable discrimination against black
people was part of everyday life. Then, although slavery was forbidden after the
civil war in 1865, it took another 99 years until segregation and discriminating
election tests became illegal. Ultimately, in 2008 and 2012, Barak Obama got
elected as the first black President of the United States of America. Hence, much
has changed in the last 200 years. Nevertheless, up until today, racism is common
3 Of course, this is not the only relevant criteria.
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in the U.S. and as for instance the Black Lives Matter movement demonstrates,
African Americans still have to fight against discrimination. Western Europe had
a long history of terrible discrimination against Jews. In the Middle Ages, Chris-
tians accused them to have poisoned wells and therefore to be responsible for
the plague (Cohn, 2007). Shortly after, pogroms were introduced and many Jews
killed. Centuries later, discrimination against Jews culminated in the Holocaust.
Nowadays, even though antisemitism has still not disappeared completely, Jews
are no longer a threatened but a protected minority in Western Europe. In Swit-
zerland, official discrimination against women survived until 1990. On a national
level, women got the right to vote after a referendum in 1971. Yet, on a cantonal
level the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland had to ultimately force the Can-
ton of Appenzell Innerrhoden to finally introduce women’s right to vote in 1990.
Today, there certainly is much less discrimination against women as there used
to be. Nonetheless, in Switzerland, women still earn 20% less than men, whereof
39.1% are not explainable by means of structural factors (BFS, 2016).
These are just three examples where discrimination against a certain group
decreased over the last decades and there certainly are many more. Yet, there
are also groups against which discrimination is not decreasing but increasing. For
example, in 2016, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights conducted
a survey, including more than 10’500 people that described themselves as Mus-
lims. Overall, 15 EU-member states were involved. The results revealed that in the
last five years 17% of participants felt discriminated against because of their reli-
gion. In 2008, this number was 10% (Reimann & van Hove, 2017). This increase
in hostility against Muslims is not silently accepted but thematised within the pub-
lic discourse. Thus, although there is more discrimination against Muslims, people
should also become more sensitised for discriminatory acts against Muslims. But
of course, only because people are sensitised does not automatically imply that
they stop to discriminate. As the examples of the last paragraph demonstrate, this
often takes decades, if not centuries.
As desirable as this overall sensitisation for discrimination and especially its
positive impact on the reduction of discrimination is, it also has a side-effect. Tal-
king about differences between social groups has become a normative minefield.
If you say that immigrants are more likely to be convicted for a crime (Schmidli
et al., 2016) or to be unemployed (Rütti, 2017), you might be called a xenophobe.
If you say that a 30-year-old woman who wants to have children is potentially
costlier for an employer than a 30-year-old man who wants to have children, you
might be called a sexist. If you say that women are still underpaid and that care-
erwise there is a glass ceiling for them, you might be called a feminist. If you say
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that some moral values of immigrants who come from conservative Islamic coun-
tries are unwanted in the Western World, you might be called an islamophobe. If
you say that a 22-year-old man who still has to do exercises for the reserves is
costlier for an employer than a 22-year-old man who is unfit for the military, you
might be called a traitor of your country. And if you say that there appear to be
significant biological differences among human populations, you might be called
a racist (Reich, 2018).
While some proudly call themselves feminists, few people want to be called
a xenophobe, sexist, islamophobe, traitor of your country, or racist. Therefore, in
our discrimination-sensitised society you have to be cautious when you talk about
group differences because the accusation of discrimination is always just around
the corner. And even if only a few critics call you a discriminator, this can already
afflict substantial damage to your reputation. For example, although the public
was divided on whether the sly vixens campaign of the SBB was discriminatory
against women, it triggered quite some negative press.
The word discrimination has such power because of the following circum-
stance: In everyday use, it carries a heavy normative load. To discriminate
is always morally reprehensible. As a consequence, discrimination is a moral
offence and discriminators are bad people. Now, since most of us want to be a
good person it naturally is of great importance to know which actions or state-
ments are discriminatory and which are not. The Cambridge Dictionary (2018)
provides an answer. It defines discrimination as “treating a person or particular
group of people differently, especially in a worse way from the way in which you
treat other people, because of their skin colour, sex, sexuality, etc.”. This definition
is perfectly compatible with the abovementioned examples. When only men had
the right to vote the law treated women worse than men and therefore discrimi-
nated against women. When only white people were allowed to study at a certain
university, the law treated black people worse than white people and therefore dis-
criminated against black people. And when there were exclusive employment bans
for Jews, the law treated Jews worse than non-Jews and therefore discriminated
against Jews.
Of course, discrimination not only occurs on a state level but also on an indivi-
dual one. If a landlord does not rent his apartments to Muslims, he treats Muslims
worse than all others and therefore discriminates against Muslims. If an employer
is solely looking for male applicants, he treats women worse than men and the-
refore discriminates against women. And if a ticket collector only controls those
passengers that seem to be immigrants, he treats immigrants worse than natives
and therefore discriminates against immigrants.
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All these examples are hardly controversial and most of us would agree that
the described acts are discriminatory and therefore also morally reprehensible.
Yet, if we for instance go back to the sly vixens campaign of the SBB, we see
that, unlike in the examples of the last two paragraphs, it is unclear which (if any)
group was treated unfavourably and therefore was the victim of discrimination.
Did the campaign discriminate against men because the ad exclusively addressed
women and therefore treated men worse than women since men were not intended
to apply for the job? Or did the campaign discriminate against women precisely
because the ad exclusively addressed women and therefore treated women worse
than men since ultimately only women would do this rather ridiculous job? Or
were the true victims of discrimination non-academics because the ad might have
only been visible on the university platform which treated non-academics worse
than academics since the former had no chance to see it? Or did the campaign dis-
criminate against both non-academics and men? Could it also have discriminated
against both non-academics and women although this would imply that both the
exclusion of a certain group and the inclusion of another one were acts of discri-
mination? And who would have been the reference group compared to which the
discriminated groups were treated worse? Lastly, did the campaign discriminate
against any group at all?
The reason why these questions are hard to answer is as follows: We examine
them through a normative lens. Without any doubt, men and women (and proba-
bly also academics and non-academics) had been treated differently in case of the
sly vixens campaign. So, following the definition of the Cambridge Dictionary,
we have a clear case of discrimination. The only aspect that might remain unclear
is whether there was discrimination against a group or simply discrimination bet-
ween groups. Nevertheless, at least for some people the sly vixens campaign
obviously did not feel discriminatory. And this is true although they would agree
that the involved groups were treated differently. Now, it might be objected that
this precisely is because they think that groups were merely treated differently
and not worse. If they realised that it was not only a different but also a worse
treatment, they would describe the treatment as discriminatory too. Yet, there are
situations where we appear to mistreat a certain group, yet, do not perceive this
mistreatment as a discriminatory act. So, neither different nor worse treatment by
itself seems to always make us perceive an act as morally reprehensible and thus
discriminatory.
In order to illustrate this argument, let us go back to the Cambridge Dictio-
nary (2018). Here, we find the following example sentence for discrimination:
“She felt she had been discriminated against because of her age.” In a situation
where a 60-year-old woman never gets invited to a job interview although she
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is perfectly qualified for the advertised jobs we in all likelihood agree with the
example sentence. This woman does not get invited to job interviews because of
her age, which most people would describe as discriminatory and morally repre-
hensible. Now, let us consider the following two situations. (1) A 55-year-old
woman has to pay CHF 3860 for her train abonnement, whereas a 64-year-old
woman only has to pay CHF 2880 for the exact same abonnement because of
a senior discount. Clearly, the younger woman is treated worse than the older
one. So, the sentence “she felt she had been discriminated against because of her
age” should be applicable to this situation as well. Yet, while there was much
critique of the SBB’s sly vixens campaign, there has hardly ever been critique
of their senior discounts (Stauffacher, 2018). Apparently, senior discounts are not
perceived as being discriminatory against younger people.4 (2) A 30-year-old and
an 85-year-old woman enter a crowded bus. While someone immediately offers
his seat to the older woman, the younger woman does not get offered a seat and
has to stand the whole ride. Again, the younger woman is therefore treated worse
than the older one and should have been discriminated against because of her
age. Yet, probably no one would label this act of offering your seat to old but not
young people as discriminatory and morally reprehensible. On the contrary, such
behaviour is not only considered to be morally right but also socially desirable.
The evident reason why these last two examples are not perceived as being dis-
criminatory is that these mistreatments are socially legitimised and accepted. But
this poses a problem because according to the definition of the Cambridge Dictio-
nary, different (and particularly worse) treatment is sufficient for discrimination,
regardless whether it is legitimate or not. There are two solutions to this pro-
blem: (1) We adjust the definition of discrimination in a way that an act does not
only have to involve dissimilar treatment but illegitimate dissimilar treatment. (2)
We acknowledge that discrimination is not always morally reprehensible and thus
separate the two concepts. Let’s scrutinise the implications of the first solution. It
suggests that the legitimacy of a dissimilar treatment makes it non-discriminatory.
Now, what if 300 years ago, the fact that Africans could be enslaved was socially
legitimised and accepted? Or what if 120 years ago, the fact that only men could
vote was socially legitimised and accepted? If this applied, there would have been
no discrimination against black people or women (only in hindsight). Thus, we
see that the first solution can lead to dissatisfying outcomes. Moreover, it simply
shifts the question of which acts are discriminatory to which dissimilar treatments
4 Similarly, student discounts are also not perceived as being discriminatory against non-
students.
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are illegitimate. What about the second solution? It suggests that a dissimilar treat-
ment always involves discrimination, regardless whether it is socially legitimised
or not. Due to that there can also be discrimination that is socially desirable. If we
accept this argument, the two legitimate and thus seemingly non-discriminatory
situations mentioned in the last paragraph would still be discriminatory.
This outcome and the possibility of legitimate discrimination in general might
be counterintuitive at the first moment. Yet, by allowing this option we free our-
selves from a normative bottleneck when analysing discrimination: We do no
longer have to care about the legitimacy of an act and can completely confine
ourselves to different treatment. Comparing how we treat several individuals or
groups and analysing whether these treatments differ is a rather descriptive task.
And this is precisely what we want to do in this dissertation: dissecting discrimi-
nation from a descriptive perspective. Thereby, we ask how and why the identity
of people involved in a possible treatment influences the specifications of this
treatment. The method we use so as to answer these questions is decision theory
enriched with behavioural economic, social psychological, evolutionary biologi-
cal, sociological, and epistemological insights. Therefore, this dissertation has a
broad interdisciplinary approach.
What is the benefit of such a perspective? The example of the sly vixens cam-
paign or the applicant screening algorithm has demonstrated that people normally
consider discrimination from an entirely normative angle. This quickly produces
hardened fronts between different normative views. Moreover, it leads to a very
one-dimensional conception of discrimination although the phenomenon actually
has multiple facets. And these facets can be thoroughly worked out by means of a
descriptive approach. Through examining the mechanisms and functions of these
different facets, we are able to assess the significance of discrimination in ever-
yday life. The results of this descriptive analysis can then be used as a basis for
a normative theory of discrimination. For example, if a descriptive analysis leads
to the result that discrimination is an essential ability of a functioning human
being, a normative theory should acknowledge that and cannot simply condemn
discrimination in general. Furthermore, it is also possible that the different facets
of discrimination might differ from each other regarding their legitimacy. In this
way, a descriptive analysis of discrimination might already provide a clear line
between what a normative theory later defines as legitimate and illegitimate dis-
crimination. Finally, the challenges we face when analysing discrimination from a
descriptive perspective are also aspects that a normative theory of discrimination
should consider.
10 1 Introduction
The dissertation is subdivided into four major parts. The first part introduces
decision theory. By use of decision theory, we again define discrimination. This
leads to a comprehensive definition that is broader than the one used in this intro-
duction since it involves different treatment of both things and people/groups. In
a next step, we limit our analysis on social discrimination which comprises dif-
ferent treatment of people/groups. Then, we analyse the possible manifestations
of social discrimination in two different decision situational settings: decision-
making under certainty and decision-making under uncertainty. This leads to the
following findings: (1) In case of decision-making under certainty, social discrimi-
nation always implies taste-based discrimination. (2) In case of decision-making
under uncertainty, social discrimination can be revealed in form of taste-based
discrimination and/or statistical discrimination.
The second part of the dissertation is about taste-based discrimination. We first
investigate one of the most central social categorisations in taste-based discrimi-
nation, namely that of the ingroup and outgroups. Here, we will delve into social
identity theory, which provides the best-known explanation for our different treat-
ment of the ingroup and outgroups, called ingroup favouritism. Moreover, we will
analyse the precise manifestations of ingroup favouritism and discuss whether it
is mainly due to ingroup love or outgroup derogation. The next chapter compares
taste-based discrimination with statistical discrimination and sheds light on the
question whether taste-based discrimination is actually always statistical discri-
mination in disguise. This seems not to be the case but requires that people have
a certain type of preferences. Thus, in the final chapter, we will examine whether
humans truly have such preferences and in so doing reveal how they could have
evolved.
The third part of the dissertation examines how we get our beliefs on which
statistical discrimination is ultimately based. There are three superordinate chap-
ters. The first chapter covers the idea of whether there are inherent beliefs that
humans “learned” during the course of evolution. In the second chapter, we inves-
tigate how people truly update their beliefs and how much this differs from what
economists describe as a rational updating process, namely Bayes’ law. The third
chapter explores how historical and societal circumstances influence our beliefs,
why it is difficult to overcome these beliefs, and why the way societies are
structured leads to group inequalities.
The fourth part of the dissertation reassembles the dissected components of
discrimination and puts them into a descriptive model of discrimination. This
model depicts the centrepiece of the dissertation. In a next step, we look at what
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implications for a normative theory of discrimination we can derive from the des-
criptive model. This leads to five aspects that a normative theory of discrimination
should consider.
Finally, conclusions are drawn. Here, we will shortly summarise the main
findings of the dissertation, show how they improve our understanding of
discrimination, and state where future research has to shed light on.
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2Defining Different Formsof Discrimination
As we have seen in the introduction, when we talk about discrimination, we
normally talk about a certain kind of behaviour. If we treat a person or group
differently compared to another person or group, this means that we behave
differently depending on who our counterpart is. Therefore, dissecting discrimi-
nation implies dissecting the ways we behave in. The tool of analysis used in this
dissertation in order to investigate and explain behaviour is decision theory.1
A decision theory assumes that behaviour is foregone by a decision-making
process: A displayed behaviour xi was chosen from a respective choice set X , in
which xi , i ∈ I , is one of the possible alternatives from choice set X .2 In this
dissertation, we define that I , which i is part of, is the set of all alternatives’
possible characteristics. For example, if someone wants to order one dish at a
restaurant, the menu’s items are equivalent to her choice set X . Let’s say that
there are three alternatives in the menu, then X = {x1, x2, x3}. The dish xi that
the person ultimately chooses has to be one of the three alternatives that the
choice set X includes. But it has to be highlighted that the content of a decision-
making process is diverse and not restricted to exchange processes such as buying
a certain product. It involves interaction processes in a more general sense and
thus also questions such as which of several future neighbours would I prefer or
which of several strangers should I approach so as to ask for help. Additionally, a
decision-making process can also contain hypothetical interaction processes and
therefore hypothetical alternatives.
1 Importantly, we exclusively use decision theory so as to define different forms of discrimi-
nation which in turn help us explain behaviour. Therefore, we do not want to guide behaviour,
predict behaviour, or determine the normatively right way to behave in by means of decision
theory.
2 We will later see that a choice set X only accounts for decision-making under certainty.
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Having a set of alternatives which an individual can choose from is the first
ingredient of a decision theory.3 The second ingredient of a decision theory
involves the preferences of the decision-maker and thus whether she prefers some
alternatives to others and/or is indifferent between (some) alternatives. So, two
random elements of X are compared to each other and put into relation: Either
there is a preference relation (,≺), meaning one alternative is preferred to the
other; an indifference relation (∼), meaning no alternative is preferred to the other;
a combination of both (,), meaning that both are possible; or the relation can-
not be defined. Such a comparison is called a binary relation on X . Overall, there
are X × X possible comparisons. In case of the menu described before, X × X =
{(x1, x1), (x1, x2), (x1, x3), (x2, x1), (x2, x2), (x2, x3), (x3, x1), (x3, x2), (x3, x3)}.
(Kolmar, 2017)
There are three important assumptions regarding such comparisons of alterna-
tives. First, when we compare an alternative xi to itself, we assume that there is
an indifference relation between xi and xi . This assumption is called reflexivity.
Assumption 1 (reflexivity) : ∀xi ∈ X : xi ∼ xi
Second, given that every binary relation of X × X can be defined through a
preference relation, an indifference relation, or the combination of both, the ass-
umption of completeness is fulfilled. Note that x j , j ∈ I , is a possible alternative
from choice set X that is = xi .
Assumption 2 (completeness) : ∀xi , x j ∈ X : xi  x j ∨ x j  xi
Third, the assumption of transitivity says that in a choice set X , which (among
others) contains the alternatives xi , x j , and xk , if xi is preferred (indifferent) to
x j and x j is preferred (indifferent) to xk , then xi is preferred (indifferent) to xk
as well. Note that xk , k ∈ I , is a possible alternative from choice set X that is
= xi and = x j .
Assumption 3 (transitivity) : ∀xi , x j , xk ∈ X : xi  x j ∧ x j  xk !⇒ xi  xk
3 In fact, a set of alternatives can also consist of only one alternative.
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In this dissertation, we presuppose that these three assumptions are fulfilled. Due
to that we assume that individuals have a preference ordering: All possible alterna-
tives xi of an individual’s choice set X are consistently ordered after how much
they are preferred. Consequently, there is a well-defined subset of alternatives
Xo ⊂ X which describes the best or optimal alternative(s) considering the accor-
ding preferences and choice set X . In a next step, we also assume that individuals
act according to their preferences. This means that they choose (one of) the best
alternative(s) given their choice set X and their preference ordering. The conse-
quent behaviour that emerges from such a decision-making process is then called
rational.4 (Kolmar, 2017).
Lastly, we assume that the choice sets that we analyse in this dissertation are
always finite. Due to that we can express a preference ordering as a function. Such
functional representations of preference orderings are called utility functions. So,
the utility of an alternative xi and an alternative x j is given by u(xi ) and u(x j ).
Next, u(xi ) and u(x j ) can then be put into relation regarding the utility they






















In this chapter, we analyse discrimination through the lens of decision theory
as described above where individuals behave rationally. By examining different
types of preference orderings or utility functions, we try to determine the various
manifestations of discrimination. The first subchapter provides a general defini-
tion of which behaviour is discriminatory and which is not. Then, we will focus
on the different ways identity and group membership can influence a preference
ordering. We will do so regarding two decisional settings: under certainty and
under uncertainty.5 The last subchapter addresses the question of how we detect
the accurate type(s) of discrimination in a given situation.
4 In this dissertation, we do not use the word “rational” in a normative sense, meaning this is
the right way to behave in, but in a descriptive sense, meaning this is the way (mainstream)
economists say a decision-maker should behave in.
5 As can be seen, we do not consider decision-making under risk. The reason for this is
that decision-making under risk requires objective probabilities as for example provided by
randomising devices such as a roulette wheel or a coin flip. As Tobler andWeber (2014) write:
“Risk refers to situations where the decision maker knows with certainty the mathematical
probabilities of possible outcomes of choice alternatives[.]” (p. 150) Since such situations
only apply seldomly in real-life (e.g. in gambling), we neglect them in this dissertation.
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2.1 When Is There Discrimination?
Let us start our dissection of discrimination with an investigation of the word’s
origin. Discrimination stems from discriminare, which is Latin for “to separate” or
“to distinguish”. So, the original meaning of the word has nothing to do with how
you treat people but is limited to perception. In this sense, you cannot discriminate
against something but only between things. Without this ability, we would not be
able to differentiate between two in fact different objects but perceive them as
one and the same. Or we might know they are not the same but could not tell the
difference between them. For example, an inexperienced wine-taster tastes two
different wines, wine A and wine B, and is not able to distinguish them in a blind
test because they taste the same to her. Yet, an experienced wine-taster notices
that wine A is a little bit fruitier in the finish, whereas wine B is overall headier.
Therefore, while the inexperienced wine-taster is not able to discriminate between
wine A and wine B, the experienced wine-taster is.
Although today the word discrimination is no longer primarily used in this
way, it still contains the original meaning as well. The Cambridge Dictionary
(2018), which we already consulted for our definition of discrimination presented
in the introduction6, provides a second definition: “The ability to see the dif-
ference between two things or people.” As the original Latin word discriminare,
this second definition of discrimination is restricted to perception. In the following
statement, the author Christopher Hitchens (2005) precisely wanted to emphasis
the perceptional and therefore original meaning of discrimination: “It especially
annoys me when racists are accused of ‘discrimination.’ The ability to discrimi-
nate is a precious facility; by judging all members of one ‘race’ to be the same,
the racist precisely shows himself incapable of discrimination.” (p. 109)
The statement of Hitchens seems to imply that the behavioural definition of
discrimination, which involves how the expression is normally used today, and
the perceptional one, which stems from the word’s original meaning, are at odds:
A racist, who “discriminates” against other races by means of treating these races
worse than her own race, is actually incapable of discrimination since otherwise
she would not discriminate against other races. This is because if she were able to
discriminate, she would realise that people of one race are very diverse and thus it
is not sensible to judge them to be the same or use race as a relevant information.
6 For repetition, this is “treating a person or particular group of people differently, especially
in a worse way from the way in which you treat other people, because of their skin colour,
sex, sexuality, etc”.
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However, the implication that the behavioural and perceptional definition of
discrimination are in conflict is a fallacy. Indeed, a racist might not discriminate
enough between people.7 Yet, in order to be a racist, she has to be able to dis-
criminate between different races. Let’s think of a blind person who is unaware
of the fact that there are black and white people. If she has a black and a white
individual in front of her, she cannot discriminate against the black or white indi-
vidual because she is unable to distinguish their skin colour in the first place. So,
the second definition is a requirement for the first: You can only treat people or
things systematically differently if you are able to distinguish them. Otherwise,
your different treatment is the product of chance and not discrimination.
The following example deepens the above argument through introducing the
difference between motivational and behavioural discrimination. Let us assume
that a non-blind person only gives tip to white waiters. While her first waiter was
white and got a tip, the second waiter was black and did not get a tip. Thus, the
non-blind person discriminates against black waiters. Now, a blind person would
also like to do that, meaning she has the motivation to discriminate. However, she
never knows the skin colour of her waiter and therefore cannot turn her motivation
into behaviour. We assume that this makes her indifferent to giving or not giving
a tip. Due to that she uses a heads or tails app on her phone, whereby heads
produce a high and tails a low tone, so as to decide for her. In case of a low tone,
she gives a tip, whereas a high tone implies not giving one. Applying this method,
she gave a tip to the first waiter who happened to be white but not to the second
waiter who happened to be black.
Obviously, in both cases the tip giver had the motivation to discriminate and the
two waiters were ultimately treated differently since only one got a tip. Moreover,
from a behavioural perspective both the non-blind and the blind person tipped the
white but not the black waiter. So, at first sight it seems that both tip givers not
only motivationally but also behaviourally discriminated against the black waiter.
However, in case of the blind person, this is wrong because her different treat-
ment was the product of chance. Given the first waiter was black and the second
white, the black and not the white waiter would have got a tip. Consequently,
the motivation to discriminate is not sufficient for behavioural discrimination. For
that, a decision-maker also has to be able to identify the persons/things between
7 However, Hitchens does not specify how much discrimination he thinks is sufficient. For
example, is it sufficient if you discriminate between every single person? Or should you
also discriminate between the same person at different times? And if so, how small should
time intervals be you discriminate between? Moreover, is the sufficiency of discrimination
context-depended? And if so, who determines howmuch discrimination is sufficient in which
context?
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whom/which she wants to behaviourally discriminate in the decision situation. In
this dissertation, when we talk about discrimination we assume that the discri-
minator is able to do that and thus always discriminates on a behavioural level
too.8
Accordingly, this assumption also entails that an act of discrimination got trig-
gered by some motivation or some beliefs and desires of the decision-maker. Such
an approach requires a substantive interpretation of utility since we do not only
want to analyse behaviour but also deduce the motivation and the psychological
profile behind it. As Bermúdez (2009) writes: “The full force of thinking about
decision theory as a regimentation of commonsense psychological explanation
is only available on the substantive way of thinking about utility. If utility and
probability assignments are to explain behavior in the way that attributions of
beliefs and desires are thought to explain behavior then the utility and proba-
bility values must track psychologically real entities that are independent of the
behavior being explained. There is relatively little explanatory power to be gained
from explaining behavior in terms of probability and utility assignments if, as the
operational theory [revealed-preference theory] holds, those assignments are sim-
ply redescriptions of the behavior being explained.” (p. 53) As a consequence, in
this dissertation, utility is an independently specifiable quantity that is not simply
a redescription of the decision-maker’s preferences.9
Now, the tip example used above leads to two requirements that have to be
fulfilled in order that an act is discriminatory: (1) In the decision situation, there
has to be a differentiation between two or more things/people. (2) At least one of
these things/people has to be treated in a systematically different way compared to
the other things/people. If we transform these requirements into decision theory,
we attain the following definition for discrimination: In a choice set X , there are
at least two alternatives xi and x j which are not equivalent. Furthermore, there is
at least one alternative xi which is preferred to another alternative x j .
8 Another possible scenario where motivational discrimination does not turn into behavioural
discrimination is when beside the motivation to discriminate there is an even stronger moti-
vation not to discriminate. As a result, such a person actually is a motivational discriminator
but never displays it. Yet, this constellation has the problem that it is impossible to detect via
empirical observation because such a person would always behave like someone who does not
have the motivation to discriminate. This unsatisfying circumstance provides another reason
why we analyse discrimination from a behavioural perspective.
9 Importantly, only because we assume that there is some quantity which is tracked by mea-
surements of utility does not mean that this quantity has to be introspectively accessible
(Bermúdez, 2009).
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∃xi , x j ∈ X : xi = x j
∧∃xi , x j ∈ X : u(xi ) > u(x j )
Accordingly, an act is not discriminatory if there is no differentiation between
two or more things/people or if none of the distinguished things/people is treated
in a systematically different way compared to the other things/people.10 In other
words, in a choice set X , there is only one alternative xi or multiple alternatives
xi which are all equivalent or there is indifference between all alternatives that
are part of X .11
X = {x1}
∨∀xi , x j ∈ X : xi = x j ⇔ ∀xi ∈ X : xi ∪ X = xi ∩ X
∨∀xi , x j ∈ X : u(xi ) = u(x j )
Let us exemplify these last three definitions. The first one describes a situation
where the choice set only contains one alternative. For example, you have to
choose a dish from a menu that exclusively contains the daily special. The second
one is very similar. Again, you only have one true alternative, yet, it seems like
there is more than one. For example, a menu says that you can either order a
burger with fries or fries with a burger. Since both alternatives are equivalent your
actual choice set only contains one alternative. Finally, the third definition depicts
10 In such a state of indifference, a decision-maker normally still has to reach a decision and
can use different methods for that. For example, she might always simply choose the first
alternative or flip a coin. Given that she prefers some method(s) over others, she would end up
discriminating again. We could call this type of discrimination “second-order discrimination”
since it is about how to handle indifference. Yet, the focus of this dissertation lies on “first-
order discrimination” which involves the preference relations within a given choice set (and
not on how someone handles indifference within that choice set). This is why such second-
order discrimination is only shortly mentioned in Section 3.2.3 when we discuss social norms
and otherwise neglected.
11 Wewill later see that there are special constellationswhere the decision-maker is indifferent
between all alternatives but still discriminates. In such a situation, it takesmore than one choice
set or preference ordering so as to detect that alternatives are treated in a systematically
different way.
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a situation where you have different alternatives but are indifferent between all
of them. For example, you are in a foreign country and do not understand one
word of the menu. So, while you realise that there are different alternatives, you
have no idea what they involve which makes you indifferent between them. But
of course, such a situation can also occur if you very well know the difference
between all your alternatives but simply are indifferent between them.
The circumstance that in this chapter we combined the perceptional and the
behavioural definition of discrimination expanded the original behavioural defini-
tion: You do not only discriminate if you treat people differently in a systematic
way but if you treat anything differently in a systematic way. Yet, whether
someone discriminates against apples through preferring pears to apples is not
per se of interest in this dissertation because it involves a non-social context and
thereby what we call non-social discrimination. Consequently, in the next chap-
ters, we focus on “treating a person or particular group” differently which is what
we call social discrimination.12
2.2 Social Discrimination Under Certainty
Decision-making under certainty implies that the decision-maker knows the exact
outcome of a given alternative as well as the utility it provides. Under such
circumstances, there is only one possible form of social discrimination, namely
taste-based discrimination. The expression taste-based discrimination stems from
Becker (1971). In his book The Economics of Discrimination he explores discri-
mination in the labour market, for example in form of wage gaps between male
and female or white and black workers. Becker suggests that individual tastes for
discrimination lead to these inequalities: An employer prefers a white to a black
worker, even though the white worker might be less productive, in order to avoid
interacting with black people. So, the employer has a taste or in other words a
preference for a certain skin colour. However, it is important to notice that regar-
ding the labour market, tastes for discrimination are not restricted to employers.
Becker actually describes three models of which each covers a different source
12 Admittedly, this distinction between non-social and social discrimination is vaguer in real
life. For example, a racist decision-maker could associate bananas with black people. Due to
that he prefers apples to bananas. In this way, the apparently non-social preference of app-
les over bananas actually has a social background. But although such social underminings
of seemingly non-social preferences certainly exist, we will not investigate them any fur-
ther in this dissertation and stick to the simplified distinction between social and non-social
discrimination.
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of discriminatory tastes: employers, co-workers, and customers. All of them can
lead to discrimination in the labour market (Guryan & Charles, 2013). In this dis-
sertation, we adopt Becker’s idea of taste-based discrimination and, via decision
theory, expand it to behaviour in general.
At the beginning of our analysis of taste-based discrimination, we are only
interested in who the involved provider of an alternative is. So, our choice set
X consists of multiple alternatives that always have the same characteristics i
(I = {1}) but still differ from each other because these characteristics are “offe-
red” by different providers.13 Thus, we assume that we can (at least theoretically)
separate an alternative’s characteristics from their provider (who would normally
be part of the characteristics).14 Note that while the expression “characteristics
are offered by different providers” seems to imply an exchange process between
decision-maker and provider, this does not have to be the case. It actually includes
interaction processes more generally. So, the expression “characteristics are offe-
red by different providers” should rather be understood as “you can have these
characteristics with that provider or that provider etc.”. Moreover, a provider does
also not have to be aware of the fact that she offers these characteristics.15 Now,
within such a choice set X , xmi (m ∈ M and i ∈ I ) embodies one possible alter-
native whose characteristics i (that in all alternatives are the same since I = {1})
are offered by provider m. Here, M , which m is part of, is the set of all possible
providers that offer the alternatives’ characteristics.
For example, we want to buy a Mars bar (x1) and can either do so from
provider 1 or provider 2 to the same conditions. So, I = {1}, M = {1, 2}, and
therefore X = {x11 , x21
}
. The fact that providers offer to the same conditions is
important because otherwise x11 and x
2
1 would not have the same characteristics.
Now, given we are not indifferent between these two alternatives, there is a case
of taste-based discrimination. This means we prefer one provider to the other and
thus gain more utility if we buy from one provider compared to the other although
both offer the same characteristics. As a result, in such a situation, the identity
of an alternative’s provider must in and of itself be relevant to us. In generalised
terms, there is taste-based discrimination in a situation where providers offer the
same characteristics i if the following requirements are fulfilled. Note that xni ,
13 We exclude the possibility that the decision-maker herself is a provider.
14 We will later see that this is no longer always possible in case of decision-making under
uncertainty.
15 For example, if you ask someone for directions, in all likelihood, the informant has not been
aware of the fact that she “offered” directions to you (and maybe she is a stranger herself and
cannot give directions, however, this would be a case of decision-making under uncertainty
that we discuss in Section 2.3).
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n ∈ M , is a possible alternative from choice set X that is = xmi and only differs
from xmi in terms of the provider.








Accordingly, under the above-mentioned circumstances, there is a case of non-
discrimination regarding providers’ identities if:





To continue, we analyse a situation where alternatives do not only differentiate
regarding which provider offers the characteristics of an alternative but also regar-
ding what these characteristics are. So now, I has more than one element. For
example, an individual can choose between a Mars bar (x1) and a Snickers bar
(x2). Moreover, there are two providers (M = {1, 2}), who both offer the two
bars to the same conditions. The choice set X of the individual is as follows:
X = {x11 , x12 , x21 , x22 }. First, we assume that the decision-maker is indifferent bet-
ween Mars and Snickers. Thus, in a choice set X , where providers are unknown,
the individual has the following preferences: x1, x2 ∈ X : u(x1) = u(x2). Now,
given the identity of providers is irrelevant, we should find the same preference
ordering in case of a choice set X where the identity of providers is known:
x1, x2 ∈ X : u(x1) = u(x2)
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If this is the case, there is no taste-based discrimination. So, in generalised terms,
there is non-discrimination regarding providers’ identities when alternatives have
differing characteristics and an individual is indifferent between these if:
∀xi , x j ∈ X : u(xi ) = u(x j )
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Second, we analyse a situation where the decision-maker prefers alternatives that
contain characteristics i to alternatives that contain characteristics j . For example,
let us say that the decision-maker prefers Mars to Snickers. As a consequence,
in a choice set X , where providers are unknown, the individual has the following
preferences: x1, x2 ∈ X : u(x1) > u(x2). Given that the decision-maker does
not care about the identity of providers, we should find the following preference
ordering in case of a choice set X where providers’ identities are known:
x1, x2 ∈ X : u(x1) > u(x2)
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An individual with such a preference ordering does discriminate between the
alternatives’ characteristics but is indifferent between the providers of these
characteristics. Therefore, there is non-social discrimination but no taste-based
discrimination. In generalised terms, there is non-discrimination regarding pro-
viders’ identities when alternatives have two differing characteristics and an
individual prefers characteristics i to characteristics j if:16
∃!xi , x j ∈ X : u(xi ) > u(x j )




































A preference ordering which has an indifference relation between all providers
that offer the same characteristics of an alternative is agent-neutral. The term
agent-neutral was introduced by the philosopher Derek Parfit (1984) and builds
on Thomas Nagel’s idea of objective and subjective reasons (Nagel, 1970). Nagel
(1986) later adopted Parfit’s expressions and says: “If a reason can be given a
16 What if a choice set contains alternatives that have more than two differing characteristics
and the decision-maker prefers some characteristics to others? In such a case, we only analyse
two characteristics and the alternatives they are part of at a time and do so until any characteri-
stics i got compared with any other characteristics j . If there is non-discrimination regarding
providers’ identities in all of these comparisons, this is also true concerning the choice set as
a whole. Otherwise, preferences regarding such a choice set are taste-based discriminatory.
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general form which does not include an essential reference to the person who has
it, it is an agent-neutral reason … If on the other hand, the general form of a
reason does include an essential reference to the person who has it then it is an
agent-relative reason.” (p. 152–153) For example, if an individual prefers Mars to
Snickers, it would be an agent-neutral reason to always buy Mars, regardless of
who the supplier is. However, given the individual prefers Mars to Snickers but
also supplier A to supplier B, it would be an agent-relative reason to buy Mars
only from supplier A and/or if supplier A does not have any Mars to rather buy
Snickers from supplier A than Mars from supplier B.
Normally, agent-neutrality does not only include equal treatment of all others
but equal treatment of all, including oneself. Therefore, if an agent has a reason to
do something just in case her doing it would increase her welfare, that would be
an agent-relative reason (Ridge, 2017). Yet, in this dissertation, when we speak of
agent-neutral preferences, we do not necessarily presuppose that an agent has to
treat herself the same way as she treats others. For example, a decision-maker has
a choice set X with the following three alternatives: x1 = “the decision-maker gets
$100”; x2 = “person 2 gets $100”: x3 = “person 3 gets $100”. Without further
information about these three individuals, it can be assumed that the decision-
maker, person 2, and person 3 would all be equally happy to get $100. Thus,
she has reason to give $100 to any of them (including herself), which should
make her indifferent between the alternatives. Therefore, the preference ordering
x1, x2, x3 ∈ X : u(x1) = u(x2) ∧ u(x2) = u(x3) is agent-neutral in the concept’s
original sense. Now, additionally to this original use of agent-neutrality that we
label as strong agent-neutrality, we introduce a second one that we call weak
agent-neutrality: Given the decision-maker treats all her counterparts in the same
but herself in a different way, her actions are weakly agent-neutral. In terms of
the above example, a preference ordering is weakly agent-neutral if there is indif-
ference between person 2 gets $100 and person 3 gets $100 but no indifference
between the decision-maker gets $100 and person 2 or 3 gets $100. As a result,
the preference orderings x1, x2, x3 ∈ X : u(x1) > u(x2) ∧ u(x2) = u(x3) and
x1, x2, x3 ∈ X : u(x1) < u(x2) ∧ u(x2) = u(x3) are weakly agent-neutral.
With that in mind, we investigate preferences that are neither strongly agent-
neutral nor weakly agent-neutral. Let us begin with a situation where someone
is indifferent between the alternatives’ characteristics. For example, an indivi-
dual can again choose between Mars (x1) and Snickers (x2). So, in a choice set
X , where providers are unknown, the individual has the following preferences:
x1, x2 ∈ X : u(x1) = u(x2). Now, two providers (M = {1, 2}) offer the two
goods. This results in the following choice set X , where the identity of providers
is known: X = {x11 , x12 , x21 , x22 }. We assume that through preferring provider 1 to
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provider 2, the individual has a taste for provider 1. This means that she prefers
the alternatives that involve provider 1 to the alternatives that involve provider 2.
Otherwise, she is indifferent. Therefore, her preference ordering is:
x1, x2 ∈ X : u(x1) = u(x2)
























In generalised terms, there is taste-based discrimination in a situation where alter-
natives differ regarding their characteristics and the decision-maker is indifferent
between these characteristics if:
∀xi , x j ∈ X : u(xi ) = u(x j )












Finally, what if the decision-maker is not indifferent between (all) alternatives’
characteristics? So, beside her preference for certain providers, she also prefers
some characteristics to others. To resume our Mars and Snickers example with
the respective choice set X = {x11 , x12 , x21 , x22 }, the individual prefers both Mars
(x1) to Snickers (x2) and provider 1 to 2. Regarding such preferences, five binary
relations of X × X are clear: (x11  x12),(x21  x22 ), (x11  x21 ), (x12  x22 ), and
(x11  x22 ). However, what if only provider 2 offers Mars? Here, three binary
relations are possible: (x12  x21 ) or (x12 ≺ x21 ) or (x12 ∼ x21 ). The first binary
relation is true if it is more important to the decision-maker that she gets her
good from provider 1 and not from provider 2 compared to which good she gets.
The second binary relation is true if it is more important to the decision-maker
that she gets a Mars (x1) and not a Snickers (x2) compared to who the provider
of the good is. Ultimately, the third binary relation is true if these two effects
precisely balance each other out. Therefore, we attain the following preferences:
x1, x2 ∈ X : u(x1) > u(x2)
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In generalised terms, there is taste-based discrimination in a situation where
alternatives have two differing characteristics and the decision-maker prefers
characteristics i to characteristics j if:


















































To summarise the above definitions, there is taste-based discrimination if the
knowledge of who the providers of the alternatives’ characteristics are: (a) leads
to a preference of one alternative over another even though they have the same
characteristics; and/or (b) changes preferences compared to a situation where pro-
viders are unknown. This also implies that if a decision-maker has the following
preference orderings, we cannot label the second one as a case of taste-based
discrimination even if she might have a taste for provider 1:
x1, x2 ∈ X : u(x1) > u(x2)








The reason for this is that otherwise one could always argue that such preferences
involve taste-based discrimination even though this is not empirically observable
since the decision-maker also prefers x1 to x2 in a situation where she does not
know providers’ identities. Taste-based discrimination would only get visible and
therefore apply if for example there were a third alternative x12 in choice set X
which the decision-maker prefers to x22 .
2.2.1 Are There Different Shades of Taste-Based
Discrimination?
If we look at the definitions of taste-based discrimination or no taste-based dis-
crimination in situations where alternatives differentiate in both characteristics
and provider, we make the following discovery: There are possible preference
orderings that fall between our definitions. For example, our preference ordering
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regarding two alternatives with unspecified providers is x1, x2 ∈ X : u(x1) =
u(x2). Let’s say the two alternatives are again Mars (x1) and Snickers (x2).
These goods are offered by two providers. On one hand, there is no taste-based























On the other hand, having the same circumstances, there is taste-based discrimi-
































Now, in the above preference ordering, we always prefer the goods offered by
provider 1 to those offered by provider 2. But what if this only sometimes is the


























Here, we are always indifferent between providers except when both offer
Snickers. In this case, we prefer to have Snickers from provider 1 and not from
provider 2. Obviously, within such preferences there seems to be less taste-based
discrimination than within the ones where provider 1 is always preferred. So,
are these two different types of taste-based discrimination? Or might the last
preference ordering not even fall under taste-based discrimination?
We start with the second question. As a reminder, we said that there is
taste-based discrimination in a situation where alternatives differ regarding their
characteristics and the decision-maker is indifferent between these characteristics
if:
∀xi , x j ∈ X : u(xi ) = u(x j )
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Therefore, even if an individual is indifferent between all alternatives except one,





, the only reason why she could prefer the first to the second
alternative is the different identity of the alternatives’ providers.
Let us continue with the question of multiple types of taste-based discrimi-
nation. For example, it could be said that there is weak and strong taste-based
discrimination. A preference ordering that strictly prefers one provider to the other
represents strong taste-based discrimination. In contrast, a preference ordering that
only sometimes prefers one provider to the other and otherwise is indifferent bet-
ween the two (or even prefers the other provider) represents weak taste-based
discrimination. This idea is actually reasonable, yet, it applies on a different con-
text. We do have to differentiate two situations. The first one is as described above:
We are indifferent between the characteristics of our alternatives but not between
the providers of those. If this is the case, we do not differentiate between diffe-
rent types of taste-based discrimination out of a simple reason. Given there is no
strict preference for one provider over the other, the preference ordering becomes
intransitive. For example, above we had a preference ordering where we were




. However, because of
transitivity, we should actually be indifferent between x12 and x
2
2 , since we are
also indifferent between x11 and x
1




2 . And due to the fact
that we assume transitivity, no shades of taste-based discrimination are possible
in such a situation.
The second situation involves a preference ordering where some characteristics
and providers are preferred to others. For example, let’s say that an employer
is looking for a new worker. Her choice set consists of two alternatives: x1 =
“highly productive workforce”; x2= “mediocrely productive workforce”. Moreo-
ver, each of the two alternatives are provided by a white (x11 , x
1
2 ) and a black
person (x21 , x
2
2 ). Without knowing the identity of those who provide these charac-
teristics, the employer of course prefers x1 to x2. However, if she also knows the
provider’s identities, different types of taste-based discrimination are possible. We
start with weak taste-based discrimination. It implies that if the decision-maker is
indifferent between the characteristics of two alternatives, she chooses the alter-
native of the preferred provider. Otherwise, she chooses the alternative whose
characteristics she prefers. Regarding the example, an employer who has a taste
for white people prefers a white to a black worker if the white worker is more
productive or if they are equally productive but a black to a white worker if the
black worker is more productive than the white one. In formal terms:
x1, x2 ∈ X : u(x1) > u(x2)
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This differs from strong taste-based discrimination. Here, the decision-maker does
not prefer an alternative whose characteristics are comparatively more favourable
to those of another alternative, given she prefers the provider of the later. Regar-
ding the example, an employer does not prefer a black worker who is highly
productive to a white worker who is mediocrely productive due to a preference
for white skin colour. Formally spoken:
x1, x2 ∈ X : u(x1) > u(x2)































This reveals the difference between weak and strong taste-based discrimination.
Only in case of strong taste-based discrimination, the decision-maker is willing
to bear costs in order to choose the alternative whose characteristics are provided
by the preferred person.17 Regarding our example, the costs are less productivity.
2.2.2 Tastes for Groups
So far, we have always analysed choice sets with either two specific providers
(e.g. X = {x11 , x12 , x21 , x22 }) or with multiple providers of which we considered two
possible ones (e.g. X = {xmi , xni , xmj , xnj }. Now, we investigate a choice set X that
consists of multiple alternatives which always have the same characteristics i (I =
{1}) but four different providers of these characteristics (M = {1, 2, 3, 4}). So,
X = {x11 ,x21 ,x31 ,x41 }. Let us assume that an individual has the following preference
ordering regarding this choice set X :
17 In fact, Becker’s (1971) idea of taste-based discrimination comprises precisely that. He
wrote: “If an individual has a “taste for discrimination,” he must act as if he were willing to
pay something either directly or in the form of a reduced income, to be associated with some
persons instead of others. When actual discrimination occurs, he must, in fact, either pay or
forfeit income for this privilege.” (p. 14) So, from his perspective, there is only what we call
strong taste-based discrimination and no weak taste-based discrimination.



















This implies that the decision-maker is indifferent between providers 1 and 2 and
that she is also indifferent between providers 3 and 4, yet, prefers providers 1
and 2 to providers 3 and 4. Therefore, we can categorise the four providers into
two groups. Group 1 consists of providers 1 and 2, whereas group two consists of
providers 3 and 4. Within groups, the individual is indifferent between providers.
However, between groups, she prefers group 1 to group 2. For example, you do
not care whether you buy a Mars from Jack or John, and you are also indifferent
whether you get it from Lisa or Lena. Nevertheless, you prefer male sellers to
female sellers and thereby Jack and John to Lisa and Lena.
Following this argument, we can divide M , which as a reminder is the set of
all possible providers that offer the alternatives’ characteristics, into at least two
subsets. We do this as follows:  is the power set of M whereby the null set is
excluded and thus no element of . Next, A is a subset of  with the requirement
that the elements of A are disjoint and their union leads to M. This requirement is
necessary because each provider should precisely be in one group. So, A defines
which groups are salient in the respective decision situation and which provider
belongs to which group.18 Finally, va and wa respectively vb and wb are two
non-equivalent providers that belong to the subset Ma respectively Mb.
 = 2M = {. . . , C,D, E, . . . }
A ⊂ 
Ma,Mb ∈ A








va, wa ∈ Ma; vb, wb ∈ Mb
18 Obviously, A can take various shapes, leading to different categorisations. In Section 3.1.2,
we will discuss what defines the precise configuration of A.
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Applying this notation, there is taste-based group discrimination in a situation
where providers offer the same characteristics if:















In this dissertation, we assume that all members within a group are always trea-
ted equally and therefore that there is indifference between providers who are
members of the same group. As a result, we can simplify the above formulation
because we do not have to regard the individuals within a group but can consider
the groups as a whole:








We see that this last formulation is very similar to the one of taste-based
discrimination in a situation where providers offer the same characteristics:
∃xmi , xni ∈ X : u(xmi ) > u(xni )
The sole difference is that while in case of taste-based discrimination we talk
about individual providers m and n, in case of taste-based group discrimination
we talk about group providers Ma and Mb. The latter sum up all individuals
who belong to a possible group Ma respectively Mb. As a consequence, all defi-
nitions of taste-based discrimination can also be applied on a taste-based group
discriminatory context. One has to simply replace m with Ma and n with Mb.
From now on, we are mainly interested in the group membership of providers and
therefore no longer use m and n but Ma and Mb. Additionally, we will no longer
explicitly refer to taste-based discrimination that involves groups as taste-based
group discrimination but simply call it taste-based discrimination as well.
2.3 Social Discrimination Under Uncertainty
So far, a respective alternative xi always led to a certain outcome and thereby
utility for sure. This is no longer the case in decision-making under uncertainty
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which means that an alternative can lead to various outcomes. Additionally, the
probabilities of these potential outcomes are subjective, meaning that the decision-
maker must assess them with some degree of vagueness (Knight, 1921).19 How
can we explain a decision-maker’s behaviour if her choice underlies uncertainty?
According to subjective expected utility theory, a decision-maker’s behaviour can
be described as if she tries to maximise her expected utility in regard to some
subjective probabilities.
Savage (1954) has provided the most well-known justification for subjective
expected utility theory. Its strength is that it works without the necessity of any
objective probabilities. But as Kreps (1988) writes: “[T]his strength comes at a
price—obtaining the representation is … quite a hard task.” (p. 38) So, we have to
ask whether the impossibility of objective probabilities per se is necessary so as to
define social discrimination under uncertainty in this dissertation. The answer is
no. Thus, we assume that there are objective randomising devices such as a perfect
dice or a fair coin and due to that we can use a middle of the road formulation for
subjective expected utility theory: the Anscombe-Aumann representation theorem.
Anscombe and Aumann (1963) use a similar setup as Savage (1954). There
are four ingredients: (1) a finite set of states of the world, denoted by S, where
si ∈ S, i = 1, . . . , n; (2) an arbitrary set of prizes or consequences, denoted by
Z ; (3) a set of all simple probability distributions on Z , denoted by P; and (4)
a set of all functions from S to P , denoted by H , whose elements h are called
acts. So, h(si), which we use interchangeably with hi, hi ∈ P , is the probability
distribution on Z if the decision-maker chooses act h and si occurs. Accordingly,
if i = 1, . . . , n, then h = (h1, . . . , hn).
Of course, the question of interest to a decision-maker is whether an act h or
g (h, g ∈ H ) provides a larger expected utility. This ultimately depends on how
likely each of the states of the world is, which in turn is subjective. In order to
solve this problem, we need seven assumptions. The first three are the same ones
that we already defined at the beginning of chapter 2: reflexivity, completeness,
and transitivity. We simply have to apply them on the elements of H .20 The
other four are called continuity, independence, nontriviality, and monotonicity.21
Continuity indicates that there is a tipping point (and no jump) between being
19 This would be different in case of decision-making under risk. Here, probabilities of
potential outcomes are objectively given. Yet, as previously mentioned, we refrain from
decision-making under risk since the concept of objectively given probabilities seldomly
applies beyond gambling and lotteries.
20 The only difference is that the elements of H are now vectors of vonNeumann-Morgenstern
lotteries.
21 The exact formulation of these assumptions is borrowed from Gilboa (2009).
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worse than and better than a given middle act.
Assumption 4 (continuity) : For every h, g, l ∈ H , if h  g  l, there existα, β
∈ (0, 1) such thatαh + (1 − α)l  g  βh + (1 − β)l.
Independence states that a preference ordering holds independently of the
possibility of another act:
Assumption 5 (independence) : For every h, g, l ∈ H and every α ∈ (0, 1),
h  g iff αh + (1 − α)l  αg + (1 − α)l.
Nontriviality means that there is at least one act h in H that is preferred to some
other act g.22
Assumption 6 (nontriviality) : There exist h, g ∈ H such that h  g.
Monotonicity requires that “if two acts differ only on a single state, then the
preference between these two acts is given by the preference between the lotteries
that are assigned to that state” (Schneider & Schonger, 2017, p. 1), which implies
state-independence of preferences.
Assumption 7 (monotonicity) : For every h, g ∈ H , h(si)  g(si) for all si ∈
S implies h  g.
If these seven assumptions are fulfilled, the Anscombe-Aumann representation
theorem applies. Note that the subjective probability of a scenario si is represented
by pi, pi ∈ P . P is the set of all possible subjective probabilities. Moreover, it
is important to notice that pi is not allowed to depend on the chosen act and
therefore is the same for all acts in H (Kreps, 1988).


















22 We only need this assumption if there cannot be indifference between all elements in a
choice set H .
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This representation can be further simplified if we reduce H to a specific subset.
Remember that one major difference between Anscombe and Aumann (1963)
and Savage (1954) is that, in case of the former, acts do not directly lead to
consequences but to simple probability distributions on consequences. This is why
such acts are denoted by h ∈ H and not f ∈ F as in case of Savage. However,
F can actually be identified with a particular subset of H , namely the subset of
those acts whose second lottery (the one after the subjective lottery) is degenerate
(Kreps, 1988). We abuse the notation a bit and say that F ⊂ H and thus f ∈ F
and f ∈ H . Due to that we can simplify the Anscombe-Aumann representation
theorem so long as the respective acts are elements of F . Note that f ’ ∈ F and
f ’ = f .
f  f ’ iff
n∑
i=1




In the following, we will use this formulation in order to analysis discrimination
under uncertainty. Therefore, the acts that we consider are always elements of F .
Moreover, we will no longer call the elements of F acts but simply alternatives
whose outcomes are uncertain. fi is one of the possible alternatives from such
choice set F . Lastly, since states of the world is a rather lengthy expression we
from now on call states of the world simply scenarios.
Now that we have a subjective expected utility theory we get to the next ques-
tion. What defines these subjective probabilities? To start with, they are defined by
Kolmogorov’s (1933) axiomatisation which can be seen as the three fundamen-
tal assumptions of probability theory. Let’s use pi interchangeably with p(si),
where si ∈ S, i = 1, . . . , n:23
1. (Non-negativity) : p(si) ≥ 0, for all si ∈ S.
2. (Normalisation) : p(S) = 1.
3. (Finite additivity) : p(si ∪ sj




for all si, sj ∈ S such that
si ∩ sj = ∅.
23 Kolmogorovwould actually introduce an algebra on S (he denotes our set S by) leading to
a set F of subsets of S that has S as a member, and that is closed under complementation (with
respect to S) and union (Hájek, 2011). He then uses the elements of F for his definitions and
not, as we do, directly the elements of S. However, since all our sets are finite this intermediate
step is not necessary in our case.
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Yet, these three properties only set the frame of subjective probabilities. So, the
question of what does ultimately determine them is still unanswered. In this dis-
sertation, we assume that a scenario’s subjective probability is defined by our
beliefs. B is the set of all beliefs, whereby b is one possible belief. Importantly,
A, which we introduced in Section 2.2.2 and defines how we divide individuals
into groups, can also be seen as a belief. So, we say that A is one of the elements
of B. Next, B is the power set of B with the restriction that all elements of B have
to include A. b is a possible element of B.
b ∈ B
B = 2B;b ∈ B
∀b ∈ B : ∃A ∈ b
Now, thanks to this setup, there has to be an element in B that involves all beliefs
that a decision-maker holds. Since that could be any element in B, the decision-
maker’s beliefs are simply denoted by b. Finally, we need a set of all functions
from B to P , denoted by Q, where qi is a possible element of Q. The expected





In order to define whether there is taste-based discrimination in a decision that
involves multiple providers and uncertainty, we first have to partition a decision-
maker’s beliefs b into three categories. The first category contains all beliefs that
are group unspecific. We denote this subset of beliefs as βθ . The second category
includes all beliefs that are group specific except for belief A. We denote this
subset of beliefs as βμ. The third category only includes belief A. We denote this
subset of beliefs as βπ . Using this partitioning, we attain the following subjective
expected utility of an alternative fi whose provider belongs to Ma and whose
outcome is uncertain. Note that due to βμ the probability pi now considers beliefs
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that are group specific and in so doing also beliefs about Ma .24 Since the subset
βπ always exclusively contains the element A, we will directly use A in the
formulation. Finally, it is important to notice that pi is still the same for all
alternatives fi in a choice set F . So, this shall not be confused with the idea that
a chosen alternative fi affects pi of which we said it is not possible.
n∑
i=1




Thanks to this partitioning, we can isolate the influence of group specific beliefs
βμ on probabilities. In a next step, we exclude it from the probability function
(qi
(
βθ , βμ, A
) → qi(βθ , A)) so as to assess whether there is taste-based discri-
mination. Here, it also becomes clear why we had to separate A from all other
group specific beliefs because otherwise, if we excluded βμ, we could not draw
back on our categorisation of individuals into groups. As a consequence, there
would be no groups at all. Yet, we actually do want to have group categorisation
but simply no further beliefs that are linked to these groups. Following these deli-
berations, there is taste-based discrimination in a situation where providers offer
the same characteristics if:














Accordingly, there is non-discrimination regarding providers’ group membership
in a situation where providers offer the same characteristics if:














We continue with the influence of providers’ group membership on subjective
probabilities. The idea behind this is that the group membership of providers can
serve as a proxy for how probable scenarios are. For example, let’s say you have
broken your leg. There are two treatments: f1 = “operation and cast”; f2 = “only
cast”. This leads to three scenarios: s1 = “treatment 1 is better than treatment 2”;
24 Unless the decision-maker has no beliefs about Ma , yet, this can actually also be seen as
a belief.
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s2 = “treatment 2 is better than treatment 1”; and s3 = “both treatments are
equally good”. Let’s say that without further information you assume the three
scenarios to be equally likely. Now, you are told that the two treatments are pro-
vided by different persons. The only information you have about them is their
professional group membership. While f1 is provided by a doctor, the provider
of f2 is a lawyer (A = {Mdoctor ,Mlawyer }). In all likelihood, you have group
specific beliefs about doctors and lawyers that influences your subjective proba-
bilities of the three scenarios: s1 becomes more probable than the other two. Yet,
as soon as you can no longer consult your group specific beliefs, the scenarios’
subjective probabilities are again the same ones as when the group membership
of providers was unknown. Therefore, we can say that group specific beliefs are
relevant if the consideration of both group specific and unspecific beliefs leads to
different subjective probabilities than the consideration of only group unspecific
beliefs.
From this point we can now define a phenomenon called statistical discrimina-
tion. The expression stems from Arrow (1972a, 1972b, 1973) and Phelps (1972),
who proposed an explanation for discrimination in the labour market that differed
from Becker’s (1971) idea of taste-based discrimination.25 Their models suggest
that an employer is imperfectly informed about some relevant characteristics (e.g.
productivity) of her applicants and thus uses group statistics as proxies of these
unobserved characteristics (Fang & Moro, 2011). This can lead to group inequali-
ties in the labour market if employers (correctly) assume that on average members
of some groups are more productive than those of others.26
Applied on our setup, statistical discrimination implies that a decision-maker
prefers an alternative fMai to an alternative f
Mb
i because of the influence that
the providers’ group memberships has on the subjective probability of the alterna-
tives’ scenarios. As a consequence, unlike in decision-making under certainty, in
decision-making under uncertainty characteristics of an alternative and the group
membership of its provider can no longer be always separated. More precisely,
they are not separable if there is statistical discrimination. In such a situation we
25 To this day, taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination are still the two main
economic theories in order to explain discrimination. Moreover, it is important to notice that
the two theories are not exclusive.
26 Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973) differ in their explanation why some groups should be
less productive than others. In case of Phelps “the source of inequality is some unexplained
exogenous difference between groups of workers, coupled with employers’ imperfect infor-
mation about workers’ productivity” (Fang & Moro, 2011, p. 135). In contrast, in case of
Arrow (1973) group differences are endogenously derived in equilibrium and can be seen as
“self-fulfilling stereotypes”.
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mark the i of fMai with a little star (*), leading to f
Ma
i∗ , which indicates that i
actually is iMa and thus no longer equivalent to the i of fMbi∗ that now is i
Mb .
So, regarding a choice set F where providers offer the “same” characteristics,
there is pure statistical discrimination if:27
































Why is there not a greater-than-or-equal sign in the last equation? Indeed, the fact
that there is statistical discrimination does not necessarily have to imply that the
alternatives’ expected utilities change compared to a situation where probabilities
are independent of group specific beliefs. However, given a decision that invol-
ves statistical discrimination leads to the exact same result as one that does not,
it is impossible to empirically observe whether there truly was statistical discri-
mination. Due to that it could always be argued that an action actually involved
statistical discrimination even though it was not observable. This poses a problem
because it dilutes statistical discrimination as a concept of analysis. Thus, so as to
make a virtue out of necessity, our definition of statistical discrimination requires
that the use of group specific beliefs changes the decision-maker’s preferences
and thereby behaviour. This is the reason why there is a greater-than sign and not
a greater-than-or-equal sign.
Due to the above definition of pure statistical discrimination, it is straightfor-
ward when there is neither taste-based nor statistical discrimination in a situation
where providers offer the “same” characteristics:
27 In this chapter, we only explicitly define statistical discrimination in situations where pro-
viders offer the “same” characteristics. Of course, statistical discrimination can also exist if
providers offer different characteristics. As a consequence, it can also appear in combination
with non-social discrimination (and taste-based discrimination). In such a case, we first have to
analyse whether the decision-maker prefers some characteristics to others in a situation where
she does not know the identity of those who provide these characteristics (checking non-social
discrimination which works similarly to the case of certainty except that the choice set is no
longer I but F). Next, we analyse whether preferences change if the identity of providers is
revealed but the decision-maker cannot retrieve group specific beliefs (checking taste-based
discrimination which works similarly to the case of certainty except that the choice set is no
longer I but F). Finally, we analyse whether preferences change if the decision-maker has
access to group specific beliefs (checking statistical discrimination).
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Now, let’s go through the other combinations. We do so under the assumption that






. First, we examine a situation
where there is both taste-based and statistical discrimination, yet, the combination




































The interpretation of such a situation is as follows: A decision-maker gene-
rally prefers the group membership of one provider (M1) to that of the other
(M2). This implies that the prizes of the preferred provider give the decision-













). However, groups specific beliefs of
the decision-maker change subjective probabilities in such a way that the expec-
ted utility of fM21∗ gets larger in comparison to the expected utility of f
M1
1∗ . These
two effects precisely balance each other out so that ultimately the decision-maker
is indifferent between the two alternatives.
The following example should illustrate these deliberations: Again, you have
a broken leg and your choice set F contains two treatments with the same
characteristics 1 but providers of different group membership.28 While the pro-
vider of treatment 1 is a lawyer, treatment 2 is provided by a doctor. Thus,
F = { fMlawyer1 , fMdoctor1 }. Generally, you prefer lawyers to doctors which means
that the utility of prizes provided by a lawyer is larger than the utility of the exact
same prizes provided by a doctor. Now, there are three scenarios (S = {s1, s2, s3}):
s1 = “treatment 1 is better than treatment 2”; s2 = “treatment 2 is better than
28 Keep in mind that in such a situation the group membership of providers might influence
the characteristics i . In other words, if there is statistical discrimination, the characteristics of
the two treatments are no longer equivalent, which is indicated by i∗.
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treatment 1”; and s3 = “both treatments are equally good”. Without conside-
ring group specific beliefs, each scenario is equally likely. As a consequence, the
treatment provided by the lawyer leads to more expected utility than that of the
doctor ( f
Mlawyer
1  fMdoctor1 ). However, as soon as you also regard group spe-
cific beliefs, your subjective probabilities of the three scenarios start to change.
s2 gets a higher subjective probability since doctors are associated with medical
expertise, which is not the case for lawyers. The higher subjective probability
of s2 starts to compensate for the lower utility that the doctor’s prizes generally
provide. At one point, this compensating effect precisely balances the expected
utility of the two treatments out ( f
Mlawyer
1∗ ∼ fMdoctor1∗ ).
In fact, the compensating effect can also lead to a situation where the change
of subjective probabilities due to group specific beliefs outcompetes a general
preference for M1 over M2:
fM11 , f
M2
































Finally, on one hand, subjective probabilities might change due to group specific
beliefs and make fM21∗ more attractive. Nevertheless, their change is not strong
enough in order to outcompete or balance out a general preference for M1 over
M2. On the other hand, a change of subjective probabilities has either no effect
on the alternatives’ utilities or even additionally increases the utility of fM11∗ :
fM11 , f
M2
































Yet, as previously mentioned, if changes in subjective probabilities due to group
specific beliefs do not alter preferences and thereby behaviour, we do not speak
of statistical discrimination. So, the above circumstances would be a case of taste-
based discrimination alone. Again, the reason for this is that otherwise one could
always argue that such a situation involves statistical discrimination even though
it is not empirically observable.
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2.4 How to Detect the Accurate Type(s) of Discrimination
Our decision-theoretical analysis of discrimination has led to the following dis-
tinctions: First of all, we separated motivational discrimination from behavioural
discrimination and said that we mean the combination of both when we talk









Figure 2.1 All types of discrimination used in this dissertation
behavioural discrimination. Then, we defined the requirements for discrimination.
Next, we differentiated between social and non-social discrimination.29 In case of
social discrimination, we identified two subtypes, namely taste-based discrimina-
tion and statistical discrimination. They can be combined with each other and/or
with non-social discrimination. Figure 2.1 summarises all types of discrimination.
Although these types of discrimination are always distinguishable from each
other in theory, this is not the case empirically since they can lead to the exact
same behaviour. For example, the last chapters have shown that there are special
constellations of different types of discrimination that lead to preferences which
on first sight look as if they were non-discriminatory. Let’s say you prefer Mars
to Snickers and group A to group B. Now, while group B only offers Mars, group
A only offers Snickers. Due to that you are indifferent between Snickers from
group A and Mars from group B. This preference ordering gives the impression
that you are non-discriminatory. However, you actually display non-social and
taste-based discrimination. The same seemingly non-discriminatory outcome is
possible if there is a special constellation of taste-based and statistical discrimi-
nation, non-social and statistical discrimination, or non-social, taste-based, and
statistical discrimination. And as the following paragraphs will show, there are
further actions that look the same although they stem from different types of
discrimination. So, how do we know which one applies?
29 As mentioned before, this distinction can become blurry in practice.
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This question touches a very general problemof the analysis of behaviour ormore
preciselyempiricalobservations thatwill indirectlyaccompanyus thewholedisserta-
tion:Whatcanweknowfromempiricalobservation?This issuehasbeendiscussedfor
centuries. For example, Immanuel Kant (2011[1785]) examined whether someone’s
behaviour can exclusively stem frommoral grounds and came to the following con-
clusion: “In fact, it is absolutely impossible bymeans of experience tomake out with
complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action that otherwise con-
forms with duty did rest solely on moral grounds and on the representation of one’s
duty.” (p. 43) Applied on discrimination, this means that we can never certainly tell
what type of discrimination an act actually involved (if any).
Yet, despite this epistemological limitation, through observing other acts we
can attain a basis of comparison and in this way try to (at least partly) deduce
the relevant form of discrimination. For instance, let’s say that you see someone
not tipping a white waiter.30 There are multiple possible explanations for this
behaviour such as: (1) The person does never give tip. (2) The person gives tip
randomly. (3) The person only tips if the service was extraordinary which was not
the case in that situation. (4) The person has a group specific belief which says
that white people are generally rather affluent which is why she did not tip the
white waiter. Or (5) the person has a distaste for white waiters/people. Of course,
there are actually more than these five explanations. But let’s restrict ourselves to
them for the moment being and treat them as if they were mutually exclusive.
Now, a day later, you see the same person tipping a black waiter. This different
treatment of black and white waiters can still have various reasons: (1) The person
gives tip randomly. (2) While the service of the white waiter was not worthy of tip,
the service of the black waiter was. (3) The person has a group specific belief which
says that while white people are generally rather affluent, black people are generally
rather poor which is why she only tips black waiters. Or (4) the person has a taste for
black waiters/people or a distaste for white waiters/people (or both).
Next, you observe a hundred restaurant visits of this person and notice that she
never gives tip to white waiters (68 times) but always to black waiters (32 times).
On one hand, it is highly unlikely that the quality of service was always worse in
case of white waiters than in case of black waiters. On the other hand, the fact that all
black but nowhitewaiters got a tip strongly challenges the idea of randomness. Thus,
we assume that only two explanations remain: (1) The person has a group specific
belief which says that while white people are generally rather affluent, black people
are generally rather poor which is why she only tips black waiters. (2) The person
30 We assume the person pays via credit card. Thus, not having spare money is not a possible
reason for her behaviour.
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has a taste for black waiters/people or a distaste for white waiters/people (or both).
Regarding our empirical observations, it is difficult to deducewhich one of these two
is correct.31 We would need a situation where the person’s group specific belief gets
overruled by another belief, namely that her currentwhitewaiter is rather poor or that
her current black waiter is rather affluent. Supposing such conditions, if the person
still exclusively tips black waiters, she probably has a taste for black waiters/people
or a distaste for white waiters/people (or both). Alternatively, if the person does tip
a poor white waiter or does not tip an affluent black waiter, her previous different
treatment seems to have been due to statistical discrimination.
We see that in order to detect the accurate type(s) of discrimination we need a
basis of comparison and thus as many empirical observations as possible. Addi-
tionally, we have to thoroughly analyse the two types of social discrimination.
What do they actually include? Why do we display or, putting it differently, what
purpose do they have? What are the psychological mechanisms behind them and
how are they composed? Is it possible to identify them in empirical observations,
for example through controlling all other influences in experimental settings? The
answers to these questions will help us to deduce the accurate type(s) of discri-
mination in a cluster of empirical observations. This is why the next two main
chapters of this dissertation enlarge upon taste-based and statistical discrimination
(more precisely the beliefs used for it). We start with the former.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use,
sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you
give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative
Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third partymaterial in this chapter are included in the chapter’sCreative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly
from the copyright holder.
31 Of course, having the mentioned group specific belief and use it as a relevant factor for
subjective probabilities might appear implausible. But it can be seen as a placeholder for any
group specific belief that leads to such behaviour via pure statistical discrimination.
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As the last chapter has revealed, the reason why a decision-maker makes use of
statistical discrimination is easily comprehensible. If a decision situation under-
lies uncertainty, he has to assess the probabilities of possible scenarios with some
degree of vagueness. In this process, group memberships of providers can serve as
a proxy for these probabilities.1 So, statistical discrimination is a tool so as to bet-
ter handle uncertainty and in this way commonly applied. As Lippert-Rasmussen
(2014) states: “[A]ll of us engage in statistical discrimination in that we treat
people differently on the basis of explicit or implicit statistical generalizations
pertaining to the group to which they belong; native speakers speak more slowly
when talking to nonnative speakers (which, generally speaking, is quite nice and
facilitates understanding); women walking home at night respond differently to
an approaching lone stranger if this person is male than if she is a female; racial
minority members are more alert to signs of racial bias when speaking to a majo-
rity member than when speaking to another minority member. Indeed, acting in
a social world without relying on statistical information about socially salient
groups seems impossible.” (p. 80)
But why do we have certain tastes (and distastes) for other people? Already
Becker (1971) said that the causes of taste-based discrimination have to be sought
in psychology (and sociology) and that he merely analysed the economic conse-
quences of it. Therefore, in this chapter we consult psychological and evolutionary
1 Which beliefs are rational to be hold and used in case of statistical discrimination and which
not will be discussed in chapter 4.
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biological concepts so as to find proximate and ultimate explanations for taste-
based discrimination.2 This is important out of two reasons: First, it reveals how
our tastes are structured and thereby whether they are fixed or dependent on exter-
nal aspects such as social context and culture. Second, there is a discussion about
whether such tastes and therefore preferences for certain people/groups actually
exist which brings us to the question of whether and how they could have evolved.
The chapter is structured as follows: First, we introduce the idea of ingroup
favouritism and discuss how it is linked to taste-based discrimination. Second, we
analyse how we can delimitate taste-based discrimination from statistical discri-
mination and thereby ask whether the former truly exists. Third, we investigate
ultimate explanations for taste-based discrimination and in so doing present the
evolution of agent-relative social preferences.
3.1 ATaste for the Ingroup
We know from chapter 2 that a taste-based discriminator prefers certain people
or groups to others and because of that treats these people or groups better than
others. To put it differently, the preference ordering of a taste-based discriminator
is not agent-neutral but agent-relative. In this chapter, we are mainly interested
in what we called strong taste-based discrimination. For repetition, we defined
strong taste-based discrimination as follows: The decision-maker is willing to
bear costs in order to choose the alternative whose characteristics are provided by
the preferred person. In formal terms, under the assumption that I = {1, 2} and
M = {1, 2}, where characteristics 1 are preferred to characteristics 2 and provider
2 is preferred to provider 1:
x1, x2 ∈ X : u(x1) > u(x2)





However, this definition is limited to a provider situation, meaning where the
provider of an alternative’s characteristics is relevant. This perspective on an inter-
action process is no longer sufficient. We have to expand it to situations where
not the provider of certain characteristics but the receiver of these characteristics
2 In section 4.3, we will discuss the sociological implications and consequences of taste-based
discrimination.
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is relevant.3 One major difference between these two situations is that while we
excluded that the decision-maker himself can be a provider, he very well can be
a receiver.
Therefore, in this chapter, we first define taste-based discrimination in a
receiver situation. Then, we examine what determines how altruistic we behave
towards others. In order to do that we introduce ingroup favouritism and social
identity theory. Next, we investigate whether ingroup favouritism stems from
ingroup love, outgroup derogation, or both. Finally, we demonstrate that not all
tastes have to stem from an ingroup-outgroup context, yet, social identity is often
still intertwined with them when we look more closely.
3.1.1 Defining Taste-Based Discrimination in a Receiver
Situation
When we introduced agent-neutrality and agent-relativity, we have already
encountered a choice set where the receiver and not the provider of certain cha-
racteristics is relevant. There, we discussed an example where a decision-maker
has a choice set X with the following three alternatives: x1 = “the decision-maker
gets $100”; x2 = “person 2 gets $100”; x3 = “person 3 gets $100”. Additionally,
we assumed that the decision-maker, person 2, and person 3 would be all equally
happy to get $100, provided that there is no further information that tells us dif-
ferently. We now want to adjust this notation so as to make it more applicable.
Instead of having three characteristics (1 = “the decision-maker gets $100”; 2
= “person 2 gets $100”; and 3 = “person 3 gets $100”), we only use one (1 =
“receiver gets $100”). The identity of the receiver who gets the $100 is indica-
ted by m (or Ma if we consider group memberships), which in this case could
be the decision-maker (DM), person 2 (P2), or person 3 (P3). Applying our new





1 }. Note that the little circle (°) marks that DM,
P2, and P3 are receivers and not providers of the alternative’s characteristics.
How do we differentiate weak and strong taste-based discrimination in a recei-
ver situation? We have to distinguish two cases. Case number one involves that
the decision-maker is not a possible receiver. In such a situation, there for exam-
ple is case of weak taste-based discrimination if the decision-maker is indifferent
between the characteristics of his alternatives but still prefers one alternative to
another. For example, I = {1, 2}, where 1 = “receiver gets a $100 note” and
3 For example, tip givers or effective altruists that we discussed in previous chapters act in a
receiver situation.
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2 = “receiver gets two $50 notes”. We presuppose that the decision-maker is
indifferent between x1 and x2 in a choice set X , where the receivers’ identity is
unspecified. Now, given further knowledge about the receivers’ identity leads to
a preference of one alternative over the other in a choice set X = {x P1◦1 , x P2
◦
2 },
there is weak taste-based discrimination.4 In formal terms:
x1, x2 ∈ X : u(x1) = u(x2)
∧x P1◦1 , x P2
◦




























We assume that strong taste-based discrimination is inexistent in a situation where
the decision-maker is not a possible receiver. The reason for this is that since the
decision-maker is not a possible receiver, he cannot bear any costs in the first
place, which is a requirement for strong taste-based discrimination.
This assumption might face the following objection: Let’s say there are two
possible receivers of $100 called Barbara and Ben. The decision-maker knows that
if Barbara gets $100, she will give him back $20. In contrast, he also knows that
Ben will keep all the money. As a consequence, if the decision-maker still decides
that Ben gets $100 due to agent-relative preferences, he would bear costs and thus
display strong taste-based discrimination. However, this is a fallacy because in
this example, the characteristics of the two alternatives are not the same. While
the characteristics of the alternative where Ben is the receiver are “receiver gets
$100”, those of the alternative where Barbara is the receiver are “receiver gets
$100 and gives decision-maker $20 back”. Therefore, if he decides to give Barbara
$100, he becomes a receiver as well which enables him to bear costs and display
strong taste-based discrimination.
Let’s continue with case number two: The decision-maker is one of the pos-
sible receivers. Here, the setup is more complicated and needs several steps. By
way of illustration, we use the same example as at the beginning of this sub-
chapter. Our choice set X consists of three alternatives that always have the
same characteristics i (I = {1}) but differ regarding the identity of the recei-





1 }. Moreover, the
characteristics 1 = “receiver gets $100”, (1 ∈ I ).
Now, as a first step, we have to clarify whether the decision-maker would
want to receive the alternative’s characteristics 1 or not in a hypothetical isolated
4 We exclude the possibility that further information might lead to statistical discrimination
or the knowledge that one receiver does actually not want to receive characteristics i .
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decision situation. An isolated decision situation implies that there is only one
possible receiver. In this way, the decision-to-be-taken can only affect the outcome
of that receiver (which is the decision-maker in our case). We do this as follows:
We add a second element to the set I . Thus, I newly consists of 1 and 2 (I =
{1, 2}). This second element of I constitutes the negation of the first one. As a
result, 2 = “receiver does not get $100”, (2 ∈ I ). From here, we build a second
choice set X that has two elements: X = {xDM◦1 , xDM
◦
2 }. A preference ordering
on this choice set X indicates whether the decision-maker would rather receive
characteristics 1 or not (and thus receive characteristics 2) given he is the only
























In a second step, we examine the preference orderings of the other receivers






do that out of the perspective of the decision-maker and thus use the decision-
maker’s assumptions about the utility function of person 2 (uP2DM ) and person 3
(uP3DM ). Moreover, we assume that the decision-maker’s assumptions about others’
utility functions are always correct and therefore uP2DM = uP2 and uP3DM = uP3,
which is why we directly use uP2 respectively uP3 in the formulations.5 Now, let’s
say that both person 2 and person 3 prefer the alternative where they themselves





















































Note that so long as there is no further information that tells us differently, we
infer from such preferences that person 2 and person 3 are equally happy to
receive characteristics 1. In turn, this implies that an agent-neutral decision-maker
has reason to give characteristics 1 to any of the two.
Building on this pre-setup, we can now define weak and strong taste-based dis-
crimination in a decision situation where the decision-maker is a possible receiver
5 If u is not further specified, it describes the decision-makers utility function (which would
be uDM ).
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and all alternatives involve the same characteristics. We start with weak taste-






choice set X, we know that he generally prefers getting $100 to not getting $100.
Next, we assume that xDM
◦
1 is also the most preferred alternative within choice
set X , which implies that the decision-maker has egoistic preferences. In this
dissertation, provided that there are no strategic reasons to do differently, such
preferences involve that their holder (a) always chooses the same alternative in
a choice set with all possible receivers as in his isolated choice set and if this is
not possible (b) least likely chooses that alternative in a choice set with all possi-
ble receivers which is lesser preferred in his isolated choice set.6 Now, given he






Accordingly, if a decision-maker is not indifferent between these two alternati-














































































































We notice that there are two ingredients of weak taste-based discrimination in a
situation where the decision-maker himself is a possible receiver: agent-relative
preferences and egoistic preferences. The former state that the decision-maker
treats receivers differently. The latter guarantee that the decision-maker is not
willing to bear costs in order to choose an alternative in the choice set with all
possible receivers that differs from the preferred one in his isolated choice set.7
6 In fact, if there are strategic reasons to do differently, the alternatives’ characteristics of
the respective receivers differ from each other (maybe only in a statistically discriminatory
sense). We will discuss such strategic reasons in section 3.2.
7 We could actually differentiate between a weak and a strong type of egoistic preferences.
Let’s say that there are two best alternatives in a decision-maker’s choice set. We call them
alternative 1 and alternative 2. While choosing alternative 1 is also favourable for the other
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This is different in case of strong taste-based discrimination. Here, the
decision-maker is willing to bear costs in order to choose the alternative whose
characteristics are received by the preferred person. As a consequence, a strong
taste-based discriminator cannot have egoistic preferences but needs to have social
preferences. Such preferences enable altruistic and/or antisocial behaviour. Fehr
(2015) defines altruistic behaviour as follows: “If a person acts in a way that is
costly for herself but provides a benefit [disbenefit] to someone else, the person’s
behavior is altruistic [antisocial]. The actor is not motivated by direct or indirect
future material benefits associated with the act, but she may still experience a
psychological benefit. She may feel better because she engaged in the altruistic
[antisocial] act, but according to this definition, that does not prevent it from being
altruistic [antisocial].” (p. 78) The definition for antisocial behaviour was added
in brackets. Yet, note that from now on, we will not always mention the antiso-
cial manifestations of social preferences as well since we mainly concentrate on
altruistic behaviour.
Let’s technically illustrate this definition. We shrink the above example where
a decision-maker has to decide who of three people gets $100 to a two-person
setup. We again call these two receivers “DM” for decision-maker and “P2” for
person 2. So, I = {1, 2}, where 1 = “receiver gets $100” and 2 = “receiver does
not get $100”, M = {DM◦ , P2◦ }, the actual choice set X = {xDM◦1 , x P2
◦
1 }, and
the hypothetical isolated choice set X = {xDM◦1 , xDM
◦
2 }. Furthermore, we make
the following two assumptions: (1) In the isolated decision situation, the decision-
maker prefers getting $100 to not getting $100. (2) If the decision regarding
choice set X were up to person 2, he would prefer that person 2 (he himself) gets
$100 to the other alternative. In such a situation, the decision-maker has altrui-



















persons involved in the decision situation, choosing alternative 2 is not. Now, in case of strong
egoistic preferences, the decision-maker is indifferent between alternative 1 and alternative
2. Therefore, someone with strong egoistic preferences only cares about himself. In contrast,
in case of weak egoistic preferences, the decision-maker prefers alternative 1 to alternative
2 (altruistic manifestation) or vice versa (antisocial manifestation). Therefore, someone with
weak egoistic preferences first cares about himself and then, if possible, also considers others.
Yet, this differentiation of egoistic preferences is not of importance for this dissertation, which
is why we do not use it.
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∧xDM◦1 , x P2
◦












∧xDM◦1 , x P2
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This means that the decision-maker basically prefers getting $100 to not getting
$100. However, if getting $100 implies that person 2, who wants to get $100, does
not get $100, the decision-maker rather relinquishes the $100 and gives them to
person 2 or is indifferent between those two alternatives. To put it differently, the
decision-maker acts in a way that is costly for himself but provides a benefit to
someone else which precisely is Fehr’s definition of altruistic behaviour.8
Now, let’s get to strong taste-based discrimination. We use the same setup
as above, add a third receiver (M = {DM◦ , P2◦ , P3◦ }), and assume that the
decision-maker prefers P2 to P3. There is strong taste-based discrimination in
such a situation if the following requirements are fulfilled: (1) In a hypothetical
isolated choice set X, the decision-maker prefers characteristics 1 to characteri-
stics 2. (2) If the decision regarding choice set X were up to person 2, he would
prefer that person 2 (he himself) gets characteristics 1 to the other alternatives.
The same applies to person 3. (3a) The decision-maker prefers the alternative
where P2 is the receiver of characteristic 1 to the alternative where he himself
is the receiver of characteristic 1 or is indifferent between these two alternati-
ves. Moreover, the decision-maker prefers the alternative where he himself is the
receiver of characteristics 1 to the alternative where P3 is the receiver of charac-
teristics 1. As a result, the decision-maker prefers P2 to P3 and is only willing
to bear costs in order to choose the alternative whose characteristics are received
by P2. (3b) The decision-maker prefers the alternative where P2 is the receiver
of characteristic 1 to the alternative where he himself is the receiver of charac-
teristic 1. Moreover, the decision-maker prefers the alternative where he himself
8 In other words, the decision-maker not only considers his isolated choice set but also how
the other person would decide in the actual choice set and then, so as to attain a better outcome
for the other person, chooses an alternative which deviates from his preferences regarding
the isolated choice set. Now, it is possible that the alternative that the other person prefers
in the actual choice set also depends on which alternative the decision-maker prefers in the
actual choice set. In such a case, both the decision-maker and the other person depend their
preferences regarding the actual choice set on the other’s preferences regarding the actual
choice set. So, the decision-maker needs to know the other person’s preferences so as to
form his preferences. But then again, the other person needs to know the decision-maker’s
preferences so as to form his preferences. This could go back and forth endlessly where no
one ever attains a preference ordering concerning the actual choice set. In this dissertation,
we exclude such cases.
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is the receiver of characteristics 1 to the alternative where P3 is the receiver of
characteristics 1 or is indifferent between these two alternatives. As a result, the
decision-maker prefers P2 to P3 and is either only willing or more willing to
bear costs in order to choose the alternative whose characteristics are received
by P2. (3c) The decision-maker prefers the alternative where P2 or P3 is the
receiver of characteristic 1 to the alternative where he himself is the receiver of
characteristic 1. Moreover, the decision-maker prefers the alternative where P2
is the receiver of characteristics 1 to the alternative where P3 is the receiver of
characteristics 1. As a result, the decision-maker prefers P2 to P3 and is more
willing to bear costs in order to choose the alternative whose characteristics are




































































































































As we see, strong taste-based discrimination in a receiver situation is a combina-
tion of agent-relativity and altruistic (and/or antisocial) preferences.9
After these technical definitions, let’s discuss a study of Batson et al. (1981)
that beautifully reveals strong taste-based discrimination. As part of an experi-
ment, a student called Elaine had to perform a memory task. While she was
doing so, participants had to observe her via a video control.10 It was said that
the study is about the effect of aversive conditions on performance. This is why
during the test Elaine got random electric shocks. These shocks certainly were
uncomfortable but not dangerous. The experimenters told participants that Elaine
does not know who is observing her and that they would not meet her in person.
9 In contrast, in a provider situation agent-relativity can be sufficient for strong taste-based
discrimination, meaning that strong taste-based discriminators with egoistic preferences are
possible in a provider situation.
10 All participants were female. Thus, the generalisability of the experiment is limited.
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However, they concealed that the video control is actually a videotape and that
Elaine is an actress who only acted like getting electric shocks.
Two further details about the experimental setup: (1) Participants were told
that it was up to Elaine how many trials she wants to perform, with a minimum
of two and a maximum of ten. Yet, regardless of how many trials Elaine does,
every participant only had to observe two trials of her.11 During the experiment,
they learned that she agreed to do all ten trials. (2) Before the experiment began,
subjects were split into two groups. One group was told that Elaine shared values
and interests that were compatible with those they had stated in a previous ques-
tionnaire. The other group was told that Elaine shared values and interests that
were incompatible with those they had stated in a previous questionnaire.
Now, as the experiment started, it was highly discernible that the electric
shocks are very unpleasant to Elaine. Because of her strong reactions the expe-
rimenter interrupted after the second trial and got Elaine a glass of water. While
she was gone, the observer had to complete a brief questionnaire regarding her
impression on Elaine and whether seeing her suffering causes distress and/or con-
cern. Then, the experimenter returned and Elaine explained why she responded so
strongly to the shocks: As a child, she had a horse accident, where she fell onto
an electric fence. This traumatic experience made her overly sensitive to electric
shocks. The experimenter proposed to Elaine that she could quit the experiment.
However, Elaine declined because she knew that the experiment was of great
importance. Next, the experimenter hit upon another idea: The observer could
continue for her. Being both relieved and reluctant, Elaine approved to check this
option. Half a minute later, another experimenter stepped into the room of the
observer and asked her if she is willing to take over for Elaine. In case of yes,
she would have to complete the remaining eight sessions. In case of no, she only
had to answer some questions about her impression on Elaine. After that she
could leave. Of course, the experimenter stressed that there was no obligation to
step in for Elaine. After the participant made her choice she again had to fill in
some questionnaires (and did not get any electric shocks).
If we extract the choice sets given in this experiment and think about pos-
sible preference orderings on these choice sets, we attain the following setup.
The decision-maker has two alternatives: Either she herself gets electro shocks
or Elaine gets electro shocks. Moreover, there are two versions of Elaine: a
likeable Elaine (E+) and an unlikable Elaine (E−). So, the alternatives have the
11 In fact, there were two groups of participants: the “easy escapers” and the “difficult esca-
pers”. In contrast to the easy escapers, who had to watch only two trials, the difficult escapers
had to watch all sessions. However, for our purpose, it is sufficient to only consider the easy
escapers, which is why we ignore the difficult escapers.
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same characteristics 1 (1 ∈ I ), where 1 = “receiver gets the remaining electro
shocks”, but different receivers (M = {DM◦ , E◦+, E◦−}), leading to the choice set














2 , where 2 = “receiver does not get the remaining
electro shocks”, the decision-maker prefers the latter. Moreover, if the decision
regarding choice set X were up to the likeable or unlikable Elaine, she would
prefer that the decision-maker gets the remaining electro shocks. And although
this is solely hypothetical, we further assume that the two versions of Elaine













































































Let’s get to the results so as to see the decision-makers preferences on getting
electric shocks herself or giving them to Elaine.
Provided that participants had agent-neutral preferences, personal characteri-
stics of Elaine should not have influenced their behaviour. So, let us compare the
two conditions. In the dissimilar one, where Elaine’s values and interests were
incompatible with those of participants, 18% took over for Elaine. In contrast,
in the similar condition, 91% stepped in for her. This leads to two observations.
First, in both conditions there were people who helped Elaine and thus behaved
altruistically. Second, the degree of similarity between the decision-maker and
the person in need was of utter importance for whether the latter received help
or not, which implies agent-relative preferences. The combination of these two
observations leads to strong taste-based discrimination. Thus, most participants

































It might be objected that participants have always exclusively made one decision,
meaning they either had the likeable or unlikeable Elaine as a second possible
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receiver and not both. Thus, there is no point of reference so as to assess whether
their preferences truly are agent-relative. However, participants were randomly
allocated to a condition. Therefore, the condition specific subsamples should be
comparable and due to that serve as a reference point.
These outcomes are not very surprising anyway. We know from daily experi-
ences that we do not treat everyone equally and thus that our preferences are not
agent-neutral. For example, closeness to a person normally enhances the willing-
ness to help. If a good friend asks you to assist him moving, you do so. But if a far
relative communicates his moving date, you might pretend to be out of town that
day. The same tendency is also observable in life-and-death issues. Even though
there are people who donate one of their kidneys to a stranger, they represent
less than 2% of all live donations. Mostly, a family member is the donor (Bern-
stein, 2017). Yet, we also differentiate between people that are equally unfamiliar
to us. The lost-letter-technique provides a great method to show that. Milgram
et al. (1965) placed letters in a city so it seemed as if someone had lost them.
The authors examined how many letters were posted and whether the posting-
rate depended on the address on the letter.12 They used four different addresses:
medical research associates, personal letter, friends of the Communist Party, and
friends of the Nazi Party. Roughly three-fourths of the medical research associates
and the personal letters returned. As opposed to this, only one out of four letters
with friends of the Communist Party or the Nazi Party as the addresses came
back. Thus, finders obviously made their behaviour conditional on the receiver.
And this is not only true in case of political ideology but many other characteri-
stics such as nationality or whether the receiver has a doctor’s degree (Hellmann
et al., 2015).13
Of course, the crucial question is why we prefer certain people to others
and are mainly altruistic to these people (and even antisocial to the others). The
concepts of ingroup favouritism and social identity theory shed light on it.
3.1.2 Ingroup Favouritism and Social Identity Theory
When we talk about groups, there are always two meta-categories that emerge
(Turner et al., 1987). Either we ourselves (saliently) belong to the group as well,
12 Of course, in actual fact the address on the letters was always the one of their labs. They
only changed to whom (name or organisation) the letter was directed.
13 In section 3.2 we will discuss whether such behaviour truly involves taste-based discrimi-
nation or whether it actually is a form of statistical discrimination.
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which defines our ingroup, or we do not belong to it, which constitutes our out-
group(s). This categorisation of others into ingroup and outgroup members highly
affects preferences. There is vast evidence that people prefer their ingroup to their
outgroups, leading to ingroup favouritism (see Balliet et al. (2014) for a meta-
study). Therefore, in a provider situation, people often have preferences like the
following one. Note that we denote the ingroup by Min and the outgroup by
Mout , A = {Min,Mout }, and assume that {m ∈ Min ∪ Mout } = M .








In a receiver situation, we often have the following strong taste-based discrimina-
tory preferences, where, for example, we can allocate money to different receivers.
Note that I = {1, 2}, where 1 = “receiver gets money” and 2 = “receiver does
not get money”. Additionally, although the decision-maker actually belongs to
the ingroup as well, we exclude him from the ingroup and list him separately as















































































































































































We already find such preferences in case of young children. A study conducted
by Fehr et al. (2008) revealed that 3–7-year-old children display more altruistic
behaviour towards ingroup members than outgroup members in various economic
games.15 Moreover, Jordan et al. (2014) let 6–8-year old children play a third-
party punishment dictator game. This game proceeds like a normal dictator game
except that the distribution is observed by a third person, who is equipped with
14 Although this is hypothetical, we suppose that the ingroup weakly prefers the alterna-
tive where the decision-maker receives characteristics 1 to that where the outgroup receives
characteristics 1.
15 Appendix A which can be found in the electronic supplementary material introduces three
common economic games that are employed in many of studies that we discuss in this and
the following chapters; the dictator game, the ultimatum game, and the public goods game.
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money as well. After the allocation, this person gets the chance to punish the
dictator. Yet, punishment is costly.
Before we get to the results, we formalise the decision-situation because it
differs from a situation where someone allocates money or electro shocks. Let’s
say that the decision-maker (DM) has to pay $10 so as to take $10 away from
the dictator’s (DI ) endowment and in this way punish him. So, within a hypothe-
tical isolated choice set X, the decision-maker simply has two alternatives: lose
$10 (xDM
◦
1 ) or do not lose $10 (x
DM
◦
2 ). Yet, within the actual choice X , both
the decision-maker and the dictator either lose or do not lose $10, depending on














1 is a punishment for him. Moreo-





1 . Yet, in a situation where receivers’ outcomes are dependent, he might rat-
her lose $10 in order that the dictator loses $10 too than do not lose $10 but the




































































If this is the case, the decision-maker displays antisocial behaviour because he is
willing to bear costs so as to provide a disbenefit to the dictator.16 But whether the
decision-maker truly behaves that way might depend on the group membership
of the dictator, how fairly he behaved, and the group membership of the second
player.
After this little parenthesis, let us continue with the results. Jordan et al. (2014)
find that 6-year-old children punished selfishness more harshly when it negatively
affected an ingroup member and when it came from an outgroup member. Mean-
while, 8-year old children did also punish egoistic outgroup dictators more harshly
than egoistic ingroup dictators. But they did not differentiate between disadvan-
taged ingroup recipients and outgroup recipients. However, it would be wrong to
16 It could also be argued that this is actually prosocial behaviour because he punishes the
unfair behaviour of someone else.
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declare this change in behaviour from 6-year-old to 8-year-old children as univer-
sal. Bernhard et al. (2006) played the third-party punishment dictator game with
two native groups of Papua New Guinea. They found the exact opposite of what
Jordan et al. did in case of 8-year old children. On one hand, the third person
punished selfishness less severely if the disadvantaged recipient was not in his
group. On the other hand, punishers were indifferent to the group affiliation of
the dictator. They punished dictators of each group equally harshly even though
dictators expected that given the third person is in their group he punishes more
leniently. So, there seems not to be a clear pattern for how people behave in third-
party punishment dictator games. Nevertheless, ingroup favouritism is detectable
in all three cases.
As previously mentioned, we are part of countless groups. From ethnic back-
ground to gender to profession to nationality to religion, our ingroup can be
composed in various ways. In the experiment of Fehr et al. (2008) presented
above, the children’s ingroup was defined as being from the same playschool,
kindergarten, or school. Consequently, participants that came from another play-
school, kindergarten, or school formed the outgroup. Jordan et al. (2014) induced
artificial groups as part of their experiment. The children were randomly assigned
to either the “blue” or “yellow” team, which in turn constituted their ingroup and,
in this way, also their outgroup. In the experiment of Bernhard et al. (2006), the
indigenous tribes Wolimbka and Ngenika constituted the ingroup-outgroup con-
text. Thus, all three experiments seem to have had clear group boundaries. But
why did the children not perceive all participants as part of their ingroup? Why
did the Wolimbka and Ngenika members form their ingroup and outgroup based
on their tribes and not more generally on being from Papua New Guinea, which
would have included both tribes? In other words, what does ultimately define
which of our many group memberships is currently salient and thereby deter-
mines our perceived ingroup and the respective outgroups? And to put this into
technical terms, what defines a decision-maker’s set A?17
The self-categorisation theory of Turner et al. (1987) provides an answer for
that question. The theory says that self-categorisation can take place on different
levels of abstraction, where a priori no level is more valid than another one. These
levels can be narrowly defined such as me myself, a bit more general such as me a
Swiss German or very broad such as me a human being. Which specific level and
17 For repetition, A is a subset of  with the requirement that the elements of A are disjoint
and their union leads to M . In turn,  is the power set of M and M is the set of all individuals
involved in a decision situation. So, A could have various manifestations as soon as M has
more than one element. Yet, in a decision situation only one manifestation can be salient.
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thereby group applies in a given situation depends on three components (Haslam
et al., 2010).
(1) The comparative fit refers to the meta-contrast principle whose underlying
assumption is as follows: Perceived stimuli are categorised in such a way that
the differences between stimuli within a category are minimal whereas those bet-
ween categories are maximal. The meta-contrast principle is then defined by the
ratio of the averagely perceived differences between categories and the averagely
perceived differences within a category.
Meta-contrast principle: = ∅ perceived difference between categories
∅ perceived different within a category
The higher this ratio the more likely categorisation occurs along these categories.
Moreover, if the ratio is smaller than one, there is no categorisation along these
categories since there are bigger differences within than between categories. The
meta-contrast principle can be illustrated through the following example: A Swiss
is more likely to define himself as Swiss if he is interacting with a German than
if he is interacting with another Swiss (Haslam et al., 2010).
(2) The normative fit implies that self-categorisation does not only need a
meta-contrast ratio greater than one but also correspondence between the person’s
expectations of a category and its meta-contrast (ebd.). For example, a study con-
ducted by Oakes et al. (1991) reveals that science students are more likely to be
categorised as science students (and not simply students) if art and science stu-
dents are perceived as holding different views about the value of science and these
different views were compatible with stereotypic beliefs about the two groups.
(3) Ultimately, comparative fit and normative fit interact with perceiver rea-
diness, also called accessibility. This means that a person does never execute
a categorisation detached from all biographical background. He always does so
in context of his beliefs, expectations, and motivations. In turn, these beliefs,
expectations, and motivations are influenced by already existing salient group
affiliations (Haslam et al., 2010).
We see that perceived similarity within a group and dissimilarity between
groups is crucial for categorisation. These similarities and dissimilarities have
to be compatible with our expectations of the categories. Consequently, it is not
the objectively existing but subjectively perceived similarity between people that
determines social categorisation. In turn, our subjective perception of similarity
depends on prior and momentary expectations, beliefs, and motivations.
Although it is unclear whether group thinking played any role in the Elaine
experiment of Batson et al. (1981) presented before, the results could at least
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be explained by use of it. Subjects that were told that Elaine has similar views
and interests as themselves often displayed altruistic behaviour towards her. The
reason might be that in this case they perceived Elaine as “one of us”. So, Elaine
benefited from ingroup directed altruism. However, when participants were told
that Elaine has different views and interest she was perceived as “one of them”
and as a result received help less frequently.
There are other experiments that reveal that a cue of similarity or relatedness
can bolster altruism. For example, Krupp et al. (2008) let participants play a
one-shot public goods game. While playing, subjects saw a photo of the face
of the other players. These faces were either strangers or computer manipulated
faces that resembled the participant.18 The results show that the more the faces
of players in the group resembled the participant the more he contributed in the
public goods game.
Pavey et al. (2011) manipulated subject’s level of relatedness, competence,
or autonomy by use of different primes. (a) Participants had to solve a sen-
tence unscrambling task, which in the relatedness condition contained words
such as community, together, connected, or relationship. Additionally, they had
to do a word completion task, where in the relatedness condition the words to be
completed were connect, relate, and share. (b) Participants had to answer eight
yes-or-no-questions. Given they answered with yes, they were asked to provide
a short example. For instance, in the relatedness condition one of the questions
was: “Have you ever felt a strong bond with someone you spend time with?” The
results show that the relatedness-priming through the sentence unscrambling task
and the word completion task led to higher interest in volunteering and intentions
to volunteer relative to the other conditions. Moreover, relatedness manipulation
participants also donated significantly more money to charity than did participants
that were given a neutral task.19 Lastly, writing about relatedness experiences
amplified feelings of connectedness to others, which in turn led to greater proso-
cial intentions. So, the authors infer that highlighting relatedness seems to increase
altruistic behaviour (or at least altruistic behavioural intentions). This is all in line
with self-categorisation theory and ingroup favouritism. As the similarity between
us and “the others” is highlighted we rather categorise them as part of our ingroup
and thereby act more prosocially towards them.
18 In the experiment, the computer manipulated faces that resemble the participant should
serve as a cue for kinship. Why kinship is important for altruistic behaviour will be discussed
in section 3.3.1.
19 In the experiment that led to this result, the authors implemented a relatedness-priming and
a neutral task but no autonomy-priming and competence-priming.
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A study by Levine et al. (2005) beautifully demonstrates how our momenta-
rily salient ingroup can be manipulated. The authors conducted a study where
subjects were self-identified supporters of the Manchester United Football Club.
There were two experiments: One primed subjects to highly identify with their
soccer club, the other with soccer in general. Regarding the procedure, the pri-
ming was induced at the beginning of the experiment by means of a questionnaire
with open questions (e.g. “Why do you support Manchester United?” (Manchester
United prime) or “When did you first become interested in soccer?” (general soc-
cer prime)). Then, participants had to go to another room and as a consequence
walk over the campus. There, a confederate run past, fell, and held his ankle while
screaming out of pain. The question of interest was whether the subject helps the
runner or not. Both experiments had three conditions: (1) The jogger wore a plain
shirt. (2) The jogger wore a Manchester United shirt. (3) The jogger wore a shirt
of the FC Liverpool, Manchester United’s rivalry team. The results confirmed the
hypotheses of the authors. One on hand, given participants were primed for Man-
chester United, 12 out of 13 helped the confederate in condition one but only 3
out of 10 in condition three. The latter is comparable to condition two where 4
out of 12 helped. On the other hand, if subjects were primed for soccer in general,
8 out of 10 helped the runner in condition one and 7 out of 10 in condition three.
Both rates are substantially higher than in the second condition where solely 2
out of 9 helped. Consequently, something as small as a few open questions can
decide whether you see the similarity between you and someone else (he is also
a soccer fan) or the dissimilarity (he is a Liverpool fan). In turn, this evaluation
strongly affects whether that other person receives our help or not.
So, up until now we know that people behave more altruistically towards fellow
ingroup members than outgroup members and that comparative fit, normative fit,
and perceiver readiness define our ingroup. Yet, why do we actually act more
prosocially if it concerns someone from our ingroup compared to someone from
our outgroup? The key concept to explain this question is social identity (Tajfel,
1970, 1974, 1982). Social identity is “that part of an individual’s self concept
which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups)
together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership”
(Tajfel, 1974, p. 69). As we categorise the social world into ingroup and outgroup
we automatically derive our social identity from the identified ingroup.
Social identity theorists have proposed two hypotheses for ingroup favouritism
(Kite & Whitley, 2016). The first one is called the categorisation-competition
hypothesis. It implies that categorisation itself leads to intergroup competition.
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This is partly due to social biases.20 For example, we perceive the outgroup as
more homogenous, are more likely to attribute their achievements to chance and
failures to their abilities, and given they are the minority overestimate their display
of negative behaviour. Additionally, some cultures such as the Northern American
one convey that relations between groups are naturally competitive. You should
not trust the others because they try to get our resources (Insko & Schopler,
1987). Because of that, mere categorisation already rises feelings of competition
and the desire to win. It is either us or them. Understandably, in such a situation
you prefer us to them and as a result favour your own group so as to defend its
(and your) interests.
The second hypothesis is called the self-esteem hypothesis. It contains the
idea that we favour our ingroup because ultimately this increases our self-esteem.
Social identity theory of Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986) explains why this should
be the case. Its first postulate is that people are motivated to uphold a positive self-
identity. Second, our social identity is a part of our self-identity. Thus, the more
positive our social identity is, the more positive our self-identity is. Third, through
comparing our group status with the statuses of other groups we can evaluate how
positive our social identity and thereby self-identity is. Now, if this comparison
does not turn out advantageously, individuals can apply three main strategies. In
case that group boundaries are permeable and/or our identification with the group
is low, we escape, avoid, or deny belonging to the low-status group. This is called
social mobility. Given group boundaries are not permeable and/or we identify
strongly with that group, there are two different strategies, depending on whether
the status hierarchy is stable or not. If it is stable, we can try to redefine the for the
intergroup comparison relevant characteristics. This strategy has the name social
creativity.21 If the status hierarchy is not stable, we can take action in order to
change the standing of our group. This is called social competition and leads to
ingroup favouritism because the more cohesion and cooperation a group displays
the more likely it socially outcompetes others (Tajfel, 1982).22
20 We will discuss such social biases in section 4.1.2.
21 Let us exemplify the strategy of social creativity. A soccer team has lost a game, which,
as a consequence, leads to a less positive social identity. Now, the players might say to
themselves that they indeed scored only one goal whereas the opponent scored two but that
their scored goal was more spectacular or that they have won more titles overall. By doing so,
the relevant characteristic for intergroup comparison is no longer who has won the match but
who has scored the more spectacular goal or has won more titles. In both cases the intergroup
comparison turns out more advantageously.
22 In fact, social competition is not only a strategy of the low-status group to gain more status
but also of the high-status group to maintain its status. Because as the low status group starts
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One of the main social psychological findings that social identity theory aimed
to explain was the so-called minimal group paradigm. It was inspired by a classic
in social psychology. In the late 1950 s, early 1960 s, Sherif et al. (1961) con-
ducted a number of field experiments that became to be known as the “Robbers
Cave Experiment”. In a summer camp, Sherif randomly assigned 22 boys into
two teams. The teams did not know about each other’s existence and were isola-
ted for five days so as to form a group spirit. Then, the two teams had to compete
in games where the winner was awarded with valued prizes. This led to mas-
sive hostility which interventions such intergroup contact (eating together) could
not diminish. Not until the experimenters created scenarios with superordinate
goals and thereby a positive interdependency between the groups, they started to
cooperate. In the end, group boundaries almost disappeared entirely.
Now, five days of group binding activities seem to lead to strong ingroup
favouritism. Tajfel (1970) wanted to know how much these group binding activi-
ties can be reduced that they still produce ingroup favouritism. In order to find
that out he conducted a minimal group experiment. There are six requirements
for a minimal group: (1) no face-to-face interaction; (2) complete anonymity of
group membership; (3) no rational or instrumental link between the categorisa-
tion of the groups and the nature of the responses requested from the subjects;
(4) all choosers should have the same choices regarding material payoffs; (5)
competition between group motivation and some other motivation; and (6) the
decision should be made as important as possible to the participant. For example,
in Tajfel’s experiment, participants were assigned to one of two groups based on
whether they preferred a painting of Kandinsky or Klee.23 Astonishingly, even in
these most minimal conditions categorisation affected individual behaviour and
led to ingroup favouritism. In fact, participants did not choose the allocations that
would simply maximise their ingroup outcome but the allocations that maximi-
sed the difference between groups. This phenomenon came to be known as the
minimal group paradigm.
How does social identity theory explain these findings? Participants’ social
identity is derived from the minimal group because the group-distributional choi-
ces make it salient. In such a situation, the Kandinsky or Klee lovers build the
outgroup with which subjects compare themselves. Here, the only way to achieve
to compete with the high-status group the latter has (or wants) to defend its position, which
produces ingroup favouritism.
23 The groups were actually randomly set up in order to exclude that Kandinsky lovers and
Klee lovers might have substantially different preferences and as a result the groups are not
comparable.
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a positive intergroup evaluation is through applying the social competition stra-
tegy. In this distributional competition, not the absolute payoff but the relative
payoff is decisive, which is why subjects choose maximum group difference over
maximum ingroup profit (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).24
To summarise, the categorisation of the social world into ingroup and outgroup
is reflected in our preferences. We are more altruistic within and concerned about
our ingroup than outgroup, which is called ingroup favouritism. However, the
ingroup is not at a static but both a dynamic and variable construct. According to
the self-categorisation theory of Turner et al. (1987), comparative fit, normative
fit, and perceiver readiness define our currently salient ingroup. These factors are
situation-dependent. The salient ingroup yields our social identity. In turn, social
identity is part of self-identity that we strive to perceive positively. Thus, we also
strive to possess a positive social identity and have three strategies to achieve (or
maintain) it: social mobility, social creativity, and social competition. The latter
leads to ingroup favouritism. This human predisposition seems to be deeply rooted
because it can even be observed in the most arbitrarily formed anonymous groups
whose members neither had intragroup nor intergroup contact.
3.1.3 Ingroup Love or Outgroup Derogation?
The minimal group paradigm has been replicated several times in various kinds of
economic games such as the prisoner dilemma (Ahmed, 2007), the dictator game
(Chen & Li, 2009), or the public goods game (Kramer and Brewer, 1984; Brewer
and Kramer, 1986). Moreover, at the beginning of the last chapter we discussed
the experiment of Jordan et al. (2014). Here, by randomly and anonymously assi-
gning children to either the “blue” or “yellow” team, the experimenters also set
up a minimal group experiment. So, there is ample evidence for the phenomenon.
However, the minimal group paradigm as described so far might lead to a wrong
conclusion. Tajfel’s experiment seems to imply that people not only favour their
ingroup but also disfavour their outgroup. Otherwise the participants would not
have chosen the maximum group difference option but the maximum ingroup pro-
fit option. Yet, these minimal group experiments are often designed as zero-sum
games, meaning the ingroup’s win is the outgroup’s loss and vice versa. So, by
24 Not all social psychologists approve this explanation of the minimal group paradigm. The
most prominent other explanation is given by the bounded generalised reciprocity model
(Yamagishi et al., 1999; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008). We will discuss it in section 3.2.2.
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expressing ingroup favouritism you also automatically express outgroup hostility
even if you are actually neutral towards the outgroup.
Why is this differentiation relevant for taste-based discrimination in the first
place? It tells us how our tastes for groups actually look like. We said that strong
taste-based discrimination is always constructed through a combination of agent-
relativity and a certain type of social preferences. The last chapter has revealed
that the ingroup and outgroup are the dominant dividing line regarding agent-
relativity and thus that social identity influences taste-based discrimination. Now,
in this chapter, we examine the second ingredient of taste-based discrimination,
namely social preferences. In so doing, we ask whether it is primarily altruistic
behaviour towards the ingroup (ingroup love), antisocial behaviour towards the
outgroup (outgroup derogation), or both that give(s) rise to ingroup favouritism.
We start with ingroup love.
Ingroup love involves the idea that people have a stronger desire to help
ingroup members compared to the outgroup members because they care more
about the well-being of ingroup than outgroup members (Everett et al., 2015). In
other words, they gain more utility if they help ingroup compared to outgroup
members. We can formulate this in four steps: (1) The decision-maker knows that
both ingroup and outgroup members prefer characteristics 1 to characteristics 2.
(2) He gains more utility if Min receives 1 compared to if Min receives 2. (3) He
gains more or equivalent utility if Mout receives 1 compared to if Mout receives









































































































As a consequence, if the decision-maker also has altruistic preferences, he gains
more utility if he acts in a way that is costly for himself but provides a benefit
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to Min compared to if he acts in a way that is costly for himself but provides a
benefit to Mout .
An explanation for such preferences provides a phenomenon that Brewer
(1999) calls depersonalisation. It implies that through categorisation of and iden-
tification with the ingroup the individual partly loses his own identity and adopts
the identity of the group.25 Through that process, his interests adjust themselves
to the group’s interests and thereby helping himself becomes equivalent to helping
the group. Kramer and Brewer (1984) describe the effects of social identification
as follows: “[Actors] attach greater weight to collective outcomes than they do
to individual outcomes alone. Inclusion within a common social boundary redu-
ces social distance among group members, making it less likely that individuals
will make sharp distinctions between their own and others’ welfare.” (p. 1045) A
minimal group experiment by Simpson (2006) where participants were exposed
to a prisoner’s dilemma confirms this view. The results reveal that not alterations
in how participants expected their fellow ingroup members to act were responsi-
ble for ingroup favouritism but how they weighted the payoffs of fellow ingroup
members.
Given group identification really leads to depersonalisation which in turn leads
to ingroup favouritism, the more someone identifies with his group the more he
should put the group’s well-being before his own.26 A study conducted by de
Cremer (2002) shows exactly that. In order to manipulate group identification,
he let participants fill out a small personality test that categorised them as either
Type O or Type P personality. The Type P personality was positively connoted
and described as caring, honest, consistent, confident, and more socially skil-
led. In comparison, the Type O personality was less positively connoted so as to
make it desirable to be a Type P personality. Half of the participants were told
that their responses placed them just inside the Type P category. The other half
was told that their answers were clear examples of a Type P personality. While
the former should lead to low group identification the latter should induce high
group identification.27 Then, participants had to play a public goods game were
all other players were said to be Type P personalities. Here, the high identifiers
were generally more cooperative than the low identifiers. De Cremer infers that
“[c]ore group members [the high identifiers] … seem to have incorporated the
25 It says partly here because we know from optimal distinctiveness theory of Brewer (2012)
that people normally seek both inclusion and differentiation within the ingroup.
26 More precisely, the group’s well-being becomes his own well-being. Thus, the two are
actually no longer separable.
27 There was also a manipulation check that asked how typical of their group participants
perceived themselves to be and to what extent they felt they belonged to this group.
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group as an important aspect of one’s self” (p. 1339). Therefore, group identifi-
cation appears to have led to depersonalisation, which in turn generated ingroup
directed altruism.
Van Vugt and Hart (2004) confirm this argument. They used a public goods
game in order to examine cooperative behaviour. Group identification was mani-
pulated as follows: Half of the participants were told that the study examines how
well students from different universities would perform individually in the game.
The other half was told that it investigates how well groups of students from dif-
ferent universities would perform in the game.28 The authors find that the more
participants identified with their public goods game group, the more altruistically
they behaved in the game. Additionally, high identifiers also made less use of an
attractive exit option that would have increased their personal outcome. Van Vugt
and Hart conclude that high identifiers’ group loyalty emerged due to an extre-
mely positive impression of their group affiliation and thus, social identity seems
to have acted as a social glue.
Let’s continue with the empathy-altruism hypothesis of Batson (2015).29 It
says that empathy (more precisely empathic concern) leads to other-oriented moti-
vation and thereby altruism. Thus, altruistic behaviour could be explained by
empathy-based social preferences, where the awareness of another person’s need
arouses empathy, which in turn raises altruistic motivation (Everett et al., 2015).
For example, a study conducted by Rumble et al. (2010) demonstrates that empa-
thy is able to sustain cooperation in a public goods game. The reason for this is
that empathy reduces “the detrimental effects of ‘negative noise,’ or unintended
incidents of non-cooperation”. (p. 856) Moreover, participants that were induced
to feel empathy in a prisoner’s dilemma behaved more cooperatively than a control
group (Batson & Moran, 1999). This is even true when subjects knew that their
co-player had already made a competitive choice (Batson & Ahmad, 2001). Con-
sequently, empathy seems to be an important part of social preferences. However,
regarding agent-relativity, the question of course is whether we feel the same
amount of empathy for every person in a needy situation.
28 The design of the study is a bit problematic because it might have led to desirability.
Participantswhowere told that the study examines individual (group) performancemight have
behaved more egoistically (altruistically) to approve the authors’ hypothesis that participants
anticipated.
29 In this dissertation, we understand empathy as “an affective reaction caused by, and congru-
ent with, another person’s inferred or forecasted emotions: that is, feeling good in response to
someone experiencing a positive event (e.g., when Emile wins an award), and feeling bad in
response to someone experiencing a negative event (e.g., when Rebecca’s paper is rejected)”
(Cikara et al., 2014, p. 111).
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Apparently, the answer is no. According to Cikara et al. (2014), humans have
a predisposition called the intergroup empathy bias. It implies that we tend to
empathise more with ingroup than with outgroup members. Several neuroscien-
tific studies have found that people display more neural activation in pain and
empathy circuits (especially the insula) given they observe an ingroup compa-
red to an outgroup member being in pain (Cheon et al., 2011; Chiao & Mathur,
2010; Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010, 2012; Xu et al., 2009). Thus, these findings are
compatible with the idea that through identifying with a group, other ingroup
members’ interests become our interests as well (at least to a certain degree). In
turn, having these neural activations serves as a predictor for ingroup favouritism
on a behavioural level (Mathur et al., 2010). A study by Hein et al. (2010) nicely
demonstrates this. The authors took soccer fans so as to induce an ingroup and an
outgroup. Subjects either witnessed a fan of their favourite team (ingroup) or their
rival team (outgroup) suffering pain. Then, they could choose whether or not they
wanted to relieve the person in pain through enduring physical pain themselves.
Regarding the ingroup, helping behaviour was forecasted best by anterior insula
activity and self-reports of empathic concern. This suggests that participants were
empathising with the fellow ingroup member in need and thus helped. Contrary
to that, if an outgroup member was suffering pain, non-helping behaviour was
predicted best by nucleus accumbens (NAcc) activity and how negative the out-
group member was evaluated.30 To conclude, “empathy-related insula activation
can motivate costly helping, whereas an antagonistic signal in nucleus accumbens
reduces the propensity to help.” (p. 149) As we have seen, the activation of these
two brain areas depends on the group membership of the person in need.
To summarise the connection between social preferences and ingroup love,
group identification leads to depersonalisation, meaning that we adjust our inte-
rests to the groups’ interests. Because of that our utility is (partly) derived from
our fellow ingroup members’ (and not outgroup members’) utility which inevita-
bly leads to ingroup favouritism. Empathy seems to be an important mediator of
this whole process.
Let us continue with how outgroup derogation affects social preferences.31
Here, it is not the pleasure of the ingroup but the displeasure of the outgroup
that provides individuals utility. At the beginning of section 3.1.2, we discussed
30 In fact, brain signals predicted helping behaviour more accurately than what people said
(Singer, 2015).
31 Sometimes, outgroup derogation is also called outgroup hate. The terms can be used
interchangeably.
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that, in a third-party punishment dictator game, participants punish other (espe-
cially selfish) players even if punishment is costly and has no strategic value
(Bernhard et al., 2006; Jordan et al., 2014). Moreover, Anderson and Putterman
(2006) reveal that the level of punishment depends on how expensive punishing
is and how egoistically the person to be punished behaved. This suggest that the
act of punishment and thereby retaliation gives utility to the punisher. Otherwise
it is unclear why someone would pay for it.
If in certain situations the disutility of others increases our utility, an explana-
tion for ingroup favouritism is that people gain more utility by the disutility of
outgroup members than by the disutility of ingroup members. We can formulate
this in four steps and exclude the possibility of ingroup love32: (1) The decision-
maker knows that both ingroup and outgroup members prefer characteristics 1 to
characteristics 2. (2) He gains equivalent or less utility if Min receives 1 compa-
red to if Min receives 2. (3) He gains less utility if Mout receives 1 compared to










































































































As a consequence, if the decision-maker also has antisocial preferences, he gains
more utility if he acts in a way that is costly for himself but provides a disbenefit
to Mout compared to if he acts in a way that is costly for himself but provides a
disbenefit to Min .
The reason behind this explanation can again be found in the concept of
empathy. So far, we have only discussed half of the intergroup empathy bias.
32 But of course, it is also possible that a decision-maker shows both ingroup love and outgroup
derogation.
3.1 A Taste for the Ingroup 71
We do not only exhibit more empathy for ingroup members but also counter-
empathy for outgroup members. Thus, we experience schadenfreude because
of the outgroup’s adversities whereas their triumphs give us displeasure, called
glückschmerz (Leach et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2009a; Cikara et al., 2011). This
phenomenon is independent of ingroup love.33 Cikara et al. (2014) found that the
intergroup empathy bias also persisted after one’s ingroup had defeated their out-
group competitors. Only by giving subjects cues that reduces group entitativity,
the intergroup empathy bias could be attenuated. As a consequence, the authors
infer that the intergroup empathy bias is (mainly) driven by outgroup antipathy
and not extraordinary ingroup empathy.
However, there is other evidence which claims that not outgroup derogation but
ingroup love is the more potent driver for ingroup favouritism. A game designed
by Halevy et al. (2008) called the “intergroup prisoner’s dilemma—maximizing
difference” should enable to detect the motivation behind self-sacrificial behaviour
in an intergroup situation. Implementing this game in a minimal group experi-
ment, Halevy et al. (2012) concluded that it is not the aggressive drive to hurt the
outgroup but the altruistic desire to help the ingroup which produces the minimal
group paradigm. Moreover, Gaertner et al. (2006) show that group formation can
occur without an outgroup, only by intra-aggregate factors that promote entitati-
vity. The group affiliation that emerged from that increased cooperative behaviour
in a prisoner’s dilemma although there was no outgroup that would have ena-
bled an intergroup comparison. Finally, in their meta-analytic analyses of 212
intergroup cooperation studies, Balliet et al. (2014) conclude that “intergroup dis-
crimination in cooperation is the result of ingroup favoritism rather than outgroup
derogation”. (p. 1556)
In conclusion, even though outgroup derogation certainly plays a role in
ingroup favouritism, it seems not to be as important as ingroup love. Or to put it
differently, our preferences for positive ingroup outcomes are more pronounced
than our preferences for negative outgroup outcomes. Therefore, our taste for the
ingroup particularly stems from the willingness to support the ingroup and not
the willingness to hurt the outgroup.
33 So, it is not like in a zero-sum game where the expression of ingroup love cannot be
distinguished from outgroup derogation.
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3.1.4 Tastes Outside the Ingroup-Outgroup Context
Social identity theory is the most prominent theory so as to describe intergroup
behaviour and, from this perspective, commonly applied on the topic of discri-
mination (Kite & Whitley, 2016). Yet, do our tastes always have to stem from
an ingroup-outgroup context which is necessary for social identity theory to be
applicable in the first place?
Let us look at the example of reciprocal social preferences which consider
the fairness of other agents’ actions (Everett et al., 2015). They imply that if
someone treated you (or someone else) nicely, you treat him nicely in return. This
is called positive reciprocity. For instance, Fischbacher et al. (2001) have found
such preferences in a public goods game. Here, 50% were conditional cooperators,
meaning that they did only cooperate if others cooperated as well. Additionally,
there is also negative reciprocity which involves that if someone treated you (or
someone else) badly, you treat him badly in return. Such behavioural patterns
could be seen in case of the public goods game with a punishment option. Here,
some players reciprocated the uncooperative behaviour of other players through
punishing them (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). So, regardless of an ingroup-outgroup
context, many people have a taste for those who behave fairly and distaste for
those who behave unfairly.
It is important to notice that such reciprocal behaviour is not strategic. So, you
do not return a favour because you expect that the beneficiary or someone else
will again return your favour in the future. Or you do not punish another player in
a public goods game because you expect that this punishment will pay off later.
If that were the case, we would speak of weak reciprocity. Yet, reciprocal social
preferences require strong reciprocity which imply that “people willingly repay
gifts and punish violation of cooperation and fairness norms even in anonymous
one-shot encounters with genetically unrelated strangers” (Fehr & Henrich, 2004,
p. 55). So, unlike weak reciprocity, strong reciprocity excludes that behaviour is
(solely) driven by strategic egoism (Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk &
Fischbacher, 2006). Finally, reciprocal social preferences are not limited on how
someone actually behaves but can also take into account the intentions behind that
behaviour (Falk et al., 2003). For example, Guroglu et al. (2011) let participants
play an ultimatum game where some proposers were forced to make a rather
unfair offer. The authors found that in such cases recipients were more likely to
accept an unfair allocation compared to when proposers had deliberately chosen
it.
Although reciprocal social preferences can be completely detached from social
identity, there is evidence indicating that the two also interact. Boldizar and
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Messick (1988) found that group membership of actors influences the fairness
evaluation of their behaviour: While ratings of ingroup actors were fairer than
those of outgroup actors if the performed behaviour was fair, this was precisely
vice versa if the performed behaviour was unfair (which came as a surprise to the
authors).34 Moreover, Chen and Li (2009) implement a response game so as to
examine how people reciprocate fair/unfair behaviour in a dictator game setting.
First, the authors found that participants were 19% more likely to respond altrui-
stically to a player that treated them prosocially if he was an ingroup relative to
an outgroup member. Second, given that a player behaved unfairly, participants
were 13% less likely to punish that player if he was part of the ingroup and not
the outgroup.35 Thus, it seems that after all reciprocal social preferences are still
affected by ingroup-outgroup categorisation.
Let us continue with a different phenomenon that can also lead to taste-based
discrimination despite the absence of an ingroup-outgroup context, namely dis-
gust. Disgust is commonly defined as the rejection of unpleasant stimuli based on
smell, sight, or even mere thought (Kiss et al., 2018). Its elicitors can stem from
various sources. Kiss et al. name five disgust domains that have been identified:
(1) core; (2) animal-reminder; (3) interpersonal; (4) moral; and (5) sexual.36 So,
while rotten food and eczemas can evoke disgust, which then would be called core
disgust, this is also possible in case of violations of social and moral boundaries,
which then would be called moral disgust.
We first consider a group which elicits mainly core disgust, meaning disgust
that functions as a protective mechanism against potential sickness: ill people. In
case of ill people, the purpose of disgust is not far-fetched. Since many patho-
gens are communicated via inter-personal contact it can be adaptive to avoid such
people so as not to get contaminated (Schaller et al., 2003). So, disgust serves
as a disease-avoidance mechanism that makes us distance ourselves from ill peo-
ple (Oaten et al., 2009). In order to detect the presence of disease in others we
34 The reason for this rather surprising findingmight be that participants distanced themselves
from the unfairly behaving ingroup member through declaring his behaviour as particularly
unfair. In turn, this helped them to uphold a positive self-identity. Boldizar andMessick (1988)
write: “[T]he confrontationwith an ingroupmember performing an unfair behaviourmay have
induced a feeling of dissimilarity to the ingroup. This lack of identification with the ingroup,
coupled with a lack of opportunities to increase favorable outcomes for the ingroup, may have
minimized the effects of an ingroup favoritism bias.” (p. 108)
35 Yet, as we will see in section 3.2.2, the pattern regarding punishment of unfair ingroup and
outgroup behaviour is more complex/unclear.
36 Of these five domains of disgust, only interpersonal disgust is directly linked to an ingroup-
outgroup context.
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may rely on heuristic signals, such as coughing, behavioural tics, spasms, and
skin lesions. For instance, individuals afflicted with illnesses that affect the skin,
such as leprosy, were often segregated from the community (Plagerson, 2005).
Yet, disgust as a disease-avoidance mechanism appears to be overinclusive and
can be activated even if we know that a disease is non-contagious or actually
not a disease in the first place (Oaten et al., 2009). For example, disgust as a
disease-avoidance mechanism has also been observed in case of cancer (Greene
& Banerjee, 2006), mental illness (Stier & Hinshaw, 2007), physical disability
(Park et al., 2003), or obesity (Harvey et al., 2002). Finally, disgust sensitivity
also influences our attitude towards such groups, leading to distastes for them
(Oaten et al., 2009; Lieberman et al., 2012).
Next, let us get to a group that can not only elicit core disgust but also other
domains of disgust such as moral disgust: homosexuals and in particular gay men.
Kiss et al. (2018) mention mainly two reasons why some people are morally
disgusted by gay men. On one hand, gay men destabilise the idea of heteronor-
mativity, which means that heterosexuality is not simply a sexual orientation but,
rather, a socially agreed-upon and normalised set of behaviours (Jackson, 2006).
In this connection, gay men are for example accused to infiltrate “heterosexual
institutions” such as marriage. On the other hand, several religions forbid homo-
sexuality and describe it as impure. “[C]oncepts such as purity and symbolic
cleansing (e.g., baptism, mikven) play an important role in most popular religions
(Terrizzi et al., 2012). Purity and sanctity also are crucial elements of moral dis-
gust. Religious beliefs frequently frame gay men as abnormal and depraved and,
thus, devoid of sanctimony (Devos et al., 2002; Helminiak, 2008).” (Kiss et al.,
2018, p. 7)
Now, as in case of ill people, disgust also influences the attitude towards and
thereby promotes a distaste for gay people. Kiss et al. (2018) conducted a meta-
analytic review of 17 studies that investigated the relationship between disgust and
homonegativity. There are two main results: (1) There is a moderate to large effect
of disgust sensitivity on homonegativity; (2) There is a large effect of disgust
induction, as for example via using a fecal odor, on homonegativity.
The distaste for homosexuals and in particular gay men brings us to another
kind of social preferences that is (at least not directly) triggered by an ingroup-
outgroup context, namely type-dependent preferences. Fehr and Schmidt (2006)
define type-dependent preferences as follows: “According to type-based recipro-
city, an individual behaves kindly towards a “good” person (i.e. a person with
kind or altruistic preferences) and hostilely towards a “bad” person (i.e. a person
with unkind or spiteful preferences).” Such preferences could be compatible with
a distaste for homosexuals because perceived morality plays an important role
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regarding whether we evaluate someone as good or bad (Everett et al., 2015). For
example, Brambilla et al. (2013) found that participants reported less desire to
interact with others that were said to lack moral qualities compared to those that
were said to be highly moral. Importantly, this finding was independent of whether
the potential counterpart was an ingroup or an outgroup member.37 Therefore, in
respect to some people such as religious fundamentalists, homosexuality elicits,
among others, moral disgust which should lead to the evaluation that homosexuals
are immoral and thus bad (Morrison et al., 2019).38 In turn, due to type-based
social preferences, these apparently immoral people are then treated worse than
those they perceive to be moral.
However, although perceived morality can breach ingroup favouritism as
Brambilla et al. (2013) have shown, often the two go together. According to
Brewer (1999), groups believe in their own moral superiority. She writes: “To
the extent that all groups discriminate between intragroup social behavior and
intergroup behavior, it is in a sense universally true that “we” are more peaceful,
trustworthy, friendly, and honest than “they”.” (p. 435) Similarly, disgust is often
mentioned to be important in an ingroup-outgroup context as well. For exam-
ple, Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) state that outgroups which threaten an ingroup’s
values primarily evoke disgust (and to a lesser extent also fear and anger). Moreo-
ver, disgust sensitivity predicts negative outgroup evaluations and discriminatory
resource allocations (Hodson & Costello, 2007; Hodson et al., 2013). Thus, while
disgust (and in particular core disgust) can promote distastes for certain groups
despite the absence of an ingroup-outgroup context, it also does so within an
ingroup-outgroup context. Likewise, while type-based preferences do not have to
be influenced by ingroup-outgroup categorisation, social identity still seems to be
important within such preferences (Everett et al., 2015).
Let us finish this chapter with a taste that is independent of an ingroup-
outgroup context and neither linked to fairness, nor disgust, nor morality. Imagine
someone who has a cat allergy. Due to that allergy he prefers situations where he
does not come in contact with cats to situations where he does come in contact
with cats. In other words, we could say that the individual has a “distaste for
coming in contact with cats” and thus is a non-social discriminator. Now, when
invited for dinner, he always asks whether the hosts have a cat and only accepts
37 Yet, the authors state that the effect of morality on behavioural intentions was mediated
by perceived group image threat for ingroup counterparts and safety threat for outgroup
counterparts.
38 This is independent of whether they behave fairly or not (so as to delimitate reciprocal
social preferences) since sexual orientation has nothing to do with fairness (cf. Brambilla &
Leach, 2014).
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if they do not. Therefore, the individual categorises people into cat owners and
non-cat owners and by always rejecting invitations of the former seems to show
a distaste for them. But is this truly a distaste for the group of cat owners? Not
really, because if cat owners would invite him to a restaurant where no cats are
present, he would happily accept. So, his apparent distaste for cat owners solely
stems from his distaste for coming in contact with cats. And given that cat owners
provide the same characteristics as non-cat owners, such as going out for dinner
at a restaurant without cats, he does no longer differentiate between cat owners
and non-cat owners. Likewise, in a dictator game, where there is no potential
contact with cats anyway, he would also not treat cat owners and non-cat owners
differently.39
However, what if an individual does not want to come in contact with a group
itself? For example, let’s assume an individual avoids physical contact with ever-
ything that is contagious such as contagious objects, contagious animals, and also
contagious people. In such a case, the individual would have a distaste for conta-
gious people. This is because the group of contagious people is defined by their
contagiousness and this is precisely what he wants to avoid. But then again, if
this distaste for contagious people is restricted to avoidance of physical contact
with that group, contagious and non-contagious people should be treated equally
in non-contact situations. For instance, he should not prima facie prefer a book
written by a non-contagious person to a book written by a contagious person.
Similarly, he should not give non-contagious people more money in a dictator
game than contagious people.40
All in all, this chapter tried to demonstrate that not all tastes have to stem from
an ingroup-outgroup context: For example, we have tastes for fair people and for
good/moral people as well as distastes for people who make us feel disgusted
and people who we perceive as a threat. Importantly, this list does not claim to
be comprehensive and there certainly are more such sources.41 Yet, despite the
fact that tastes can also stem from a non-ingroup-outgroup context, such tastes
are often still intertwined with social identity (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Hodson
et al., 2013; Everett et al., 2015; Boldizar & Messick, 1988; Chen & Li, 2009).
39 Of course, it is also possible that an individual with a cat allergy truly develops a distaste for
cat owners and also treats them differently than non-cat owners even if they provide/receive
the same characteristics. Yet, this does not have to be the case.
40 Yet, as this chapter has shown, contagious people often elicit disgust which in turn promotes
a general distaste for them.
41 For instance, not only disgust but also fear can promote distastes (Cortell &Neuberg, 2005).
Wewill discuss its relevance in section 3.3.3, whenwe present the anxiety about the unknown.
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This is why this dissertation primarily discusses taste-based discrimination from
an ingroup-outgroup context.
To summarise the whole section 3.1, the categorisation in ingroup and
outgroup frequently defines the dividing line between whom we treat more favou-
rably and who we treat less favourably. Thereby, the precise manifestation of the
salient ingroup is changeable. Social identity theory provides an explanation for
ingroup favouritism: We partly derive our self-identity from our social identity
and therefore the groups we are part of. This leads to ingroup love and out-
group derogation because it boosts a positive social identity, whereby ingroup
love is more prevalent than outgroup derogation. Ultimately, tastes can also stem
from a non-ingroup-outgroup context. Yet, as it seems, such apparently “non-
ingroup-outgroup context-based tastes” are nevertheless often connected to social
identity.
3.2 Is All Discrimination Ultimately Statistical
Discrimination?
Let’s resume an example that we have already used once. It consists of two state-
ments: (1) If a good friend asks you to assist him moving, you do so. (2) If a far
relative communicates his moving date, you pretend to be out of town that day.
We assumed that this is a demonstration of strong taste-based discrimination. You
bear costs (e.g. in form of time) when you help someone to move and provide
a benefit to the moving person. Therefore, if you help someone to move, you
must have social preferences. Then, you only help your close friend but not your
far relative which indicates agent-relativity. Both together lead to strong taste-
based discrimination. However, what if we also had the following information:
(1) Among your close friends, there is the informal rule that you help each other
move. (2) Someone who offends this rule cannot expect that he receives help in
case of a future move. (3) There is no such rule among far relatives. (4) You
yourself plan to move soon and hope that others will help you. Considering this
additional information, is your willingness to help your friend move still altruistic
or simply strategic because you do not want to lose your friends’ manpower when
you move at some point in the future?
We see that in such a situation, the identity of the receiver of an alternative’s
characteristics can influence these characteristics. Let’s say all alternatives have
the same characteristics i , which is “help receiver move”. As we have just learned,
these characteristics i probably have different consequences or different probabi-
lities on consequences if the receiver is a close friend (CF
◦
) or a far relative
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The uncertain part of the decision situation is that he does not know the (subse-
quent) consequences of his actions for sure.43 Maybe his friends are generous and
still help him when he moves at some point in the future. Maybe his far relative
will be disappointed and never invites him to his new mansion, which would be
quite a loss for the decision-maker. The fact is that we do not know the objective
probabilities of these scenarios and thus, among others, use group (or individual)
specific beliefs so as to form predictions about them.
If we develop these deliberations further, we could even form the hypothesis
that all what seems to be taste-based discrimination actually is statistical discrimi-
nation. If that were true, ingroup favouritism would not be an expression of a taste
for the ingroup but a strategic way to behave in for an egoistic decision-maker.44
Regarding economic games, there is plenty of research which demonstrates that
what on first sight looks like ingroup favouritism becomes strategic egoism on
a second sight. Following the classification of Everett et al. (2015), we examine
three areas in this chapter where ingroup favouritism can function as an expected
utility maximising belief of a decision-maker with egoistic preferences: interde-
pendence of outcomes and direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity and reputational
concerns, and cooperative norm violation.
3.2.1 Interdependence of Outcomes and Direct Reciprocity
The first ingroup favouring belief suggests that results of distributional games,
which imply ingroup favouring social preferences, can be explained by perceived
42 For repetition, the littler star (*) next to the i indicates that the alternatives’ characteristics
are influenced by the receivers’ identity and thus that there is statistical discrimination.
43 In contrast, if you perfectly know the subsequent consequences of two alternatives (more
precisely the objective probabilities of the scenarios they involve) that have the same imme-
diate but different subsequent consequences, the two alternatives do not have equivalent
characteristics in the first place.
44 It is also possible that what seems to be ingroup favouritism is actually statistical discrimi-
nation of a decision-maker with social and agent-neutral preferences: You help your ingroup
because from a statistical perspective they benefit more from your help than the outgroup.
Yet, as section 3.3 will reveal, such unconditional social preferences are difficult to explain
from an evolutionary biological perspective. Moreover, no paper could be found that pursues
this approach to ingroup favouritism, which is why we neglect it.
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outcome interdependence and expectations of reciprocity. Rabbie et al. (1989)
stated an early critique on the interpretation of Tajfel and his colleagues regarding
their minimal group experiments (Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). They
argued that instead of ingroup favouring social preferences, the allocations within
these experiments were grounded on beliefs about outcome interdependence. So,
participants (at least implicitly) thought that their own outcome depends on their
choices. In the words of Rabbie et al. (1989): “[A]lthough subjects in the standard
MGP [minimal group paradigm] cannot directly allocate money to themselves,
they [think that they] can do it indirectly, on their reasonable assumption that the
other ingroup members will do the same to them. By giving more to their ingroup
members than to the outgroup members—in the expectation that the other ingroup
member will reciprocate this implicit cooperative interaction—they will increase
their chances of maximizing their own outcomes.” (p. 176)
Locksley et al. (1980) provide evidence for this hypothesis. The first two expe-
riments of their paper showed that social categorisation via a lottery procedure
produced ingroup favouring allocation. However, the second two experiments
revealed that ingroup favouritism could be extinguished by means of the follo-
wing condition: Subjects were told that neither their fellow ingroup members nor
outgroup members depend their allocations on group membership. Given partici-
pants really had had ingroup favouring social preferences this condition should not
have affected their allocation. Yet, it did. Therefore, beliefs about how other group
members would behave were obviously of great importance. In the experiments of
Locksley et al. (1980), subjects apparently believed that their outcome was more
strongly dependent on their fellow ingroup members because ingroup members
are more likely to reciprocate their behaviour. This and not ingroup favouritism
is the reason why they favoured the ingroup in their allocations. And as soon as
a condition eliminates this belief, it also eliminates ingroup favouritism. Rabbie
et al. (1989) call this the reciprocity hypothesis.
There are two versions of this theory: the unbounded reciprocity hypothesis
and bounded reciprocity hypothesis (Everett et al., 2015). The former implies
that group membership per se is irrelevant for the allocation. You simply allocate
more resources to those you think your outcome is dependent on, anticipating
that they reciprocate this favourable treatment. Our default belief might be that
ingroup members are those on which our outcome more heavily depends. Howe-
ver, if we learned that our outcome more heavily depends on the outgroup, we
would treat the outgroup more favourably than the ingroup. So, unlike outcome
interdependence, group membership only serves as a proxy and has not a mode-
rating effect itself. This is different in case of the bounded reciprocity hypothesis.
Here, our beliefs about reciprocity are not only affected by perceived outcome
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interdependence but also group membership. To put it differently, social catego-
risation bounds our expectations of reciprocity. This might be because repeated
interactions with ingroup members are more likely than with outgroup members
(ebd). In turn, repeated interactions increase the chances of a beneficial reciprocal
relationship. Outcome interdependency cannot (totally) overrule this effect. So,
even if participants know that their outcome depends on the outgroup, they still
do not treat outgroup members better than ingroup members (Gaertner & Insko,
2000).
Stroebe et al. (2005) tested whether the unbounded or bounded version of the
reciprocity hypothesis applies in the minimal group experiment. As in case of
Locksley et al. (1980), they found that participants gave less to ingroup members
if they knew that their outcome is not dependent on them. Moreover, subjects
also gave less to outgroup members if they knew that their outcome is not depen-
dent on the outgroup. This shows that not only believes about the ingroup but
also about the outgroup are important and thus seems to confirm the unbounded
reciprocity hypothesis. However, to say that the bounded reciprocity hypothesis
is therefore wrong is not correct because subjects still made more ingroup-
favouring reward allocations across all conditions. So, even in the mere outgroup
outcome dependent condition ingroup favouritism prevailed, suggesting that our
expectations of reciprocity are at least partly bounded.
There are several other experiments which suggest that ingroup favouritism
does not emerge due to ingroup favouring social preferences but expectations
about reciprocity. Most famous are the studies conducted by Yamagishi and col-
leagues (Karp et al., 1993; Jin and Yamagishi, 1997; Yamagishi et al., 1998,
1999). For example, Karp et al. (1993) implemented the classic minimal group
experiment and a modified version of it. In this modified version, players were
told that in the end they would get a fixed amount of money which is indepen-
dent on others’ allocation decisions. While the classic minimal group experiment
led to ingroup favouritism, the modified version did not. This result confirms
the importance of beliefs. Gaertner and Insko (2000) also conducted a minimal
group experiment but varied whether the other allocator was part of the ingroup
or outgroup and whether subjects would personally get rewards or not. Again, the
authors only found ingroup favouring allocations if participants’ outcomes were
dependent on another ingroup member.
All these findings regarding expectations of reciprocity and interdependence
support “a model where individuals respond to the dependence structure and then
reciprocate with favoritism towards those on whom they are dependent, with this
effect considerably stronger for the ingroup” (Everett et al., 2015, p. 12). This
is due to the general assumption of the ingroup as a container of generalised
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reciprocity.45 Thus, our expectations of reciprocity are (at least partly) bounded.
The meta-study of Balliet et al. (2014) that we already cited in section 3.1.2 also
emphasises the importance of outcome interdependence. The authors found stron-
ger ingroup favouritism in experiments that involved interdependence of outcomes
compared to those without outcome interdependence. For example, the effect size
of ingroup favouritism in social dilemmas was 0.42, whereas the one in dictator
games was 0.19. Yet, this also makes clear that outcome interdependence and
thereby direct reciprocity cannot explain all observed ingroup favouritism, which
brings us to indirect reciprocity and reputational concerns.
3.2.2 Indirect Reciprocity and Reputational Concerns
According to Everett et al. (2015), indirect reciprocity means that it is not the
person that profits from your beneficial treatment who is expected to return your
favour but someone else. This someone else is expected do so because he knows
that you previously treated others in a generous way. In other words, you build
up a good reputation which will be beneficial for you in future interactions. In
this way, seemingly altruistic behaviour that leads to no chances of direct reci-
procity can in the long run still be utility maximising for someone with egoistic
preferences. Yamagishi and colleagues have created a model called the boun-
ded generalised reciprocity model that explains why indirect reciprocity provokes
ingroup favouritism (Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000; Kiyonari & Yamagishi, 2004;
Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008, 2009). To put it simple, group identification activates
a default group heuristic strategy that leads to more prosocial behaviour within
the ingroup. The first of the three core ideas of the bounded generalised recipro-
city model tells us why this is the case: While humans have depersonalised and
generalised trust in other ingroup members willingness to cooperate, this does
not apply to outgroup members.46 The other two core ideas of the model are then
an ingroup specific variation of the indirect reciprocity definition given at the
beginning of this paragraph: (1) Humans are motivated to build up and maintain
a cooperative reputation within the ingroup because such a reputation leads to
45 The expression “the group as a container of generalised reciprocity” stems from Yamagishi
and Kiyonari (2000) and will be further discussed in the next paragraphs.
46 According to Yamagishi and Mifune (2008), this is due to our evolutionary history.
Section 3.3.1 will explore the evolution of indirect reciprocity in more detail.
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strategic advantages. (2) Humans expect other ingroup members to behave proso-
cially towards them even though these ingroup members might not have benefited
from our own cooperative/prosocial behaviour (so far).
Yamagishi and Mifune (2008) provide empirical evidence for their model. In
a dictator game, participants distributed more money to fellow ingroup members
compared to outgroup members. However, this was no longer true if participants
were told that recipients would not know their group membership. In this condi-
tion, there was no significant difference between the giving rate regarding ingroup
or outgroup recipients. These findings show the importance of reputation buil-
ding in ingroup favouring behaviour. Without the ingroup recipient knowing that
you are part of his group, your generosity will not lead to a positive reputation
within your group. As a consequence, you behave less prosocially. Consistent
with Yamagishi and Mifune (2008), Mifune et al. (2010) found that subjects only
behaved in an ingroup favouring manner if there was a cue for monitoring. The
authors let participants play a dictator game. While they knew whether the recipi-
ent was an ingroup or outgroup member, they were told that the recipient would
never know the dictator’s group membership. The experiment had two conditions:
(1) The screen of the computer, on which the game had to be played, is neutral.
(2) The computer screen displays a painting of eyes that critically stare at the
player. The painting of the eyes should function as a cue for monitoring. In turn,
monitoring implies that the way you behave in is not without consequences for
your reputation. Mifune et al. found that in condition 1, dictators did not signi-
ficantly differ between ingroup and outgroup recipients. However, condition 2
produced ingroup favouring allocations and thereby demonstrates the importance
of reputational concerns in ingroup favouritism.
All these experiments presented regarding direct and indirect reciprocity have
one substantial limitation. They only used artificial groups. Therefore, it is unclear
whether these results also apply to real groups. For example, there are indications
that punishment behaviour in a third-party punishment game depends on whether
the experimenters examined real or artificial groups. Experiments with artificial
groups tend to lead to less harsh ingroup than outgroup punishment (Jordan et al.,
2014; Butler et al., 2013; Chen & Li, 2009; Goette et al., 2012) whereas experi-
ments with real groups tend to lead to similar or even harsher ingroup punishment
(Goette et al., 2006, 2012; Bernhard et al., 2006; Shinada et al., 2004; Mendoza
et al., 2014).47 For example, Goette et al. (2012) tested both randomly assigned
47 Fehr et al., 2008 and Kubota et al. (2013) are exceptions to this rule.
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real and artificial groups.48 They found that real groups led to more ingroup favou-
ritism. Moreover, the groups differed in their norm enforcement patterns. While in
case of artificial groups punishers punished selfish ingroup vs. outgroup dictators
more leniently, this was not true in case of real groups. The authors explained
these results as follows: Members of real groups share a social history of social
interactions and social ties, which raise empathy between group members. On one
hand, this increased empathy reinforces the willingness to treat ingroup members
more prosocially than outgroup members. On the other hand, it also reinforces
members willingness to punish ingroup dictators who treated ingroup members
badly. It is important to notice that increased empathy has nothing to do with
beliefs about direct or indirect reciprocity but with ingroup love. Thus, the beha-
viour of real groups seems not to be solely describable by means of ingroup
favouring beliefs.
Jackson (2008) provides further evidence for this argument. In his experiments,
members of real groups behaved more cooperatively in simultaneous social dilem-
mas compared to members of artificial groups. This effect was mediated by group
identification and thereby confirms previous findings of the connection between
social identity and cooperative behaviour (Kramer & Brewer, 1984; de Cremer &
van Vugt, 1999).49 Nevertheless, as a study conducted by Ockenfels and Werner
(2014) demonstrates, ingroup favouring beliefs are also of importance for real
groups. They let participants play a dictator game in various versions, in which
university affiliation always served as the line between ingroup and outgroup. In
version 1, both the dictator and the recipient knew each other’s group affiliation.
In version 2, only the dictator knew the other’s group affiliation. In version 3,
the dictator could choose whether he wants to know the recipient’s group affi-
liation. If he wanted to know it, the recipient would also be told the dictator’s
group affiliation. Version 4 is the same as version 3 except that here, the recipient
would not be told the dictator’s group affiliation if the dictator wanted to know the
recipient’s group affiliation. The authors attained the following results: (1) Public
knowledge of group identities led to substantial ingroup favouritism. (2) There
was less ingroup favouritism given the recipient was unaware (vs. aware) of the
dictator’s group affiliation. (3) Dictators wanted to know recipients’ group affilia-
tion less often if this created public knowledge (version 3) compared to if only
they got to know the other’s group affiliation (version 4). Ockenfels and Werner
48 Platoons of the Swiss military, to which soldiers are randomly assigned to, functioned as
the real groups. The artificial groups were formed via a lottery mechanism.
49 Yet, it could be argued that group identification does not only increase the desire to positively
evaluate the status of the respective group but also outcome interdependence and the possibility
of indirect reciprocity.
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(2014) conclude that “[t]he evidence supports the view that ingroup favoritism is
partly belief-dependent” (p. 453). Therefore, both ingroup love and ingroup favou-
ring beliefs appear to influence inter- and intragroup behaviour in real groups. Yet,
further research is needed in order to assess how strongly each of the two affects
ingroup favouritism.
3.2.3 Cooperative NormViolation
The third ingroup favouring belief suggests that we behave more prosocially
towards ingroup than outgroup members because we perceive social norms that
recommend us to do so. There are several studies that show that group identi-
fication leads to higher adherence to group norms and that one of these norms
typically is ingroup cooperation (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Terry & Hogg, 1996;
Jetten et al., 1997). Moreover, if someone strongly identifies with a group and fol-
lows its norms, he also anticipates that other ingroup members follow the group’s
norms as well (Terry & Hogg, 1996; Mullin & Hogg, 1998). In turn, this rein-
forces ingroup cooperation. For example, Seinen and Schram (2006) found that
participants acted more prosocially if they expected that other players behave
prosocially as well.
Of course, the higher adherence to group norms and the consequent ingroup
favouritism can be explained by ingroup love and thereby social identity. Howe-
ver, there is also a belief-based explanation because violating social norms can
be costly (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). As a consequence, if an egoistic person
believes that the overall utility of acting “egoistically” and thereby bearing the
costs of norm violation is smaller than acting “altruistically” and thereby fol-
lowing the norm, he acts “altruistically”.50 Now, given that norm violation and
thus acting “egoistically” is costlier if it strikes ingroup compared to outgroup
members, ingroup favouritism emerges.
This kind of reasoning is supported by Shinada et al. (2004) and Mendoza
et al. (2014). The former found that noncooperative ingroup members were punis-
hed more severely than noncooperative outgroup members in a gift-giving game.
Mendoza et al. (2014) implemented an ultimatum game where participants recei-
ved a distribution offer and could accept or decline it. In the first study, black
and white people played the game. Given the proposer had the same skin colour,
50 Egoistically and altruistically are put into brackets because ultimately, a decision-maker
with egoistic preferences always behaves egoistically. Yet, his actions might seem altruistic.
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he was punished more harshly for an unfair offer than a proposer with a diffe-
rent skin colour. Their second study replicated this finding with college instead
of racial group membership. Additionally, here, the authors discovered that the
more students identified with their ingroup, the more they punished unfair ingroup
members. Their third study revealed that the stricter punishment of ingroup mem-
bers was mediated by fairness perception and not proposer evaluation. Unfair
ingroup members violated the participants’ fairness expectations and as a con-
sequence had to be punished. Thus, both Shinada et al. (2004) and Mendoza
et al. (2014) suggest that the costs of acting “egoistically” are higher if the action
concerns an ingroup compared to an outgroup member, leading to ingroup favou-
ring beliefs. However, there are also studies that found no such effect or even a
contrary one (Bernhard et al., 2006; Goette et al., 2012; Kubota et al., 2013).
As a side note, such social norms which impose that you should favour the
ingroup might also be relevant in a situation where an agent-neutral decision-
maker is indifferent between alternatives. For example, a person can either give
a certain amount of money to an ingroup member or an outgroup member and
does not care about who gets it. Now, one option would be to flip a coin so as to
define the final receiver. Another option would be to consider social norms so as to
define the final receiver. Regarding this second option, the decision-maker would
give the money to the ingroup member since social norms say that you should
favour the ingroup. Now, it is important to notice that this decision would neither
be based on a taste for the ingroup nor the fear of costs that might come along
with norm violation. In fact, according to this dissertation’s definition of discrimi-
nation, the decision-maker would not discriminate at all because he is indifferent
between the two alternatives. Nevertheless, in the state of indifference, he might
still always choose the alternative that favours the ingroup because he uses a
respective social norm in order to reach a decision. Therefore, while the decision-
maker is indifferent between the actual alternatives, he might not be indifferent to
how he handles this indifference. This is why we could define such behaviour as
“second-order discrimination”.51 And if this “indifference-handling-rule” or more
precisely its content treats people/groups differently, as it might be in case of
social norms, there is second-order social discrimination. So, second-order dis-
crimination might be of importance in certain decision. Nonetheless, the focus of
51 Let us look at an example of second-order discrimination in a non-social context.Adecision-
maker is indifferent to whether he wears his watch on his left or his right wrist. Now, he could
flip a coin every time he puts on a watch so as to decide whether he wears it on his left or right
wrist. But instead, he prefers to consider social norms so as to reach a decision. These norms
involve that watches are worn on the left wrist which is why he always wears his watch on
the left wrist.
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this dissertation lies on possible “first-order discrimination” which involves the
preference relations within a given choice set (and not on how someone handles
indifference within that choice set). This is why we do not further elaborate on
second-order discrimination.
To summarise, while it is often difficult to empirically separate ingroup favou-
ring beliefs from ingroup love, it appears to be undeniable that such beliefs affect
ingroup favouritism. However, only if a seemingly ingroup loving action is the
sole product of ingroup favouring beliefs, it can be described as pure statisti-
cal discrimination. The experiments discussed in this chapter suggest that this
seldomly is the case. Thus, the hypothesis that all discrimination is ultimately
statistical discrimination is rather unlikely. It seems that we are not only statisti-
cal discriminators but also taste-based discriminators. Yet, this requires that we
have ingroup favouring and/or outgroup derogating social preferences.52 So far,
we simply assumed that they exist. In the next chapter we examine whether they
truly do.
3.3 The Evolution of Agent-Relative Social Preferences
Out of an evolutionary perspective, strong taste-based discrimination poses a two-
fold problem. The first one is that of social preferences and thereby altruism in
general, whereby altruism implies “behaviors that are beneficial to the recipient
and costly to the actor” (Silk, 2015, p. 64) for evolutionary biologists.53 The evo-
lutionary biological issue with altruism is as follows: If a group has both altruists
and egoists, the latter should supersede the former sooner or later. This is because
if an egoist is in need, she gets help from an altruist. In turn, if an altruist is in
need, she cannot expect any help from egoists. So, while altruists for example
share their food and thereby seem to decrease their fitness54 because by doing so
they have less food, egoists only profit from altruists and never sacrifice any fit-
ness for others. As a consequence, egoists should have higher fitness than altruists.
The second problem, which is of particular interest for this dissertation, is that of
agent-relative social preferences. Why should it be adaptive to be altruistic within
the ingroup but less altruistic, egoistic, or even hostile towards the outgroup?
52 Actually, only strong taste-based discrimination requires social preferences.
53 Thus, from an evolutionary perspective, the concept of altruism is very close to that of
economists.
54 The concept of fitness will be defined a few paragraphs below under “Kin Altruism”.
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In this chapter, we first examine the evolution of social preferences in general.
Here, we present four concepts that explain why altruistic behaviour has been an
evolutionary stable strategy in the course of evolution. Since these four concepts
cannot satisfactorily explain all human altruism we then investigate the influence
of culture on the evolution of altruistic behaviour. Finally, we discuss the condi-
tionality of altruism and in so doing the idea of parochial altruism, which provides
an ultimate explanation for agent-relative social preferences.
3.3.1 Why Altruistic Behaviour Can Be Adaptive
In order that altruism is adaptive it has to lead to higher fitness than egoism. Yet,
as said above, the very concept of altruism involves that while an action benefits
others, it is costly to oneself. Therefore, the only solution to this problem is that
costly altruistic behaviour pays off in the long run. In this chapter, we discuss the
following four evolutionary concepts where altruism ultimately leads to enhanced
fitness: kin altruism, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, and costly signalling
theory.
Kin Altruism
So as to understand kin altruism we first have to make an important distinction
regarding the idea of fitness. On one hand, there is direct fitness which com-
prises the amount of my genes that spread within the direct family line (parent
= >children). On the other hand, there is indirect fitness which comprises the
amount of my genes that spread within the extended family via relatives. So, my
fitness is not limited on how much offspring do I have but also involves how much
offspring does my family excluding me has. Both together then result in inclusive
fitness, which is what we refer to when we talk about fitness in this dissertation
(Grafen, 2006; Scott-Phillips et al., 2011).
The concept of kin altruism precisely is based on the distinction between direct
and indirect fitness. High cooperation between family members is very common
in everyday life and can be explained by kin altruism (Burnstein et al., 1994).55
Since relatives share a part of our genes it can be adaptive to help them, provided
that the ratio of cost and benefit is positive. Hamilton (1964) formalised this
insight which led to the Hamilton’s rule: r × b > c. Written out, the formula has
55 For example, the experiment conducted by Krupp et al. (2008), which we presented in
section 3.1.2, provides evidence for kin altruism. Here, participants were more cooperative
in a public goods game the stronger the cue for kinship between players was.
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the following implication: Altruism is adaptive if the fraction of genes the helper
shares with the recipient of the help (r ) multiplied by the benefit the recipient
receives (b) is bigger than the costs the helper bears (c). A quote by Haldane
illustrates what this means in practice: “I’d lay down my life for two brothers
or eight cousins.” Brothers share half of our genes, whereas cousins share one-
eighth of our genes. As a result, two brothers or eight cousins carry as many of
Haldane’s genes as he does.
While kin altruism can be widely observed in human behaviour, there are
animals where it is even more dominant, namely social insects such as ants and
bees. Due to the haplodiploidy56 of these insects it is adaptive for the workers
to sacrifice their reproduction so as to serve their queen (Queller & Strassmann,
1998). Sherman (1977) provides another impressive example of kin altruism in
wildlife. He studied the alarm calls of squirrels. The evolutionary puzzle of these
alarm calls is as follows: While an alarm call might save the surrounding squirrels,
it puts the squirrel that makes it at risk because it draws the raider’s attention to
itself. So, squirrels that make these alarm calls are more likely to be killed and,
as a consequence, such behaviour should extinct. Yet, Sherman found that in the
context of kin altruism these alarm calls become an evolutionary stable strategy.
To conclude, kin altruism is a ubiquitous phenomenon. Yet, it requires a non-
negligible degree of kinship. We know that humans also help each other even if
they are not related. Therefore, kin altruism is not sufficient to explain the whole
spectrum of human altruism.
Reciprocal Altruism
The proverb “you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours” contains the main idea
of reciprocal altruism. Trivers (1971) first mentions reciprocal altruism and argues
that “natural selection favours these altruistic behaviours because in the long run
they benefit the organism performing them.” (p. 35) Therefore, it is an evolutio-
nary stable strategy to cooperate with non-kin given the long-term fitness benefits
of cooperation are higher than its costs. So, what seems like altruistic behaviour is
actually egoism in disguise. We already discussed such behaviour in section 3.2.1
and called it direct reciprocity there. The key requirements for direct recipro-
city are repeated interactions because otherwise your favour cannot be returned,
which undermines reciprocal altruism. Experimental evidence confirms that. In
a two-person interaction, the more probable future interactions are, the higher
56 Haplodiploidy means that, regarding a certain species, males only have one chromosome
set, whereas females have two chromosome sets. Due to that females share three quarters of
their genes with their sisters, enabling stronger kin altruism.
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the rate of cooperation gets (Andreoni & Miller, 1993; DalBo, 2005; Gächter &
Falk, 2002). Furthermore, Trivers (1971) says that psychological adaptions such
as “friendship, dislike, moralistic aggression, gratitude, sympathy, trust, suspicion,
trustworthiness, aspects of guilt and some forms of dishonesty and hypocrisy”
(p. 35) improve the functioning of reciprocal altruism. This is because they help
us maintaining a beneficial dyadic cooperation and distinguishing between good
and bad cooperators.
If reciprocal altruists cooperated with more or less every interaction partner as
long as they assume that there will be future interactions, egoists would constantly
exploit them. As a consequence, the ability to distinguish a like-minded reciprocal
altruist from a selfish cheater would be decisive. There is evidence that humans
actually have such a skill. For example, Mealey et al. (1996) found that parti-
cipants recognised photos of people better when these people had been labelled
as “untrustworthy” at first exposure compared to other adjectives. Additionally,
we are not only able to identify cheaters but also to quickly recognise altruists
(Brown & Moore, 2000). An experiment of Frank et al. (1993) confirms this
insight. Before playing a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma, the authors let participants
communicate face-to-face. The results reveal that “subjects who interacted for
thirty minutes before playing one-shot prisoner’s dilemmas with two others were
substantially more accurate than chance in predicting their partner’s decisions”.
(p. 247)57
Is reciprocal altruism an exclusively human phenomenon? Apparently not.
Rutte and Taborsky (2008) found direct reciprocity among Norway rats in an
adjusted version of a repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Here, rats preferentially hel-
ped cooperators instead of defectors. Dolivo and Taborsky (2015) even revealed
that rats are able to differentiate between cooperators depending on the quality
and the delay of their help. Moreover, other well-studied animals regarding the
display of reciprocal altruism are for example bats (Carter & Wilkinson, 2013,
2015). And although Zentall (2016) argues that these behaviours are actually not
the product of reciprocal altruism but laboratory induced Pavlovian conditioning,
there are goods arguments why this is not the case (see Dolivo et al., 2016).
So, reciprocal altruism seems to be part of (some) animals’ nature as well,
which makes the phenomenon and its adaptivity even more robust. Nonetheless,
the theory has two strong restrictions. First, reciprocal altruism only functions if
there is a random number of repeated interactions. Second, its explanatory power
57 However, other studies conclude that most humans are not better than chance in detecting
liars and thus question the existence of such a skill (Eckman & O’Sullivan, 1991; Frank &
Eckman, 1997).
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is limited to few-person interactions (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2005). However, on
one hand, humans often cooperate in large groups. On the other hand, people also
behave altruistically in anonymous one-shot interactions where the possibility of
direct reciprocity is excluded. Ultimately, altruistic punishment, as we have seen it
in section 3.1.2, is not explainable by reciprocal altruism. Thus, while this concept
provides an important supplement to kin altruism, it still leaves a lot of unsolved
problems regarding altruism.
Indirect Reciprocity
We already discussed indirect reciprocity in section 3.2.2. As we know from
that chapter, reputation is the key word in indirect reciprocity. Now, let us look
at indirect reciprocity from an evolutionary perspective. The model (Alexander,
1987; Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998) states that hel-
ping non-kin results in a good reputation. In turn, having a good reputation rises
the likelihood of receiving someone’s help in the future even though there are
no further interactions with that person. Hence, people behave altruistically in
order to attain a good reputation, which is beneficiary in the long run. In previous
chapters, we already presented laboratory experimental evidence for indirect reci-
procity (Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008; Ockenfels & Werner, 2014). Additionally,
there is also field experimental evidence for indirect reciprocity. In a large-scale
field study conducted by Yoeli et al. (2013), reputational concerns tripled par-
ticipation in a public-goods-game-like program of an electric utility company.
Offering $25 as an incentive to participate was four times less effective. Ulti-
mately, studies suggest that children and even infants display indirect reciprocity
(Kato-Shimizu et al., 2013; Meristo & Surian, 2013).
Indirect reciprocity solves one major problem of reciprocal altruism. There is
no longer a necessity for repeated interactions because actors can build up an
interaction superordinate reputation. As a result, altruism in one-shot interacti-
ons can be adaptive. Yet, notwithstanding how promising this approach is so as
to explain aspects of human altruism that are inexplicable by kin altruism and
reciprocal altruism, there are a few drawbacks. First, Leimar and Hammerstein
(2001) found in their simulations that cooperativeness only emerges if groups are
more or less isolated and there is no genetic mixing between groups. Second, it is
unclear how the concept of good reputation should be modelled. Does not helping
a person with a bad reputation jeopardise one’s good reputation (e.g. Nowak &
Sigmund, 1998) or not (e.g. Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001)? According to Fehr
and Fischbacher (2005), “this question is intrinsically related to society’s prevai-
ling norms, which are themselves the product of evolutionary forces.” (p. 34) As a
consequence, indirect reciprocity is in need of another theory that explains which
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norms prevail in a given society. Third, indeed, there are examples where indirect
reciprocity led to cooperation in larger groups (Milinski et al., 2002; Panchana-
than & Boyd, 2004). However, many non-cooperative equilibria are possible as
well. Furthermore, hunter-gatherers had to collect and recall a lot of information
in order to rightly assess the willingness for cooperation of each group member.
Besides, in reality, information is often private and self-evidently, the whole pro-
cess of indirect reciprocity becomes more and more complex the larger the group
is (Bowles & Gintis, 2011). Finally, kin altruism, reciprocal altruism, and indirect
reciprocity together can still not explain the phenomenon of strong reciprocity
(Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2005).
Costly Signalling Theory
Costly signalling theory provides a fourth explanation of altruism. The idea
behind the theory is over a century old. In “The Theory of the Leisure Class”,
Thorstein Veblen (1899) introduced the expression “conspicuous consumption”,
which involves a hard-to-fake signal for wealth that should enhance prestige
among the rich. More than 70 years later, Spence (1973) applied Veblen’s idea
on the job market and argued that educational qualifications are taken as a signal
for the employee’s productivity. Another two years later, signalling reached evo-
lutionary biology. Zahavi (1975) used the approach so as to explain the helping
behaviour in Arabian babblers.
The idea of signalling is as follows: Individuals give honest information about
themselves by displaying behaviour that is costly. Yet, this costly behaviour bene-
fits the individual because ultimately it increases reproduction and overall fitness
(McAndrew, 2002). According to Smith and Bird (2000), a costly signal needs to
fulfil four qualities. First, it has to be an honest signal of quality. Second, the costs
which the signal involves must not be compensated by reciprocity. Third, others
must be able to easily observe the signal. Fourth, the signal has to be beneficial,
which means the signaller has to gain a net benefit. Now, behaving altruistically
could be such a signal. As Gintis et al. (2001) argue: “[C]ooperation … con-
stitutes an honest signal of the member’s quality as a mate, coalition partner or
competitor, and thus results in advantageous alliances for those signaling in this
manner.” (Gintis et al., 2001, p. 103) Following this interpretation, costly signal-
ling theory could for instance explain why societies have hunting games where
they use a rather difficult instead of an efficient hunting technique or provide
excessive amounts of food at feasts (Boone, 1998; Gurven et al., 2000; Smith &
Bird, 2000; Sosis, 2000; Hawkes et al. 2001).58
58 However, one major weakness of costly signalling theory is as follows: The signalling of
unobservable traits need not to manifest as altruistic acts but can also occur in other forms
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Indirect reciprocity and costly signalling theory apparently have an overlap.
In both models, the payback for the person’s cooperative behaviour comes from
third parties. Yet, Bowles and Gintis (2011) note the following difference: “[I]n
the signalling model the third party responds favourably because the signal is
correlated with some desirable but unobservable property of the actor; in the indi-
rect reciprocity model the signal (cooperating with those in good standing) is the
desirable property itself.” (p. 71) However, as indirect reciprocity, it is not able
to provide a solid explanation for all aspects of human altruism such as strong
reciprocity.
The problem of strong reciprocity could be solved by group selection (Wilson,
1997; Boehm, 1999; Sober & Wilson, 1998).59 While strong reciprocity decre-
ases individual fitness, it raises group fitness since it sustains cooperation (Fehr
& Gächter, 2000; Bowles & Gintis, 2002). Therefore, groups of strong recipro-
cators supersede groups of egoists. But this concept of group selection seems
to be in conflict the basic idea of natural selection. Genes are the ones that are
passed on to the next generation and individuals function as their vehicles in
this transfer (Dawkins, 1976). Yet, if we go one level up, there are neither rep-
licators (such as DNA information) nor vehicles (such as individuals) (Dawkins,
2012). Consequently, a trait that is exclusively beneficial to the group still has
to be transmitted via genes. Due to that group selection can at best be relevant
in small isolated groups since intragroup selection against strong reciprocators
in combination with migration is a much stronger force than intergroup selec-
tion. According to Fehr and Fischbacher (2003): “The migration of defectors to
groups with a comparatively large number of altruists plus the within-group fitness
advantage of defectors quickly removes the genetic differences between groups
so that group selection has little effect on the overall selection of altruistic traits
(Aoki, 1982). Consistent with this argument, genetic differences between groups
in populations of mobile vertebrates such as humans are roughly what one would
expect if groups were randomly mixed (Long, 1986). Thus, purely genetic group
selection is … unlikely to provide a satisfactory explanation for strong reciprocity
and large-scale cooperation among humans.” (p. 789)
such as antisocial acts (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). So, given that costly signalling theory
applies in case of altruistic behaviour, there needs to be another theory that explains why
the prosocial-signal equilibrium prevailed (Bowles & Gintis, 2011). We will present such a
theory in the next chapter, namely cultural group selection.
59 The theory in which group selection is nowadays embedded is called multi-level-selection.
Wilson andWilson (2008) describe its basic notion as follows: “Adaption at a level X requires
a corresponding process of selection at level X and tends to be undermined by selection at
lower levels.” (p. 381) Thus, both selection at the gene-level and the group-level are possible.
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So, how can the remaining forms of human altruism be explained then? One
explanatory approach is to identify them as maladaptations. Richard Dawkins
(2006), who is a proponent of this explanation, writes: “Throughout most of
our prehistory, humans lived under conditions that would have strongly favoured
the evolution of all four [kin altruism, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity,
and costly signalling] … most of your fellow band members would have been
kin, more closely related to you than to other members of the band … plenty
opportunities for kin altruism to evolve. And … you would tend to meet the
same individuals again and again throughout your life—ideal conditions for the
evolution of reciprocal altruism. Those were also ideal conditions for building
reputations for altruism and the very same ideal conditions for advertising con-
spicuous generosity.” (p. 220) Therefore, strong reciprocity is a vestige of ancient
times. It used to be advantageous because the environmental conditions in the late
Pleistocene promoted such a trait. But these conditions changed and as a result the
trait became disadvantageous. Nowadays, we neither sufficiently differentiate bet-
ween one-shot and long-lasting interactions nor between strangers and intimates
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Price, 2008).
The maladaptation theory has some discrepancies though. First of all, group
sizes of ancestral human societies seem to have been rather large and therefore
suboptimal for reciprocal altruism (Gintis et al., 2008; Bowles & Gintis, 2011).
Second, hunter-gatherers appear to have traded in distances over hundreds of kilo-
metres and thereby probably had contact with various strangers (Keats, 1977; Fehr
& Henrich, 2004). Thus, it should have been essential for them to distinguish bet-
ween strangers and intimates as well as one-shot and long-lasting interactions
(Bowles & Gintis, 2011).60 Third, there is ample evidence that hunter-gatherer
groups were neither isolated nor stable, which dampens the effect of kin altruism
(Harpending & Jenkins, 1974; Lourandos, 1997; Howell, 2000; Woodburn; 1982;
MacDonald & Hewlett, 1999; Fix, 1999; Moreno-Gamez et al., 2011). Due to
these three problems we look for a further explanation of strong reciprocity, which
brings us to culture.
3.3.2 The Role of Culture in Evolution
Richerson and Boyd (2005) define culture as follows: “Culture is information
capable of affecting individuals’ behavior that they acquire from other members
60 Besides, there are strong indications that humans can very well differentiate between one-
shot and long-lasting interactions (Andreoni & Miller, 1993; DalBo, 2005)
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of their species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social transmis-
sion.” (p. 5)61 So, traits cannot only be transmitted genetically but also culturally
via social learning (Creanza et al., 2017). The importance of such culturally trans-
mitted knowledge becomes obvious if we image the situation of being lost in
nature. We do not know how to make fire. We do not know which plants are poi-
sonous. We do not know how to make arrows, nets, and shelters or how to hunt.
Our ancestors once knew how to do these things, yet, today they are no longer
culturally transmitted which is why modern humans have never learned them.62
The fact that we have to learn these abilities demonstrates that they do not have
a genetic but cultural background (Chudek et al., 2015).
Yet, this shall not imply that genes and culture are exclusive concepts. The
two can overlap. This is called gene-culture coevolution (Gintis, 2011; Richerson
& Boyd, 2005; Henrich, 2011). It means that cultural traits that a group trans-
mits from generation to generation can create a group structure that influences
individual fitness or co-form the environment to which individuals adapt (Gintis
et al., 2008; Feldman & Zhivotovsky, 1992). In other words, a genetic change
can be initiated by a former cultural change. A classic example of this process
provides some humans’ ability to digest lactose after weaning. Areas where this
is a common trait in the population (e.g. Northern Europe) correlate with the
distribution of the earliest European cattle farms (Beja-Pereira et al., 2003). The-
refore, the cultural invention of dairy farming initiated the natural selection of
people with lactose tolerance since milk provided an additional nutrition form.
Bersaglieri et al. (2004) found genetic evidence for the adaptation which enables
the digestion milk products after weaning. It took place in the last 5’000 to 10’000
years and is said to be one of the strongest selections yet seen for any gene in the
genome.
Comparable to genetic evolution, cultural traits “reproduce themselves from
brain to brain and across time, mutate and are subject to selection according to
their effects on the fitness of their carriers” (Gintis, 2011, p. 879). Thus, if a
cultural adaptation directly leads to more individual fitness, it is little surprising
that it prevails. For example, let us assume a hunter-gatherer invents a new arrow
with small feathers at the end. These feathers stabilise the arrow’s trajectory and
enable a harder and more precise shot. Since the new arrow makes hunting both
61 By information, Richerson and Boyd (2005) mean any kind of mental state that is acquired
or modified by social learning and affects behaviour.
62 There is also no need to learn these abilities in a modern society because with respect to
today’s environment they no longer contribute to survival.
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more effective and efficient, every individual that adopts it increases her fitness.63
As a consequence, the new arrow supersedes the old one and its production is
from now on culturally transmitted. But can also norms emerge that (at least at
the beginning) are costly for the individual but beneficial for the group? To put it
differently, might strong reciprocity be a cultural adaptation?
There is ample evidence which suggests that altruistic behaviour varies with
local cultural environments. Henrich et al. (2001) let 15 small-scale societies play
the ultimatum game and found substantial differences between these societies. For
instance, the Lamaleras, a whale hunting society, are dependent on cooperation
in their daily life since you cannot catch a whale alone. After a successful hunt,
they distribute the catch among all members of the group. This cooperativeness is
mirrored in how they played the ultimatum game. 63% of proposers allocated half
of the amount to the responder. Those who distributed differently normally gave
even more, resulting in an overall average offer of 57%. In contrast, the Machi-
guenga, which is a Peruvian tribe, offered on average 26% of the pie and only one
out of 21 responders rejected the offer. This outcome reflects the cooperativeness
in their everyday life. Cooperation, sharing, or exchange beyond the family unit
is uncommon. Accordingly, the Machiguenga do also not fear social sanctions or
having a bad reputation. So, altruism seems to have a cultural component.
We know that the environment of our ancestors was not perfectly stable (Mar-
trat et al., 2004). This circumstance promoted ways of fast adaptation such as
cultural transmissions. Strong reciprocity could be one of these cultural inventi-
ons and enabled high cooperativeness in large groups even with migration. Still,
how could this cultural norm spread out within a group even though it appears to
be costly for the individual that adheres to it? According to Fehr and Fischbacher
(2003), given there are enough strong reciprocators in a group, acting selfishly
is no longer fitness enhancing because egoists get punished by strong reciproca-
tors. Moreover, if even pure cooperators (individuals who cooperate but do not
punish defectors) get punished for not punishing defectors, behaving like a strong
reciprocator leads to highest individual fitness within a group. Besides, the more
cooperators a group has, the less often strong reciprocators have to punish defec-
tors. As a result, the intragroup disadvantage of strong reciprocators relative to
pure cooperators gets smaller and might even vanish at one point. “At the limit,
when everybody cooperates, punishers incur no punishment costs at all and thus
have no disadvantage.” (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003, p. 790)
63 We assume that producing these new arrows is only marginally costlier than the old arrows
without small feathers.
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This is how strong reciprocity could become dominant within a group. Here,
it is important to remember that one great difference between cultural and gene-
tic adaptations is their speed. Unlike genetic adaptations, cultural adaptations can
occur within a single generation. So, a group of egoists can become a group of
strong reciprocators in few decades. Due to this, the situation where an insuffi-
cient number of upcoming strong reciprocators gets superseded by egoists might
get bypassed.64 But how could strong reciprocity spread between groups? One
possible answer is that groups of strong reciprocators simply had higher rates of
reproduction. However, there is another concept that provides an answer to this
question, namely cultural group selection (Henrich & Boyd, 2001; Boyd et al.,
2003). There is ample evidence which implies that our ancestors experienced
many intergroup conflicts (Jorgensen, 1980; Otterbein, 1985).65 In such conflicts,
a group of altruists that follows the cultural norm of strong reciprocity displays
a high level of cooperativeness and consequently outcompetes a selfish group.
Here, outcompete does not mean that the defeated group gets eliminated. It is
their cultural norm of selfishness that vanishes because the loosing group is for-
ced to adapt the winner’s cultural norms and institutions (Kelly, 1985; Soltis et al.,
1995).
Thus, if we look at evolution from a dual inheritance perspective, which inclu-
des both genetic and cultural adaptations, we realise that the two inheritances
can lead to two different selection processes. On one hand, we have gene-level
selection. On the other hand, cultural group selection ultimately provokes a group
(norm) selection mechanism. Moreover, in the course of evolution, some cul-
tural adaptations might have found their way into our genes via gene-culture
coevolution. Human morality and our ability to internalise norms could be the
product of such a process (Gintis et al., 2008; Gintis, 2003). First, brain regions
involved in moral judgements and behaviour such as the prefrontal cortex or the
orbitalfrontal cortex are virtually unique to or most highly developed in humans
and without doubt evolutionary adaptations (Moll et al., 2005; Schulkin, 2000).
Second, the emergence of human morality is closely tied to the evolution of the
human prefrontal cortex (Allman et al., 2002). Third, Gintis (2011) states that
“[t]he social environment of early humans was conductive to the development of
prosocial traits, such as empathy, shame, pride, embarrassment and reciprocity,
without which social cooperation would be impossible.” (p. 879) Following this
64 Here, insufficient means that there are too few strong reciprocators in order that strong
reciprocity becomes the best behavioural strategy.
65 We will further investigate the importance of war regarding the evolution of altruism in the
next chapter.
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line of argumentation, morality is a proximate mechanism that serves as a psy-
chological rewarding and/or punishment system which ultimately maintains strong
reciprocity. Or to put it in more drastic words, the cultural norm of strong reci-
procity got directly encoded into the human brain. Here, it is important to notice
that strong reciprocity as a universal structure of human morality only acquires
concrete content in the context of specific cultural values regarding the legiti-
mate rights and obligations of individuals (Gintis et al., 2008). This explains why
Henrich et al. (2001) found considerable variance in how members of 15 small-
scale societies behaved in the ultimatum game. In contrast, studies conducted in
advanced industrial societies led to rather similar results since individuals of such
societies considerably agree on the content of moral behaviour (Fong et al., 2005;
Gintis et al., 2008).
Thanks to gene-culture coevolution and cultural group selection we might have
found a conclusive explanation for strong reciprocity. However, while there is
little doubt that elements of culture adapt over time (Bentley et al., 2004; Dur-
ham, 1991; Gabora, 1995, 2011; Mesoudi et al., 2004, 2006; Orsucci, 2008),
the analogy between genetic and cultural adaptations and the consequent idea of
dual inheritance is not undisputed. Most commonly, critics say that “the gene
is a well-defined, discrete, independently reproducing and mutating entity, whe-
reas the boundaries of the unit of culture are ill-defined and overlapping” (Gintis,
2011, p. 879). Yet, in the same paragraph, Gintis counters that this conception
of well-defined genes is out-dated, which is a valid point, considering the epige-
netics revolution (Carey, 2012). Gabora (2011) criticises that there is neither an
objective benchmark for determining cultural fitness nor do cultural “mutations”
occur randomly. Additionally, Tooby and Cosmides, (1992) claim that at least
some behaviour, whose origin is said to be cultural, can be explained by biology
alone. Nevertheless, despite these objections, it seems inappropriate to simply
characterise gene-culture coevolution and cultural group selection as incompa-
tible with natural selection and thus wrong (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis,
2011; Richerson et al., 2016).
3.3.3 Why Altruism Is Conditional
So far, we only discussed how social preferences could evolve. However, the
title of section 3.3 is “The Evolution of Agent-Relative Social Preferences”.
Section 3.1.2 revealed that whether or not we behave altruistically (partly)
depends on the group membership of the receiver. If the receiver is a fellow
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ingroup member, we treat her prosocially. If the receiver is an outgroup mem-
ber, we treat her less prosocially, neutrally, or even antisocially. So, evolution has
not generated universal but conditional altruism. This subchapter investigates why
this conditionality might be the missing piece of the jigsaw in order to attain the
ultimate explanation of human altruism.
When we discussed cultural group selection it was already mentioned that
group conflicts and war were substantial parts of our ancestors’ lives (Jorgen-
sen, 1980; Otterbein, 1985). The growth rate of human population can serve as
an indicator for how frequent clashes of groups must have been. From 100’000
BC until 20’000 BC, growth was close to zero, ranging from 0.002% to 0.1%
(Bocquet-Appel et al., 2005; Hassan, 1980). Yet, the environmental conditions
should have allowed a rate of about 2% (Hassan, 1980; Johansson & Horo-
witz, 1986). This gap between possible and actual growth suggests that humans
themselves were their own worst enemy (Bowles & Gintis, 2011).
In the late Pleistocene, which also comprises the ending of the last glacial
period, the climate was volatile and led to unpredictable natural disasters (Martrat
et al., 2004). These unstable conditions laid the foundation for intergroup wars. On
one hand, groups fought for resources so as to ensure immediate survival. On the
other hand, they also wanted to protect themselves against future disasters and in
so doing did not back away from attacking other groups that might endanger their
future survival (Wendorf, 1968; Ember & Ember, 1992). Additionally, the unstable
environment led to long distance migrations. Here, groups who had no established
political relations frequently encountered each other, provoking conflict (Bowles
& Gintis, 2011).
Archaeological findings are in line with the idea of belligerent ancestors. Bow-
les (2009) examined bones on marks of violent death. He infers that in the late
Pleistocene and early Holocene the mortality rate which can be traced back to
warfare was approximately 14%. Although this is an impressive number, there
are three reasons why we have to treat it with caution. (1) It is not possible to
differentiate between deaths caused by intergroup conflicts and deaths caused by
intragroup conflicts. (2) Not all violent deaths leave marks in bones. (3) So far,
only a tiny fraction of our ancestors’ bones was found and thus could be analysed.
As a result, Bowles’ violent death rate of 14% is not representative. Nonetheless,
the number probably points in the right direction. In the late Pleistocene, hunter-
gatherers did not only behave altruistically. Intergroup conflicts seem to have been
frequent and widespread.
Human’s tendency for belligerence towards people from the outgroup, so-
called parochialism, is puzzling out of an evolutionary perspective. This is because
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such a trait should decrease the fitness of an individual. In comparison with sel-
fish but tolerant individuals, parochialists have a higher risk of death and are less
likely to benefit from intergroup relationships. Consequently, tolerance should
supersede parochialism. But like in the case of egoists who should outcompete
altruist, reality proves the opposite. Both altruism and parochialism are commonly
observable human traits. Now, the dazzling idea of Choi and Bowles (2007) is as
follows: While neither altruism nor parochialism can be an evolutionary stable
strategy on its own, both together can. This intersection of the two concepts is
called parochial altruism.
How do Choi and Bowles reason the notion of parochial altruism? We know
that, on a group-level, altruists outcompete egoists due to the former’s higher level
of cooperation. Yet, we also know that group selection in and of itself is contro-
versial. Given selection exclusively occurs on the gene-level, the advantage of
altruism on the group level becomes irrelevant, unless another mechanism fosters
intergroup competition and in this way a kind of group selection. Parochialism
could function as such a mechanism. If intergroup hostility leads to sufficient
conflicts, traits that are for the good of the group can prevail because those who
have them outcompete those who do not. In the end, this provokes a sort of group
selection.
This last sentence makes clear how the two contrary behaviours might com-
plement each other. On one hand, altruism alone increases group fitness, however,
there is no selection process on the group level. Thus, the individual costs of beha-
ving altruistically are higher than its benefits. On the other hand, parochialism
alone provides a mechanism for group selection. However, selfish parochialists
would not voluntarily engage in intergroup conflicts because “they are not wil-
ling to risk death in order to benefit their group members.” (Choi & Bowles,
2007, p. 637) Nonetheless, unlike tolerant egoists, they bear the extra cost of par-
ochialism. As a consequence, even though parochialism leads to a group selection
mechanism, the trait does not prevail because it is neither advantageous on the
individual nor on the group level. So, we see that both behaviours vanish if they
evolve alone. But if there is a co-evolution of altruism and parochialism, they
back each other and become complementary since only parochial altruists start
war and, in this war, risk their lives for the good of the group.
The decisive question for the evolution of parochial altruism is as follows:
Were there sufficient group conflicts in order that intergroup selection was not
(entirely) superseded by intragroup selection? At the beginning of this chapter
we said that warfare was probably common in the late Pleistocene and early
Holocene. With regard to ancestral hunter-gatherer societies, Bowles (2009) states
that “the estimated level of mortality in inter-group conflicts would have had
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substantial effects, allowing the proliferation of group beneficial behaviours that
were quite costly to the individual altruist.” (p. 1293) Thus, according to Bowles,
parochial altruism could have evolved. Or to put it differently, the data we have
about the late Pleistocene seems not to be incompatible with such a course of
evolution.
Choi and Bowles (2007) theoretically analysed the evolution of parochial
altruism by means of agent-based simulations. In these simulations, there were
four types: tolerant egoists, parochial egoists, tolerant altruists, and parochial
altruists. The simulated environmental conditions were based on the known data
of the late Pleistocene. Given at least one of two encountering groups was mainly
populated by parochialists, conflict occurred. Here, the group with more parochial
altruists tended to prevail. The authors let the four types interact with each other
over thousands of generations and found two equilibria: “In millions of simulated
evolutionary histories, the populations emerging after thousands of generations of
selection tend to be either tolerant and selfish, with little warfare, or parochial
and altruistic with frequent and lethal encounters with other groups.” (Bowles,
2008, p. 326) So, in their model, the emergence of parochial altruism cannot be
ruled out. Other studies employing evolutionary simulations also support the pre-
valence of parochial altruism (García & van den Bergh, 2011; Gao et al., 2015).
Nevertheless, Choi and Bowles (2007) emphasise that they merely provide a pos-
sible explanation for how humans could have become both altruistic and warlike.
The paper contains no evidence of a warlike genetic predisposition and remains
purely theoretical. It only states that if such a predisposition exists, it could have
co-evolved in the way Choi and Bowles describe it. Finding conclusive empirical
and genetic proof has to be done in other research.
So, what have other papers found? We have already discussed massive evi-
dence for ingroup favouring and outgroup derogating behaviour in section 3.1.
Such findings came from both field experiments (Voors et al., 2012; Banderia
et al., 2005; Leider et al. 2009; Gneezy & Fessler, 2012) and laboratory experi-
ments (Charness et al., 2007; Chen & Li, 2009; Leibbrandt & Sääksvuori, 2012;
Abbink et al. 2010, 2012; Fowler & Kam, 2007; Ahn et al., 2011; Bernhard
et al., 2006; Butler et al., 2013; Goette et al., 2006, 2012; De Dreu et al., 2015).
Moreover, researchers detected a connection between altruism and parochialism
in war-like situations. On one hand, Gneezy and Fessler (2012) discovered that
the willingness to punish non-cooperative group members and reward cooperative
ones increases during violent intergroup conflicts. On the other hand, Voors et al.
(2012) found that people who are exposed to violence are more risk seeking and
behave more altruistically towards their neighbours. Ultimately, such traits are
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war deciding and thus, in situations where a group needs them most so as to win
a conflict, we might instinctively reinforce them.
Then, section 3.2 analysed whether altruistic ingroup favouring preferences can
actually be explained by selfish ingroup favouring beliefs. Here, we said that such
beliefs certainly affect behaviour, yet, they are not able to explicate all altruistic
behaviour. Finally, the idea of social identity theory fits that of parochial altruism
well. In fact, parochial altruism could be the ultimate explanation for it. Due to
social identity individuals no longer make sharp distinctions between their own
and the group’s welfare (cf. depersonalisation), leading to behaviour that is for the
good of the group. Additionally, the desire to improve or maintain one’s positive
social identity by means of group comparison can give rise to social competition.
In turn, this promotes a group selection mechanism. Therefore, social identity and
its implications could be the proximate mechanisms of parochial altruism, or in
other words, the evolution of parochial altruism provides an ultimate explanation
for social identity theory.
However, there are also critics of parochial altruism. Yamagishi and Mifune
(2016) tested three hypotheses of parochial altruism: (1) unconditional intragroup
cooperation; (2) non-instrumental, non-retaliatory, and costly intergroup aggres-
sion; and (3) the positive relationship between intragroup cooperation and
intergroup aggression. The authors conclude: “Laboratory experiments revea-
led no support for the unconditional nature of intra-group cooperation, mostly
negative evidence for the non-instrumental, non-retaliatory, and costly nature of
inter-group aggression, and mixed evidence for the positive relationship between
intra-group cooperation and inter-group aggression.” (p. 39)
How convincing is this critique? First of all, we have to keep in mind that
Yamagishi, who is the founder of the bounded generalised reciprocity model, is
an early critic of social identity theory. Thus, it is little surprising that he also
criticises parochial altruism since the two concepts are connected. Second, alt-
hough Yamagishi and Mifune claim that there is no unconditional intragroup
cooperation, we came to a different conclusion in section 3.2. For example, the
meta-analysis of Balliet et al. (2014) revealed that the effect size of ingroup favou-
ritism is indeed higher given there is mutual interdependence. Yet, there is also
ingroup favouritism in anonymous dictator games that neither enable direct nor
indirect reciprocity. Third, Yamagishi and Mifune have a point when they say that
ingroup favouritism is mainly the product of ingroup love and not outgroup dero-
gation. For example, Halevy et al. (2012) demonstrated that if a game allows to
express ingroup love and outgroup derogation separately, players mostly express
ingroup love and not outgroup derogation. Balliet et al. (2014) or Aaldering et al.
(2018) come to a similar inference. Indeed, there is also evidence for outgroup
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antipathy as for example in case of schadenfreude (Cikara et al., 2014). Further-
more, three newer experiments further support the idea of parochialism. De Dreu
et al. (2015) manipulated cognitive self-control via a Stroop Interference Task
(Stroop, 1935). The authors found that compared to the easy task, the difficult
one led to more parochially altruistic behaviour in an IPD-MD game (cf. Halevy
et al., 2008).66 Cacault et al. (2015) provide evidence for unprovoked parochial
altruism. In their experiment, participants tended to benefit the ingroup at the
cost of the outgroup even if they could have reached the same outcome without
harming the outgroup. Böhm et al. (2016) confirm these findings (Rusch et al.,
2016). Yet, despite this evidence it is unclear whether human outgroup hostility
was truly strong enough so as to produce sufficient outgroup derogation in order
that a group selection mechanism emerged. Fourth, Yamagishi and Mifune admit
that more studies are needed that examine the relationship between intragroup
altruism and intergroup parochialism. So far, most evidence of how the two con-
cepts are linked is indirect, revealing that they correlate with the same factors,
as for example intergroup competition, social distance, and testosterone (De Dreu
et al., 2015; Diekhof et al., 2014; Reimers & Diekhof, 2015). The only study
Yamagishi and Mifune cite that examines the correlation on an individual level
is one they conducted themselves (Yamagishi & Mifune, 2009). Here, they found
a negative and not a positive relationship. However, for example in case of sport
fans, a strong identification with one’s club promotes ingroup favouritism and
can also lead to outgroup hostility (Lee, 1985). So, here, we seem to find a direct
positive individual correlation between the two concepts. But maybe, this is due
to the zero-sum game character of sports.
Thus, while two arguments of Yamagishi and Mifune (2016) are questiona-
ble, one argument is rather strong, namely that there is little non-instrumental
intergroup aggression. Still, unlike Yamagishi suggests, generalised reciprocity
appears not to be able to explicate the ingroup favouring behaviour that experi-
ments reveal. Interestingly, Böhm (2016) came up with a distinction between two
manifestations of parochial altruism: a weak and a strong one. He proposes “a
semantic differentiation between effects that are based on a lack of positive atti-
tudes toward the out-group, i.e., weak parochial altruism, and effects that are due
to negative attitudes toward the out-group, i.e., strong parochial altruism” (p. 2).
Thus, what researchers might mainly find in their experiments is not strong but
weak parochial altruism, implying ingroup favouritism and outgroup neutrality.
This of course raises the following question: If today humans primarily display
weak parochial altruism, was ancestral intergroup aggression strong enough to
66 This suggests that parochial altruism might operate by means of intuitive mechanisms.
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create a group selection mechanism? And consequently, provided that parochia-
lism was not strong enough to evoke a group selection mechanism, is there another
explanation for ingroup favouritism?
The evolution of weak parochial altruism could have been possible by means
of cultural adaptations, cultural group selection, and gene-culture coevolution.
Here is how that might have occurred. As described in the last chapter, during the
late Pleistocene, the social norm of strong reciprocity emerged because it helped
to maintain a high level of cooperation in a changing environment. This norm
was bounded to the ingroup. So, on one hand, while hunter-gatherers coopera-
ted with fellow ingroup members, they treated outgroup members neutrally. On
the other hand, while they harshly punished selfish ingroup members, they beha-
ved more leniently towards selfish outgroup members (cf. Shinada et al., 2004;
Mendoza et al., 2014). This includes cases where an outgroup member does not
treat an ingroup member or another outgroup member prosocially. In this way,
a group of weak parochial altruists could protect itself against selfish outgroups
that wanted to exploit them. This is due to two reasons. First, the weak parochial
altruists approached their outgroups with a selfish attitude as well. Second, since
weak parochial altruists treat the outgroup neutrally, they do not engage in costly
punishment of selfish outgroup behaviour. Thus, the norm of strong reciprocity
prevails in a limited and therefore controllable scope and thanks to the quick-
ness of cultural adaptations it can emerge within a single generation. Next, since
groups of weak parochial altruists are fitter than groups of egoists, the cultural
norm of ingroup bounded strong reciprocity spreads via cultural group selection.
Ultimately, the process of gene-culture coevolution engraves the norm into our
hardware and thereby genes in form of social identity (cf. Ihara, 2011).
It has to be highlighted that the above paragraph is a hypothesis and needs fur-
ther proof. Yet, it provides a comprehensive explanation for how altruism evolved
and why it is particularly prevalent in case of the ingroup without simply descri-
bing it as a maladaptation. Additionally, unlike the evolution of strong parochial
altruism, it is not dependent on substantial intergroup aggression. Admittedly, cul-
tural group selection also requires some sort of group conflicts. Yet, such conflicts
are inevitable in an unstable environment and do not need additional outgroup
hostility. If a group of egoists runs out of food because the territory provides too
little food so as to feed all selfish groups in it, they also start fighting against the
other groups. This is because in so doing, there is at least the chance to survive.
Otherwise, they are dead for sure.
After examining parochial altruism, let us consider another explanation for
agent-relative social preferences. It comprises the idea that humans rather interact
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with people they are familiar with than unfamiliar people. We call this phenome-
non anxiety about the unknown. Such anxieties can be observed in an intergroup
context. An interaction with an outgroup member leads to more stress and anxiety
than an interaction with a fellow ingroup member (Shelton et al., 2009; Trawal-
ter et al., 2012). Moreover, there is a positive correlation between the anxiety
about the unknown and ingroup favouritism (Paolini et al., 2006). Thus, our agent-
relative social preferences seem not only to derive from the groups we are part
of and those we are not part of but also from groups we know and those we do
not know. Of course, it seems natural that our ingroup is also the group we know
and the outgroup the one we do not know. This insight leads to the following
reasoning: If we simply get to know the outgroup better, our anxiety and stress
produced by the outgroup decreases. In turn, this should shrink ingroup favouring
preferences.
This is precisely what the contact hypothesis describes: Provided that the con-
ditions for contact are advantageous, contact between members of two groups
reduces prejudices towards the outgroup (Allport, 1979).67 There are three psy-
chological processes behind the contact hypothesis: decategorisation, attitude
generalisation, and recategorisation. First, the outgroup member with whom you
interact is no longer perceived as part of the outgroup but as an individual which
reduces prejudices towards that specific outgroup member (Brewer & Miller,
1984, 1988; Miller, 2002). Second, this change of attitude towards the specific
outgroup member is transferred to the outgroup as a whole (Brown & Hewstone,
2005; Wilder et al., 1996). Third, due to these changes of attitudes towards the
outgroup the two groups are reappraised and might ultimately form a common
ingroup identity (Gaertner et al., 2016; Kite & Whitley, 2016).
There is ample evidence for the contact hypothesis. Pettigrew and Tropp (2006)
conducted a meta-analysis, which consisted of 515 studies. They found a nega-
tive effect of intergroup contact on prejudice with an effect size of 0.22. Given
the four prejudice reducing conditions of contact defined by Allport (1979) were
encountered, the effect size even rose to 0.29. Thus, contact seems to truly reduce
prejudices.
67 Allport (1979) defined four conditions for positive intergroup contact: (1)Groups have equal
status. (2) Groups have to work together cooperatively in order to achieve a superordinate
goal. (3) Groups have the possibility to get acquainted with each other (and to become friends
(Pettigrew, 1998)). (4) Intergroup contact occurs in a context of supporting of authorities, law,
or customs. While these conditions are promotive for positive intergroup contact, they are not
necessary (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).
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So, is ingroup favouritism simply a question of familiarity? The answer is
no. First, as can be seen, even with advantageous conditions the prejudice redu-
cing effect of contact is barely moderate. Second, even if prejudices get smaller,
this does not necessarily have to affect behaviour. For example, Jackman and
Crane (1986) indeed found evidence that contact has a positive impact on stan-
dard measures of racial affect. However, this impact had little effect on white
people’s support for political policies designed to redress racial inequalities: “In
other words, intimate contact promoted emotional acceptance of Blacks, just as
the contact hypothesis predicts. However, it left unaltered a resilient core of con-
servative attitudes that led members of a dominant group to defend their privileges
and to accept the kinds of inequalities that prevent the optimal conditions for con-
tact from being implemented.”68 (Dixon et al., 2005, p. 706) Yet, other studies
come to a different conclusion. They find that if the advantaged group has con-
tact with the disadvantaged one, the former is more likely to approve political
measurements that improve the situation of the latter (Dixon et al., 2007; Cakal
et al., 2011). Third, there is evidence which suggests that a common ingroup
identity increases outgroup derogation towards those groups that both the former
ingroup and outgroup perceive as outgroups. For instance, Kessler and Mummen-
dey (2001) examined group identity prior and after the German reunification.
Prior to the reunification, West and East Germany had viewed each other as
outgroups. Then, after the reunification, there were two identity-clusters. Some
Germans developed a strong common ingroup identity as simply Germans, whe-
reas others mainly derived their ingroup identity from regional markers and thus
developed a weaker common identity. The authors found that on one hand, those
with the stronger common ingroup identity displayed less prejudice towards the
former outgroup than those who developed a weaker common ingroup identity.
Yet, on the other hand, those who strongly identified themselves as Germans after
the reunification expressed more prejudice against non-Germans compared to the
rather regional identifiers. Therefore, through intergroup contact, overall ingroup
favouritism has not vanished. Instead, the categorisation of ingroup and outgroup
has simply changed. In conclusion, anxiety about the unknown appears to play
a role in ingroup favouritism. However, familiarity alone is not the reason why
humans display ingroup favouritism.69
68 It has to be noticed that to defend one’s privileges does not require ingroup favouring
preferences. Someone with egoistic preferences might do the same. Yet, it excludes that white
people developed altruistic preferences towards black people.
69 The ultimate explanation for anxiety of the unknown will be given in section 4.1.1, where
we introduce the belief in the superiority of familiar alternatives.
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To finish this chapter, let us examine the following thought: As we have seen,
culture and cultural norms seem to have been essential in the evolution of human
altruism. So, would it be possible to alter culture in such a way that ingroup
favouritism vanishes? The ideas and theories presented in this chapter suggest
that (weak) parochial altruism, which might originally have been a cultural adap-
tation, is encoded into the human brain. Concurrent with that, “in all societies,
individuals view themselves as part of defined social groupings (ingroups) cha-
racterized by mutual cooperation and reciprocal obligation (Levine & Campbell,
1972; Sumner, 1906)” (Brewer & Yuki, 2007, p. 307). This seems to imply that
ingroup favouritism cannot be fundamentally eliminated by culture (at least not
in the short run).
Yet, even though the capacity for social identity seems to be hardwired and
universal, where we draw the line between ingroup and outgroup is not (Turner
et al., 1987). As mentioned in section 3.1.2, perceived similarity and dissimilarity
plays an important role in social categorisation. But whether we perceive someone
as similar and thus part of the ingroup or dissimilar and thus part of the outgroup
can be manipulated (cf. Levine et al., 2005). Therefore, a culture that emphasises
similarity between all individuals could be able to diminish ingroup favouritism.
In so doing, it “tricks” the apparent human nature to mainly be altruistic towards
the ingroup by making us perceive more and more people as ingroup members.70
Theoretically, it is even possible that the ingroup at one point includes all humans
and as a result there is no outgroup left. However, it is unclear whether such
a situation would lead to universal altruism or complete personalisation. Maybe
humans always need an outgroup in order to define the ingroup towards which
they behave altruistically (Hogg, 2001). In the absence of an outgroup, altruism
would decay. Yet, there is also evidence indicating that a sense of “Us” is possible
without “Them” which might enable universal altruism (Gaertner et al., 2006). As
a consequence, while culture cannot alter our predisposition for parochial altruism
and social identity in the short term, it should be able to change the scope of the
ingroup towards which we behave prosocially. And given that the ingroup either
includes all humans or only the individual himself, ingroup favouritism could
disappear.
To quickly summarise this subchapter, there are two evolutionary concepts
that could have led to agent-relative social preferences: strong parochial altruism
and weak parochial altruism. Strong parochial altruism requires substantial human
70 Similarly, a culture that involves the exact opposite of what we describe in this paragraph
might also diminish ingroup favouritism. By emphasising dissimilarity, it leads to smaller
ingroups which at one point might only include the individual himself. Such a situation
would lead to complete personalisation.
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belligerence because only if this is the case, a group selection mechanism emer-
ges that makes both parochialism and altruism adaptive. In turn, weak parochial
altruism requires cultural adaptations, cultural group selection, and gene-culture
coevolution, yet, no non-instrumental intergroup aggression. These two evolutio-
nary theories are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, they can be complemented
with the idea of anxiety about the unknown. Further research is needed so as to
define how important each of these three concepts were in the course of human
evolution.
To conclude the whole section 3.3, social preferences have different sources.
On one hand, there are the four widely accepted evolutionary theories of altruism,
namely kin altruism, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, and costly signal-
ling. On the other hand, there are the more controversial ideas of gene-culture
coevolution combined with cultural group selection and parochialism that might
have provoked a sort of group (norm) selection mechanisms. By means of these
mechanisms we can explain why human preferences are agent-relative. But alt-
hough especially gene-culture coevolution in combination with cultural group
selection appear to be promising candidates so as to explicate all aspects of
altruism, the existence of these mechanisms is still disputed. Given they have
not existed, we have to declare agent-relative preferences as maladaptations. Yet,
this hypothesis is not really convincing, which is why we do not stick to it in this
dissertation. Then, the anxiety about the unknown might also have played a role in
the formation of our preferences. This is because it leads to mistrust of strangers
and since strangers are typically outgroup members, this mistrust might spread to
the outgroup in general. Finally, the evidence presented in this chapter suggests
that agent-relative social preferences truly evolved. As a result, taste-based dis-
crimination seems to actually exist and is not simply statistical discrimination in
disguise.
108 3 Where Does Taste-Based Discrimination Come From?
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use,
sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you
give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative
Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third partymaterial in this chapter are included in the chapter’sCreative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly
from the copyright holder.
4HowDoWe Get Our Beliefsfor Statistical Discrimination?
From a decision theoretical perspective, there is one major question that the
concept of statistical discrimination raises: When is it rational to have a cer-
tain belief and use it for statistical discrimination and when not? By definition,
the correctness of a statistical difference between two or more groups regarding
some characteristic is not a requirement for statistical discrimination (Lippert-
Rasmussen, 2014). You also discriminate statistically if the difference and / or its
relevance does not actually exist but you believe it to exist. But what defines the
boundary between a rational and an irrational belief then?
On one hand, this is important so as to generally distinguish rational stati-
stical discrimination from irrational statistical discrimination, meaning statistical
discrimination that stems from irrational beliefs. On the other hand, from an empi-
rically observational perspective, we need to know this boundary so as to be able
to detect whether a decision is based on pure statistical discrimination or involves
hidden taste-based discrimination. For example, an employer might not employ
any women because he believes that the performance of women is statistically
significantly worse than the one of men. If asked whether there is any proof for
his statement, he might cite some article he read that came to this conclusion or
his own experience: Of the last ten employees he had to fire, eight were female.
For him, this is enough proof to believe that women perform worse than men.
Now, are the employer’s beliefs rational and, as a result, is not hiring any women
merely applied statistical discrimination? Or is he a misogynist and thus a taste-
based discriminator who wants to hide his resentment to women behind dubious
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beliefs that actually are irrational (and he knows that)?1 Or does the decision-
maker simply possess irrational beliefs, regardless whether he is a taste-based
discriminator or not?
Let us look at what subjective expected utility theory says about this problem.
Gilboa et al. (2012) write: “In modern economic thought, a decision maker who
satisfies Savage (1954) axioms, and behaves as if they entertain a prior proba-
bility over a state space [the set of all scenarios], will be considered a rational
decision maker under uncertainty, and may be viewed as having rational beliefs.”
(p. 12) Although the authors mention Savage’s axioms this is also true in case of
the assumptions that we needed for the Anscombe-Aumann representation theo-
rem. Therefore, in subjective expected utility theory the rationality of beliefs is
solely defined by internal consistency. In turn, which beliefs, or more precisely the
subjective probabilities they result in, are internally consistent is defined by the
assumptions needed for the Savage or Anscombe-Aumann representation theo-
rem.2 This leads to the consequence that beliefs, which are highly implausible,
can still be declared as rational as long as they are consistent with the other beliefs
of the decision-maker.3
How does a rational decision-maker integrate new information into his current
beliefs? In light of new data, a prior belief should be updated to a posterior belief




This means if new evidence e is more likely in scenario si than generally, the
posterior probability of scenario si increases. In contrast, given that new evidence
e is less likely in scenario si than generally, the posterior probability of scenario
si decreases.
1 This would imply that in the deciding situation he actually uses rational beliefs but has a
taste for men and thus only hires men. When confronted by others, he tries to hide this taste
for men behind irrational beliefs that he defends as being rational although he knows that they
are not rational. Yet, it is also possible that he is not aware of the fact that he is a taste-based
discriminator and really thinks that his different treatment is due to statistical discrimination
(although it is actually due to taste-based discrimination).
2 This of course includes the three assumptions of probability theory defined by Kolmogorov
(1933) that were presented in section 2.3.
3 There are economists that criticise such an understanding of rational beliefs (e.g. Gilboa
et al., 2012).
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For example, an employer with agent-neutral preferences has a native and a
foreign applicant with equal qualifications. There are three possible scenarios: s1
= “native applicant is more productive”; s2 = “foreign applicant is more pro-
ductive”; and s3 = “both applicants are equally productive”. Now, the employer
believes that native workers are generally more productive than foreign workers.
Therefore, he assigns s1 a higher subjective probability than s2 (e.g. p1 = 0.8,
p2 = 0.1, and p3 = 0.1) and consequently hires the native worker. Yet, after
two weeks he fires him due to low productivity. Luckily, the foreign applicant is
still looking for a job. The employer hires him and observes that he is much more
productive than any native worker in the company. Because of this new evidence,
he updates his prior belief that native workers are generally more productive than
foreign workers and thereby also his subjective probabilities for s1, s2, and s3.
The result is some posterior belief as for example native and foreign workers are
on average equally productive leading to posterior subjective probabilities such as
p1 = 0.2, p2 = 0.2, and p3 = 0.6.
We see that from a decision theoretical point of view, the actual content of a
decision-maker’s beliefs is irrelevant for whether his actions are rational or not.
As long as the following two requirements are fulfilled, the decision-maker is a
rational statistical discriminator: (1) His beliefs are internally consistent and thus
his preference orderings satisfy the seven assumptions needed for the Anscombe-
Aumann representation theorem. (2) He updates these beliefs or more precisely
the subjective probabilities they result in by use of Bayes’ law. In turn, these two
requirements for rational beliefs lead us to the following consequence: While sub-
jective expected utility theory determines how posterior beliefs should be formed,
it does not offer a theory of prior belief generation (Gilboa et al., 2012).
There are two opinions in the literature on how a decision situation with no
prior evidence that is linked to it should be handled (Kolmar, forthcoming). On
one hand, objective Bayesianism says that a decision-maker should apply the prin-
ciple of insufficient reason. This principle implies that given there are n mutually
exclusive and collectively exhaustive scenarios that are only distinguishable by
their names, each scenario should have a probability equal to 1/n (Jaynes, 1968).
On the other hand, subjective Bayesianism states that valid priors solely have to
fulfil the three assumptions of probability theory (cf. Kolmogorov, 1933). As a
consequence, a decision-maker can freely choose his prior beliefs as long as they
adhere to this requirement (de Finetti, 1937).
Now, in light of new information, a decision-maker’s prior belief is of course of
utter importance for the formation of his posterior belief. Let’s take an example of
Gilboa et al. (2012): “Consider a graduate student who believes that he is among
the best economists in the world. Assume that he assigns probability 1 to this
event, and that he takes decisions so as to maximize his expected utility with
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respect to these views. In the face of new evidence (failing prelims for example),
he employs Bayes’s rule to update his probability. But since he ascribes zero
probability to the event that he is not a supremely gifted economist, his updated
beliefs are that his professors are simply not sufficiently smart to recognize the
depth and importance of his ideas.” (p. 13) This behaviour is perfectly rational out
of the perspective of decision theory if throughout the process the student satisfies
all seven assumptions needed for subjective expected utility theory. Yet, from an
intuitive perspective, we probably agree that the student needs to be treated as
delusional.
We can think of a similar example regarding a group specific belief, such
as a person who believes with probability 1 that men are more intelligent than
women. In case of new disconfirming information, he would reinterpret it in a
way that allows him to keep up his prior belief. Declaring such behaviour as
rational is somewhat unsatisfying though. Therefore, in this chapter, we want
to closer examine how we truly form and update our beliefs and thereby see
whether groups and group memberships are relevant in these processes as well.
In so doing, we make use of 19 biases, which are listed in table 4.1.4 First,
we look whether humans might have inherent prior beliefs that are directly or
indirectly linked to groups. Second, we consider whether we truly update our
beliefs by use of Bayes’ law. Third, we analyse society’s role in belief generation
and particularly preservation.
4.1 Inherent Prior Beliefs
The idea of this chapter is that there are beliefs which are not learned but inher-
ently held by humans without the need of prior evidence. In turn, these inherent
beliefs shine through in our biases. In section 2.3, we partitioned a decision-
maker’s beliefs b: βθ comprises group unspecific beliefs and βμ group specific
beliefs (except A, which is a own category). These two partitions can now again
be partitioned into inherent and learned beliefs, where γ stands for inherent and
λ stands for learnt.5 This leads to four types of beliefs (A excluded): βθγ , βθλ ,
βμγ , and βμλ .
4 Appendix B reveals how these 19 biases were chosen and appendix C introduces each of
these 19 biases in more detail. Both appendices can be found in the electronic supplementary
material.
5 The principle of insufficient reason could be seen as an inherent group unspecific belief that
helps us to assign subjective probabilities in a decision situation where no prior evidence is
available and scenarios appear symmetric.
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Table 4.1 The relevant biases for chapter 4
Decision-Making, Belief, and Behavioural Biases
Representativeness
heuristic
The unconscious inference that high representativeness of an
object regarding a category automatically implies high probability
that the object also belongs to that category (Kahneman, 2011).
Availability heuristic The unconscious inference that high availability of an incident or
characteristic implies high probability/frequency of these
(Kahneman, 2011).
Illusory correlations Beliefs that incorrectly link a category with certain attributes or
another category (Meiser & Hewstone, 2006).
Omission bias People tend to judge harmful omissions as (morally) better than
equally harmful actions (Baron & Ritov 2004).
Negativity bias Humans have a tendency to weigh negative entities such as
personal traits, objects, or events more heavily than positive ones
(Rozin & Royzman, 2001).
Loss aversion The tendency that losses loom larger than same sized gains
(Kahneman, 2011).
Status quo bias People tend to remain at the current state of affairs and prefer it to
possible changes (Kahneman et al., 1991).
Confirmation bias The human tendency to seek or interpret evidence in ways that
are confirming existing beliefs, hypothesis, or expectations
(Nickerson, 1998).
Backfire effect Disconfirming evidence might not lead to an adaption but
reinforcement of previous beliefs (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010).
Continued influence
effect
After a misinformation, which was initially presumed to be
correct, has been corrected it can still influence a person’s belief
(Johnson & Seifert, 1994).
Semmelweis reflex The tendency to reject new evidence because it contradicts
established norms, beliefs, or paradigms (Mortell et al., 2013).
(continued)
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Table 4.1 (continued)
Social Biases
Outgroup homogeneity bias The belief that outgroup members are all alike, whereas
ingroup members are diverse (Park & Judd, 1990).
Ultimate attribution error The phenomenon that people overemphasise situational
factors in case of negative behaviour of their own group but
personal factors in case of negative behaviour of other
groups. Moreover, positive acts tend to be attributed to
situational factors less when they are performed by an
ingroup member than when they are performed by an
outgroup member (Pettigrew, 1979).
Linguistic intergroup bias The way people describe the behaviours of the ingroup and
outgroup varies in their level of abstraction. Positive ingroup
and negative outgroup behaviours tend to be described in
abstract terms. Negative descriptions of the ingroup and
positive descriptions of outgroups are prone to be made in
concrete terms (Maass et al., 1989).
Memory Errors and Biases
Illusion of truth effect People are more likely to believe a statement they
previously heard than an unfamiliar one (Begg et al., 1992).
Stereotypical bias Stereotypes can distort our memory (Payne et al., 2004).
Rosy retrospection The tendency to remember past events as having been more
positive than they actually were (Norman, 2009).
Hindsight bias The propensity to perceive an event that has happened as
having been predictable even if it was not or very little
predictable (Wood, 1978).
Choice-supportive bias When remembering past choices, people tend to attribute
positive features to chosen options and negative features to
rejected options (Henkel & Mather, 2007).
Given there truly are inherent prior beliefs, these must have emerged and
prevailed in the course of evolution, which implies that there should be an evo-
lutionary ultimate explanation for them. Therefore, this chapter has three goals:
(1) if possible, bundle various biases that seem to be manifestations of the same
inherent belief; (2) find an evolutionary ultimate explanation for the existence
of the inherent belief; and (3) see whether these biases are universal so as to
strengthen the argument that they truly are inherent and not learned. It has to be
highlighted that particularly the last two goals are a rather speculative endeavour
since in this area, research is often scarce.
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In the first part, we examine an inherent belief that is actually group unspecific,
yet, can still affect group outcomes indirectly. Here, the following biases are of
relevance: rosy retrospection, choice supportive bias, omission bias, loss aversion,
negativity bias, and the status quo bias. In the second part, we concentrate on
group specific inherent beliefs that derive from the outgroup homogeneity bias,
the ultimate attribution error, and the linguistic intergroup bias.
4.1.1 Prior Beliefs about Familiar and Unfamiliar Alternatives
If we analyse table 4.1, it seems like there is a superordinate cluster that inheres
the following characteristics: Multiple biases make us wrongly anticipate the uti-
lity of familiar and / or unfamiliar alternatives. We can formulate this as follows:
A choice set F contains two alternatives, where f1 is familiar and f2 is unfamiliar
to the decision-maker. This leads to three scenarios: s1 = “familiar alternative is
better”, s2 = “unfamiliar alternative is better”, and s3 = “both alternatives are
equally good / bad”. Of course, if p1 is larger than p2, the decision-maker choo-
ses the familiar alternative or vice versa. However, the fact that he has hardly any
information about the unfamiliar alternative f2 complicates the formation of prior
subjective probabilities.
Now, in such a situation, it seems that we systematically overestimate p1 and
thereby the subjective probability of s1 due to the following biases. They do so in
different ways. Rosy retrospection and the choice supportive bias make us over-
estimate the positivity of the past respectively past choices and thereby what we
are familiar with (Norman, 2009; Henkel & Mather, 2007). The omission bias
makes us overestimate the expected utility of the status quo (the familiar option)
because we judge harmful omissions as (morally) better than equally harmful
actions (Baron & Ritov 2004). Loss aversion and the negativity bias make us
underestimate the expected utility of the unfamiliar alternative because we empha-
sis the dangers of the unfamiliar alternative and neglect its opportunities (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1991; Rozin & Royzman, 2001).6 Finally, the status quo bias either
makes us overestimate the expected utility of the status quo or underestimate that
6 It is important to notice that this is only one side of loss aversion. The other side is that if
our status quo is threatened, we rather defend it even though its expected value is lower and
variance higher than those of the unfamiliar alternative. For example, there is a lottery with
two options: (A) lose $1000 or $0 each with 50 % chance; (B) lose $450 for sure. Here, many
would choose option A although its expected value is lower and variance higher (Kahneman,
2011). But they do so because option A provides the only chance to remain the status quo.
This also demonstrates that loss aversion is not the same as risk aversion.
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of change (Kahneman et al., 1991). To summarise, these biases lead to a systema-
tic distortion of our predictions: If confronted with change, we overestimate the
expected utility that the familiar alternative provides while underestimating the
expected utility of the unfamiliar alternative. As a consequence of this, our sub-
jective probability of the scenario which comprises that the familiar alternative is
better turns out larger than it should be. We call this the belief in the superiority
of familiar alternatives.
Of course, this last paragraph could be a fallacy. How should we know that
people truly systematically over- and underestimate the expected utility of familiar
respectively unfamiliar alternatives and not simply have a preference for familiar
alternatives (or are anxious about the unknown)? For example, let’s assume that
someone refuses to buy a computer and rather handles all administrational and
informational matters analogue. The reason for that could be a status quo bias
because of which he underestimates the expected utility of the new technology
and / or overestimates the costs that are linked to this change. Yet, it could also
be that he correctly anticipates the expected utility of buying a computer and still
does not choose this alternative because maintaining the old-fashioned, familiar
way to handle his matters simply provides him more expected utility. If this is the
case, sticking to the status quo is not an expression of a bias but a preference.
The decisive question to solve this problem is as follows: How good are we
at predicting future positive and negative affects? Given we anticipate positive
and negative affects equally well (or badly), there should not be a systematic
over- and underestimation of familiar respectively unfamiliar alternatives. Howe-
ver, given we tend to overestimate negative future affects, we do not simply have
a preference for the familiar alternative but a belief in the superiority of familiar
alternatives. Before we get to the explanation of this statement let us look at the
evidence in the affective forecasting literature. First of all, there is a broad consen-
sus that our affective forecasting abilities are limited (e.g. Buehler & McFarland,
2001; Sanna & Schwarz, 2004; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). We tend to overesti-
mate the intensity and duration of our affective reactions in case of various focal
events. This phenomenon is called the impact bias (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003).
Second, this impact bias displays a positive-negative asymmetry, meaning that it is
much more pronounced for negative events compared to positive events (Buehler
& McFarland, 2001; Gilbert et al., 1998; Finkenauer et al., 2007). For exam-
ple, Finkenauer et al. (2007) examined participants’ ability to forecast their affect
when they passed or failed their driving test. While affective forecasting differed
from experienced affect in general, this was particularly true for negative affect.
The authors summarise that “these findings closely replicate previous findings on
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the positive-negative asymmetry for the impact bias. In their forecasts, partici-
pants overestimate the intensity of their negative affect following the failure of an
important exam much more than they overestimate their positive affect following
the success of an important exam.” (p. 1159)
The apparent positive-negative asymmetry of the impact bias strengthens our
idea of a belief in the superiority of familiar alternatives. Since we are already
experienced with the familiar alternative / the status quo, we are comparatively
good at forecasting the affect that it produces. Contrary to that, in case of the
unfamiliar alternative we overestimate the negative affect it might lead to. As a
result, there are situations where we rather choose the familiar alternative / stick
to the status quo than trying something new even though the unfamiliar alternative
would actually have provided more expected utility. Yet, we did not realise that
due to wrongly assigned subjective probabilities.
Now, are the above-mentioned biases linked to the impact bias and thereby dis-
play a positive-negative asymmetry? We begin with loss aversion. Loss aversion
is usually explained via the asymmetrical impact of losses and gains, meaning
that losses loom larger than same sized gains (Kahneman, 2011). Yet, most expe-
riments that came to this inference either involved hypothetical decisions or did
not measure the actual affective response after the decision was made and the
outcome experienced. So, it is unclear whether loss aversion might actually stem
from an affective forecasting error (at least partly). Kermer et al. (2006) investi-
gated this question. In accordance with loss aversion, they found that participants
predicted losses to have a greater emotional impact than gains of equal magni-
tude in a gambling task. Yet, when participants actually gambled, the impact of
losses (and to a lesser degree also gains) was smaller than they predicted. In other
words, the authors found an impact bias with a positive-negative asymmetry.
Regret is an essential element of the omission bias. This is because people
seem to expect that bad effects of actions lead to greater regret than bad effects
of omissions (Ritov & Baron, 1995). As a consequence, given that a decision-
maker wants to avoid regret, he tends to prefer omissions to actions. Yet, as the
affective forecasting literature shows, expected regret does not have to match with
experienced regret, with the former tending to be larger than the latter (Gilbert
et al., 2004). Now, the omission bias has often been connected with the decision
not to vaccinate (Ritov & Baron, 1990; Asch et al., 1994; Brown et al., 2010).
Chapman and Coups (2006) examined anticipated and experienced regret regar-
ding the decision to get a flu shot. They found that those who got the flu shot
massively overestimated how much regret this decision would evoke. In contrast,
those who did not get a flu shot showed no significant difference between antici-
pated and experienced regret. As a consequence, compared to omissions, people
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seem to overestimate the expected regret that the effects of an action might lead
to. In turn, this implies that the omission bias is at least partly due to affective
forecasting errors.
Unfortunately, there is no study that directly links the status quo bias with
affective forecasting. Nevertheless, there are indications that affective forecasting
could be relevant here as well. This is because loss aversion and regret avoidance
are said to be important mechanisms behind the status quo bias (Anderson, 2003;
Kahneman et al., 1991; Eidelman & Crandall, 2012). So, if affective forecasting
errors are relevant for them, they should also be relevant for the status quo bias.
This implicates that “at least sometimes, the tendency to stick to the status quo
results from affective forecasts rather than from affective experience”. (Zamir,
2014, p. 271).
What about the negativity bias, rosy retrospection, and the choice-supportive
bias? The negativity bias is connected with loss aversion because it involves that
we weigh negative outcomes more heavily than positive outcomes (Hochman &
Yechiam, 2011). Due to that it is not far-fetched to assume the positive-negative
asymmetry of the impact bias and the negativity bias are somehow intertwined.
Within rosy retrospection, we can directly identify the impact bias. For example,
Mitchell et al. (1997) showed that anticipation of holidays was generally more
positive than actual experience, which is equivalent to the impact bias regarding
positive events. So far, so good. Now, interestingly, in retrospection the holidays
were perceived more positively than they actually had been in the moment of
experience. A prominent explanation for this effect is that negative affect tends
to fade faster than positive affect (Ritchie et al., 2015). Consequently, if people
had to again choose a holiday trip, they would overestimate the positivity of those
already chosen in the past which leads to an affective forecasting error. Finally,
the choice-supportive bias has per se nothing to do with affective forecasting.
Yet, as rosy retrospection, it might help to maintain an impact bias in case of
already chosen options. The bias includes that “[w]hen remembering past choices,
people tend to attribute positive features to chosen options and negative features
to rejected options” (Henkel & Mather, 2007, p. 163). This is even true if they
misremember or got misled concerning their actually chosen option. Therefore,
compared to rejected options, people seem to overestimate the positivity of chosen
options. In turn, this would lead to affective forecasting errors if a choice set,
among others, also includes a formerly chosen option.
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We see that the analysis of this chapter’s biases regarding their connection
to affective forecasting indicates that they at least sometimes do influence the
formation of subjective probabilities. At this, they seem to promote a belief in
the superiority of familiar alternatives. Now, out of an evolutionary perspective,
it is on first sight questionable why such an inherent belief should be adaptive. It
could be argued that sticking to the familiar alternative should only make sense if
the expected consequences of the familiar alternative are better than those of the
unfamiliar one. Thus, there should be no favouritism for the familiar alternative
in and of itself. For example, let us assume that an environment has three kinds
of berries (berry 1, 2, and 3) and two populations (group A and group B). While
group A does not belief in the superiority of familiar alternatives, group B does.
Now, both groups try all three berries and realise that berry 2 and 3 are inedible,
whereas berry 1 is nutritious and well-tolerated. As a consequence, both groups
exclusively eat berry 1. After a few generations, the groups still only eat berry 1
although their members have never tried the other berries. All of a sudden, a new
berry (berry 4) appears. Group A tries this new berry and realises that it is even
better than berry 1. Thus, they start to mainly eat berry 4 and in so doing increase
their fitness. Meanwhile, group B does not try this new berry and simply sticks
to the status quo. Since fitness of the members of group A is higher than that of
the members of group B, the former should supersede the latter as time goes by.
Of course, this example is very simplified. However, precisely food is an area
where familiarity is crucial to us. The popular proverb “some people won’t eat
anything they’ve never seen before” demonstrates this. Indeed, our eating habits
are highly correlated with our culture. While eating cats, dogs, or guinea pigs is
unthinkable in Europe, in other countries it is a common dish. However, even
within their own food culture, most people order the same food in the same
restaurants most of the time (Hall, 1992). Why are we not more adventurous?
Rozin (1990) argues that our scepticism in new food functions as a defence sys-
tem against potentially dangerous substances. Thus, unfamiliar food is rejected
because we consciously or unconsciously fear to get poisoned and endanger our
health.7 The finding that the degree of perceived dangerousness of food predicts
the subsequent willingness to try unfamiliar food supports this hypothesis (Pliner
et al., 1993; Lähteenmäki & Arvola, 2001).
7 Of course, if food is scarce in general, you should not be too picky because otherwise you
die due to malnutrition. Thus, this explanation is based on the underlying environmental
assumption that food was not scarce but rather abundant. We will discuss the importance of
these environmental assumptions in a moment.
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Can we expand this explanation for why we favour familiar food on fami-
liar alternatives in general? Let us begin with the theoretical concept that lies
underneath that explanation: error management theory (Haselton & Buss, 2000;
Haselton & Nettle, 2006; Johnson et al., 2013). “Error management theory … app-
lies the principles of signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966) to judgment
tasks in order to make predictions about evolved cognitive design.” (Haselton
et al., 2015, p. 972) The idea is as follows: The goal of our cognitive mechanisms
is not per se accuracy (e.g. Fodor, 2001) but adaptiveness (e.g. Tooby & Cosmides,
1990). While these two sometimes go together, they do not have to. There are two
reasons why this is true. First, our cognitive mechanisms are seldomly perfectly
accurate. Normally, real-world judgments involve an irreducible amount of uncer-
tainty. As a consequence, our cognitive mechanisms produce errors. Second, there
are two kinds of errors: false negative (failing to take an action that would have
been better to take) and false positive (taking an action that would have been
better not to take). For example, if you do not eat a certain berry because you
think that it is not edible, yet, it actually is, we have a case of false negative.
In contrast, if you eat a certain berry because you think that it is edible, yet, it
actually is not, we have a case of false positive. Now, given the costs of these
two errors are exactly the same, ceteris paribus, the more accurate you are the
higher is your fitness. However, this is no longer true if the costs of false negative
and false positive are asymmetric. Let us illustrate this by means of a fire detec-
tor. Here, the two possible errors are as follows: (1) The fire detector bells even
though there is no fire (false positive). (2) The fire detector does not bell even
though there is a fire (false negative). Of course, here, the costs of false negative
typically are much higher than those of false positive. Thus, a fire detector is not
designed to be as accurate as possible and thereby minimise the overall error rate
but to detect as many fires as possible and thereby minimise false negatives: You
rather have an alarm system that occasionally bells even though there is no fire
than an alarm system that occasionally does not bell although there is a fire, yet,
overall is more accurate (Haselton & Nettle, 2006).8
8 Minimise false negative errors does not automatically mean that there should be none of
these errors. If this were the case, the alarm would simply have to bell all the time. Yet,
then, the fire detector becomes obsolete. So, there is a trade-off between minimising false
negative errors and minimising overall errors, which has to be considered when designing a
fire detector.
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If we apply these considerations on the evolution of cognitive mechanisms,
we realise that they are not designed to minimise our total error rate but the net
effect of error on fitness. As Haselton et al. (2016) write: “Where one error is
consistently more damaging to fitness than the other, EMT [error management
theory] predicts that a bias toward making the less costly error will evolve— this
is because it is better to make more errors overall as long as they are relatively
cheap.” (p. 973) That is exactly what we might observe in case of food, particu-
larly in regard to children (Cashdan, 1998; Dovey, 2010). Provided that there is
abundant food, trying unfamiliar food that actually is poisonous is costlier than
not trying some unfamiliar food that actually is edible. As a result, we favour
familiar food so as to minimise false positive. Indeed, such a cognitive mecha-
nism leads to more errors than one whose purpose is to be as accurate as possible.
Yet, they are relatively inexpensive and therefore better than occasional disastrous
errors.
Now, the emergence of an inherent belief in the superiority of familiar alterna-
tives needs the following circumstances: The costs of the possible errors regarding
the decision of whether a familiar or an unfamiliar alternative should be chosen
are at least sometimes asymmetric. And given they are asymmetric, the costs of
choosing an unfamiliar alternative although it provides less expected utility are
generally higher than the costs of not choosing an unfamiliar alternative although
it would provide more expected utility. But could such a belief truly evolve?
In order to answer this question, we have to ask a follow-up question, namely,
how much openness for unfamiliar options was most adaptive in our past environ-
ment. As mentioned several times, the costs of false negative and false positive
depend on the environment. For instance, if food is scarce, the costs of not trying
unfamiliar food although it is edible can be higher than those of trying unfamiliar
food although it is not edible. This is true if familiar food alone is not sufficient
to guarantee survival either way. Thus, if you never try unfamiliar food because
you are not open to unfamiliar alternatives, you die from malnutrition for sure. In
contrast, if you try unfamiliar food because you are open to unfamiliar alternati-
ves, you might die from food poisoning but maybe also find a new edible food
source that enables your survival. In other words, if the bird in the hand is not
enough either way, you better go for the two in the bush.
Importantly, even if the environment led to cost asymmetry that either pro-
moted a bias towards familiar or unfamiliar alternatives, this does not imply that
people would therefore always choose the respective alternative. Let’s take the
belief in the superiority of familiar alternatives. It says that we overestimate the
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subjective probability that the familiar alternative is better. Yet, despite this overe-
stimation, our subjective probability that the unfamiliar alternative is better might
still be higher, which is why we then choose the unfamiliar alternative.
Now, given we truly have an inherent belief in the superiority of familiar alter-
natives, the environment in which humans evolved had to be stable enough in
order that false negative became costlier than false positive. However, since insta-
bility can have countless manifestations it is hardly possible to precisely determine
how stable the environment needed to be in order that false positive was costlier
than false negative. The only thing we know for sure is that our environment
was not completely stable (e.g. Martrat et al., 2004). As a result, the question of
whether our environment truly led to such a cost asymmetry is a bit pointless.
So, let us rather examine a consequence that would stem from an inherent belief
in the superiority of familiar: Given such a belief evolved during the course of
evolution, it should be culture invariant.
Wang et al. (2017) examined loss aversion across 53 countries. They used
the questionnaire of Hofstede (2001) on cultural dimensions so as to measure
cultural differences. First of all, the results revealed that loss aversion existed in
all cultures. However, there are substantial differences. Participants of cultures
that score low in individualism, power distance, and masculinity also display a
lower degree of loss aversion.9 Moreover, higher uncertainty avoidance led to
more loss aversion, yet, less significantly than the other three dimensions. So,
while loss aversion could be found in all examined cultures, its precise magnitude
is culture-bound.
Concerning the status quo bias, there is no such cross-cultural analysis. Yet,
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), who studied the status quo bias regarding policy
reforms, provide evidence that people of non-Western countries experience such
a bias as well. They write: “A striking paradox, particularly in developing coun-
tries, is that while trade reform typically turns out to be a boon to large segments
of the private sector, these same groups are rarely enthusiastic about reform early
on. This is a pattern observed in Taiwan and South Korea (early 1960’s), Chile
(1970’s), and Turkey (1980’s) … In all three cases, reform was imposed by autho-
ritarian regimes and against the wishes of business, even though business emerged
as the staunchest defender of outward orientation once the policies were in place.”
(p. 1147)
9 High power distance means that people accept that power is distributed unequally. High
masculinity means that self-assertion, competition, and success are crucial (and for example
not caring, which would be feminine).
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What about the other biases? There is no cross-cultural study regarding the
omission bias. However, there are Asian studies that examine the omission bias.
For example, the sample of Chung et al. (2014) consisted of Korean students.
As in studies with Western subjects, the authors also found an omission bias,
yet, only if participants had a prevention focus, meaning sensitivity to negative
outcomes and losses.10 This makes sense because only a prevention focus sug-
gests higher costs of false positive than false negative and therefore sticking to the
familiar alternative (which is doing nothing).11 Nonetheless, there is at least one
culture that does not show an omission bias. Abarbanell and Hauser (2009) inves-
tigated a small-scale, agrarian Mayan population and found that subjects did not
judge omissions causing harm as better than respective actions.12 Thus, the omis-
sion bias could have a culture component. Yet, it might also be the very culture
of this small-scale, agrarian Mayan population that disperses the omission bias.
Concerning the negativity bias, there is no cross-cultural study, however, studies
that were conducted in China or Japan also report a negativity bias (e.g. Huang
& Luo, 2006; Ito et al., 2017). Unfortunately, no cross-cultural or non-Western
studies could be found for the choice supportive bias and rosy retrospection. To
summarise, the belief in the superiority of familiar alternatives seems not to be
culture-bound, which maintains the hypothesis that it is inherent.
How does this inherent belief affect groups? Let’s say a choice set has two
alternatives with the same characteristics i but providers of different groups. One
provider is identified as being part of M1 and the other as being part of M2, so







assume that there are three scenarios (S = {s1, s2, s3}): s1 = “provider of M1 is
better”, s2 = “provider of M2 is better”, and s3 = “the two providers are equally
good / bad”. The scenarios subjective probabilities are a function of βθγ , βθλ ,
βμγ , βμλ , and A. Now, there are three further assumptions. (1) Regarding M1,
the decision-maker has some / many group specific beliefs, including that M1 is
familiar. (2) Regarding M2, the decision-maker has few group specific beliefs,
including that M2 is unfamiliar. (3) Given the decision-maker cannot retrieve βθγ
that contains the inherent belief in the superiority of familiar alternatives, he is
indifferent between the two alternatives.
10 In contrast, the promotion focus implies sensitivity to positive outcomes and gains.
11 Unfortunately, the authors do not indicate howmany participants had a prevention and how
many a promotion focus.
12 Interestingly, the authors found an omission bias in the less rural and more educatedMayan
comparison group.
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The third assumption is due to the fact that the decision-maker has hardly any
information about the provider of M2, which is why his group specific beliefs are
insufficient so as to properly assess whether s1 or s2 is more likely.13 However,
if he can retrieve βθγ , he can make use of inherent group unspecific beliefs and
thereby the belief in the superiority of familiar alternatives. In this example, the
familiar alternative self-evidently is the one that the person of the familiar group
provides. This leads to a subjective probability distribution on S where p1 is
larger than p2.


















It is important to distinguish the belief in the superiority of familiar alternatives
from anxiety about the unknown that we introduced in section 3.3.3. The belief in
the superiority of familiar alternatives is restricted to the formation of a subjective
probability distribution. In contrast, anxiety about the unknown is equivalent to a
preference for familiar alternatives. Here, even in a situation of decision-making
under certainty, an alternative with characteristics i gives more utility if it is pro-
vided by someone from a familiar compared to an unfamiliar group. In formal
terms, where M f am stands for the familiar and Mun f for the unfamiliar group,
there is a sufficient case of anxiety about the unknown if:
∃xM f ami , x
Mun f












13 In certain situations, group specific beliefs about the familiar group might be sufficient so
as to assess whether s1 or s2 is more likely. For example, if you want to go for dinner and have
two alternatives whereby the familiar provider is a world-famous cook, it is probable that her
meal is better than that of the unfamiliar cook. Of course, the opposite case is also possible
given the familiar cock is known to be extraordinarily bad.
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Yet, despite this crucial difference between anxiety about the unknown and the
belief in the superiority of familiar alternatives, the former’s ultimate explanation
might be provided by error management theory too. When meeting a stranger, you
do not know whether she is friendly or hostile. Given the costs of assuming that
the stranger is friendly although she actually is hostile (false positive) are higher
than vice versa (false negative), it can be adaptive to develop a preference for
familiar providers (cf. Haselton & Nettle, 2006). Moreover, as previously men-
tioned in section 3.3.3, through intergroup contact the unfamiliar provider can
become a familiar provider as well. This then dissolves the difference between
the expected utility of the two alternatives that the belief in the superiority of
familiar alternatives produced since there is no unfamiliar alternative left.
To summarise this chapter, in a decision situation where there is a familiar
alternative and an unfamiliar alternative, people have an inherent belief in the
superiority of the familiar alternative. Error management theory provides an ulti-
mate explanation for this belief. If the costs of false negative and false positive
errors are asymmetric, biased cognitive mechanisms should evolve. Our biases
suggest costlier false positive errors. In turn, this suggests a rather stable envi-
ronment. Yet, it is unclear what that exactly means. We only know that our
environment was not perfectly stable. Finally, our cross-cultural analysis mainly
revealed that favouring familiar alternatives is not limited to Western culture.
Thus, we can maintain the hypothesis that the belief in the superiority of familiar
alternatives has an evolutionary origin and thus is inherent.
4.1.2 Prior Beliefs about the Ingroup and Outgroup
In this chapter we discuss three biases that could be described as inherent prior
beliefs about the ingroup and the outgroup: the outgroup homogeneity bias, the
ultimate attribution error, and the linguistic intergroup bias. In so doing, we have
to keep in mind that since these beliefs concern the ingroup and outgroup their
exact manifestation is intertwined with the holder’s social identity.14 Unfortuna-
tely, there is no literature about the evolution of these three biases. So, while
reading this chapter, it has to be kept in mind that the following explanations are
hypothesises that need further proof. Notwithstanding this limitation, the sole fact
that groups have such conflicting beliefs about each other suggests that they could
not have been formed in an exclusive objective Bayesian way.
14 Appendix D which can be found in the electronic supplementary material reveals the
interaction between social identity and these three biases in more detail.
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Let us begin with the outgroup homogeneity bias. This bias involves the
belief that outgroup members are all alike, whereas ingroup members are diverse
(Linville et al. 1989; Park & Judd, 1990). Kite and Whitley (2016) mainly mention
two lines of explanation for it. (1) Since we have more contact with the ingroup
than with the outgroup, we also have more knowledge about the ingroup, inclu-
ding its diversity. (2) While outgroup members are primarily perceived through
a group perspective, ingroup members are also perceived through an individual
perspective (individuals compare themselves with fellow ingroup members). So,
in case of outgroup members, mainly group membership is salient. Since all out-
group members of one group self-evidently have the same group membership,
they seem rather homogenous. In case of ingroup members, both group member-
ship and individual characteristics are salient. As a result, the ingroup appears
more heterogenous than the outgroup. So, the outgroup homogeneity bias might
not be an adaptation in and of itself but the product of a lack of knowledge and
the unnecessity to further differentiate between outgroup members. This suggests
that the belief that outgroup members are all alike, whereas ingroup members are
diverse is actually learned and not inherent.
But the outgroup homogeneity bias could also be explained via an evolutionary
approach because in intergroup conflicts, perceiving the outgroup as homogenous
can also be fitness enhancing. Normally, in such a situation, there is a clear line:
We are the good ones and our enemies are the bad ones (Brewer, 1999). So, all
outgroup members are viewed as homogenously evil, which decreases empathy
with them, up to the point of dehumanisation (Haslam, 2006; Shilo et al., 2018),
and thereby facilitates the victory over them.15 In his book “All Quiet on the
Western Front”, Erich Maria Remarque (1975) impressively describes a scene,
where a soldier loses his outgroup homogeneity and thereby the thinking that all
enemies are evil. It happens when he deadly wounds an enemy in a ditch and
has to accompany his slow death because it is too dangerous to leave the ditch.
He says to the dead enemy soldier: “Comrade, I did not want to kill you. If you
jumped in here again, I would not do it, if you would be sensible too. But you
were only an idea to me before, an abstraction that lived in my mind and called
forth its appropriate response. It was that abstraction I stabbed. But now, for the
first time, I see you are a man like me. I thought of your hand-grenades, of your
bayonet, of your rifle; now I see your wife and your face and our fellowship.
15 In line with that there is a close relationship between perceived outgroup homogeneity and
the endorsement of outgroup stereotypes (Hewstone&Hamberger, 2000; Park&Hastie, 1987;
Ryan et al., 1996). So, if a stereotype says that the outgroup is evil and someone perceives
the outgroup in a homogenous way, she is likely to extensively endorse that stereotype of an
evil outgroup.
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Forgive me, comrade. We always see it too late. Why do they never tell us that
you are poor devils like us, that your mothers are just as anxious as ours, and
that we have the same fear of death, and the same dying and the same agony—
Forgive me, comrade; how could you be my enemy? If we threw away these rifles
and this uniform you could be my brother just like Kat and Albert. Take twenty
years of my life, comrade, and stand up—take more, for I do not know what I
can even attempt to do with it now.” (p. 100) So, by realising that his enemies are
humans just like himself and not homogeneously evil, he loses the willingness to
kill them. Yet, this willingness is decisive in order to win intergroup conflicts and
consequently in order that one’s own group prevails.
The last two paragraphs provided two possible explanations for the outgroup
homogeneity bias that either followed a learning or an evolutionary approach.
Yet, the outgroup homogeneity bias actually depends on group status (which is
connected to whether the group is part of the minority or majority) and strength of
ingroup identification (Simon & Brown, 1987; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1998; de Cremer,
2001).16 Low status / minority groups are less likely to display an outgroup homo-
geneity bias. In fact, they even tend to perceive the ingroup as more homogenous
than the outgroup. Additionally, the more a person identifies with her ingroup, the
likelier she displays an ingroup homogeneity bias.
Let us first discuss the second phenomenon. Group identification leads to
depersonalisation, meaning the individual adopts the identity and interests of the
group (Brewer, 1999). Consequently, the more a person identifies with a group,
the more that person defines herself in terms of the group. Due to this, when loo-
king at fellow ingroup members, mainly group membership is salient, leading to
the impression of a homogenous group.17 This is compatible with the idea that
people learn the outgroup homogeneity bias. But then again, this whole process
is advantageous in case of intergroup conflicts. This is because individuals who
adopt the interests of their group and thoroughly follow the norm “one for one
and one for all” increase group fitness and thus prevail, given there is a group
selection mechanism. In line with that intergroup conflict elevates group identifi-
cation (cf. Haidt, 2012) and therefore triggers this process that ultimately leads to
higher group fitness, which in turn raises the chances that the group prevails. So,
this appearance of an ingroup homogeneity bias could also have an evolutionary
origin.
16 In fact, the order of comparison is of importance as well (Bartsch & Judd, 1993; Castano
& Yzerbyt, 1998). However, we neglect this here.
17 As we said before, this is what happens anyway in case of the outgroup.
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To continue, there is evidence that minority group members may perceive their
social identity more positively if they regard their ingroup as homogenous. The
reason for this is that ingroup homogeneity is positively linked to ingroup solida-
rity (Lee & Ottati, 1995; Simon & Mummendey, 1990; Simon & Pettigrew, 1990;
Doosje et al., 1995). Behind this proximate explanation, we find the same ultimate
explanation given in the last paragraph. Minority groups do not suffer an outgroup
homogeneity bias but an ingroup homogeneity bias because that increases their
group fitness. Ultimately, this is useful in order to compete against the majority
group. Beside this evolutionary explanation, there is also a learning explanation
for why minority groups perceive themselves as less heterogenous. Societies are
usually dominated by majority / high-status groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001).
Consequently, they have a stronger impact on the determination of cultural beliefs.
Now, due to the outgroup homogeneity bias, these groups spread the belief that
minority / low-status groups are more homogenous. In turn, minority / low-status
groups internalise this culturally dominant belief and start perceiving themselves
as more homogenous than the outgroup.
So, the specifications of the outgroup homogeneity bias can be explained via
both an evolutionary and a learning approach. Which one is more likely to be true?
A meta-analysis of Boldry et al. (2007) provides an indication. First of all, they
found a small but reliable tendency to perceive the outgroup more homogeneous
than the ingroup in the 173 independent samples they examined. Secondly, and
more importantly, this tendency could not be found in case of minimal groups.
This supports the learning hypothesis out of the following reason: In a minimal
group setting, it is not possible to acquire any beliefs about the ingroup and out-
group. Thus, if the belief that a certain outgroup is more homogenous than the
ingroup is learned, we should not find it in case of minimal groups. Otherwise,
if the belief were inherent, we should have also found it when we have not yet
learned any beliefs about the ingroup and outgroup since the inherent belief can
always be retrieved.
Now, given the outgroup homogeneity bias is learned, we might find cultu-
ral differences in its appearance. While there are no proper cross-cultural studies
about the outgroup homogeneity bias, two papers give us a hint about its univer-
sality. Shilo et al. (2018) examined the outgroup homogeneity bias in both Israeli
and German children as well as adults. The results revealed no cultural diffe-
rences, yet, both cultures are also characterised by Western values. Lee and Ottati
(1993) studied the outgroup homogeneity bias of Chinese and American partici-
pants, whereby the respective other group provided the outgroup. They found that
in both cases, Americans were described as more heterogenous than the Chinese.
There are two explanations for this finding: (1) Americans truly are a lot more
4.1 Inherent Prior Beliefs 129
divers than the Chinese because America is much more multi-cultural and multi-
ethnical than China. (2) In Chinese culture, being homogenous has a positive
value. In contrast, Americans positively value heterogeneity. Therefore, while the
Chinese rather describe themselves as homogenous, Americans rather perceive
themselves as heterogenous. Unfortunately, there is no study that analysed two
groups that both have a Chinese background (and more or less the same objec-
tive homogeneity). Here, it would be interesting whether the positive value of
homogeneity eliminates the outgroup homogeneity bias and might even provoke
an ingroup homogeneity bias. Nevertheless, we see that culture plays a role in
the display of the bias. This finding is compatible with the idea that the bias did
not develop in the course of evolution. In conclusion, although the origin of the
outgroup homogeneity bias and its different manifestations is still unclear, the evi-
dence for the learning hypothesis is more convincing than that of the evolutionary
hypothesis.
We continue with the other two biases. The ultimate attribution error and the
linguistic intergroup bias have a lot in common. Both describe the phenomenon
that we attribute and describe positive and negative ingroup behaviour in a more
flattering / favourable (and thereby self-serving) way than positive and negative
outgroup behaviour (Pettigrew, 1979; Maass et al., 1989). The two biases can also
be seen as beliefs: While positive ingroup behaviour is due to the ingroup’s skills
and negative ingroup behaviour is accidental, it is precisely vice versa in case of
the outgroup. Now, both the ultimate attribution error and the linguistic intergroup
bias get stronger the more an individual identifies with her ingroup or might even
only appear if there is strong group identification.18 This is why we assume that
they have the same underlying ultimate explanation.
Let us begin with the psychological effect of the ultimate attribution error and
the linguistic intergroup bias. Through misattribution and biased description, the
two biases lead to a more positive social identity than a situation actually yields.
From this perspective it also becomes obvious why they interact with group iden-
tification. The more a person identifies with a group, the keener she is in attaining
a positive social identity by means of the group she identifies with. This is due to
the fact that this group substantially defines her self-identity. Thus, the two biases
could be explained through cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957): (1) I
want a positive social identity. (2) A situation either attacks my social identity
18 Admittedly, the results regarding the linguistic intergroup bias are in fact a bitmore complex
and might also depend on group status and other factors. Moreover, the interaction between
the linguistic intergroup bias and group identification is not as straightforward as in case
of the ultimate attribution error. Nevertheless, in this chapter we only consider the positive
correlation between group identification and the two biases.
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(the ingroup does something bad in their own responsibility or the outgroup does
something good in their own responsibility) or does not allow to improve it (the
ingroup does something good out of luck or the outgroup does something bad
out of bad luck). (3) In order to still maintain or improve my social identity, I
misattribute the situation and describe it in a biased way.
Yet, this simply shifts the problem because now we have to ask what is the
ultimate explanation of cognitive dissonance? In fact, there is hardly any research
about that. For example, Perlovsky (2013) writes: “Why have researchers of CD
[cognitive dissonance] theory, “the most influential and extensively studied theory
in social psychology” not noticed this contradiction between its fundamental
premise and the fact of human evolution?” (p. 2)
Might the two biases be advantageous in intergroup conflicts because they
increase group fitness? For example, it could be argued that a more positive social
identity facilitates depersonalisation and, in this way, ultimately leads to higher
group fitness. However, in case of group conflicts, the two biases can also be
disadvantageous. Let us assume that a group loses a conflict with another group.
Attributing one’s loss and the other’s victory to situational and not group factors
will not help to win the next conflict. In contrast, such a self-deceiving attribution
probably results in another loss. Thus, a realistic assessment of the situation could
be better for the survival of the group even though it leads to a less positive
social identity. In the end, whether the biases are beneficial for a group depends
on how strong each of these two effects are. Unfortunately, there are no studies
that examine this topic. So, the ultimate explanation for the linguistic intergroup
bias and the ultimate attribution error is still very unclear and further research is
needed in order to get a proper hypothesis.
At least, there is evidence for the biases’ universality. There are two studies
that were conducted in Non-Western societies. The experiment of Khan et al.
(2008) had Indians and Pakistanis as participants. In turn, Chan (2017) let Chi-
nese (more precisely Hong Kongese) subjects fill out his questionnaires. While
Khan et al. (2008) confirmed the existence of the ultimate attribution error, Chan
(2017) did so in the case of the linguistic intergroup bias. Moreover, it seems unli-
kely that people individually learn the ultimate attribution error and the linguistic
intergroup bias. This is because it is difficult to explain how groups that consider
the same evidence systematically and universally come to totally different con-
clusions (e.g. the achievement was out of luck vs. the achievement was out of
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skill).19 Ultimately, on an individual level, there is ample evidence that people
are overconfident / overoptimistic regarding themselves (Svenson, 1981; Brown
1986; Campbell, 1986; Hagerty, 2003; Sedikides et al., 2003). For example, Sven-
son (1981) asked car drivers from the US and Sweden how well and safe they
think they drive compared to the other participants in the study. 93 % (88 %) of
the US sample and 69 % (77 %) of the Swedish sample believed themselves to be
more skilful (safer) drivers than the median driver of their sample. Such beliefs
could hardly be obtained in an objective Bayesian way, which suggests inher-
ent overconfidence (Haselton & Nettle, 2006). And this inherent overconfidence
probably not only affects individual assessments but also group assessments, whe-
reby the biased way we attribute ingroup and outgroup behaviour is one of the
mechanisms that generates and helps us to uphold our overconfidence. As a con-
sequence, we can maintain the hypothesis that the ultimate attribution error and
the linguistic intergroup bias are not learned but inherent and therefore have an
evolutionary origin.
To conclude, humans seem to have inherent prior beliefs. On one hand, there
is the belief in the superiority of familiar alternatives. It makes us wrongly antici-
pate the expected utility of familiar and unfamiliar alternatives. On the other hand,
we have prior beliefs about the ingroup and outgroup, affecting the attribution of
their behaviour. Finally, although the outgroup homogeneity bias seems to be rat-
her learned than inherent, its existence still appears to be in conflict with objective
Bayesiansim. If we updated our beliefs correctly, group differences regarding per-
ceived homogeneity should vanish at one point because obviously only one group
can be more homogenous than the other (or they are equally homogenous). This
is particularly true for groups we have a lot of interpersonal contact with such
as the opposite sex. The fact that this does not happen (Park & Rothbart, 1982)
seems to imply that we do not update our beliefs according to Bayes’ law. So, let
us investigate this topic more closely in the next chapter.
19 Unlike in case of the outgroup homogeneity bias, these different conclusions cannot
be explained through more contact with ingroup than outgroup members and different
categorisation when interacting with ingroup compared to outgroup members.
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4.2 HowWe Update Beliefs
The way we handle new evidence is essential in regard to the ultimate specifica-
tion of our beliefs and therefore also the result of statistical discrimination. For
example, if it were possible to hold certain beliefs despite substantial disconfir-
ming evidence, almost any action could stem from statistical discrimination; You
would only have to hold the respective beliefs. This would complicate the distinc-
tion between taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination in empirical
observations because what seems to be a taste might actually be a “strange” belief.
Moreover, taste-based discriminators might hide their tastes behind some dubious
beliefs. That is why we have to analyse how people update their beliefs more
closely.
In a strict sense, the way we update beliefs can also be seen as a belief, namely
the belief in how we should update beliefs. And if subjective expected utility
theory assumes that humans are Bayesian updaters, it implies that updating beliefs
employing Bayes’ law is an inherent prior belief itself. In this chapter we examine
whether humans exclusively update their beliefs by use of Bayes’ law or whether
there are other inherent prior beliefs about how we should update our beliefs as
well. In so doing, we consider the remaining ten biases of table 4.1. We stick
to the same approach as in the last chapter: (1) if possible bundle various biases
that seem to be manifestations of the same inherent (updating) belief; (2) find an
evolutionary ultimate explanation for the existence of the inherent belief; and (3)
see whether these biases are universal so as to strengthen the argument that they
truly are inherent and not learned. Again, it has to be highlighted that the last
two goals are a rather speculative endeavour since in this area, research is often
scarce.
In the first part, we look at how people deal with probabilities and how the con-
cept of probability is connected to availability and frequency. Here, the following
biases are relevant: availability heuristic, representativeness heuristic, illusion of
truth effect, and illusory correlations. In the second part, we discuss the stereo-
typical bias and the hindsight bias. Both distort our memory and thereby might
interfere with Bayesian updating. In the third part, we present the inherent prior
belief that we are right and others wrong. Due to that we gather and process con-
firming evidence differently than disconfirming evidence and are less critical in
regard to our own beliefs than those of others. This apparent circumstance of a
systematic preference for our own beliefs is in conflict with Bayesian updating.
The following biases are linked to it: confirmation bias, backfire effect, continued
influence bias, and Semmelweis reflex. In the last part, we examine whether social
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identity affects our belief formation process, leading to beliefs that tend to flatter
the ingroup and decry the outgroup.
4.2.1 On Availability, Frequency, and Probability
There are four biases in table 4.1 that all are somehow linked to probability:
availability heuristic, representativeness heuristic, illusion of truth effect, and illu-
sory correlations. The two basic assumptions behind these proximate mechanisms
are simple. (1) Humans did not evolve to be good at handling probabilities but
natural frequencies, “which simply report how many cases of the total sample
there are in each subcategory” (Hoffrage et al., 2002, p. 346). (2) We use an
incident’s availability as a proxy for its natural frequency, whereby availability is
mainly (but not exclusively) defined by the number of relevant instances and the
ease with which these relevant instances come to mind (Kahneman, 2011).
How do these two assumptions interfere with Bayesian updating? Fischhoff
and Beyth-Marom (1983) write: “To find a place in the Bayesian model, one’s
beliefs must be translated into subjective probabilities of the form appearing in the
model. Any difficulties in assessing such component probabilities would impair
hypothesis evaluation.” (p. 244) At a later passage, the authors get more specific:
“There is reason for concern whenever the assessors have followed procedures
that are inconsistent with the rules of statistical inference. … Two well-known
deviations are reliance on the availability and representativeness heuristics when
making probability assessments.” (p. 245) Therefore, considering the two ass-
umptions stated above, the law by use of which we actually update our beliefs
looks as follows. First, we rewrite it so there no longer are probabilities but natu-
ral frequencies and for that use the formulation of Hoffrage et al. (2015). Note
that f(e ∩ si) stands for the natural frequency of joint occurrences of e and si,
f(e ∩ ¬si) stands for the natural frequency of joint occurrences of e and ¬si, and
f(e) for their sum.
p(si|e) = f(e ∩ si)
f(e)
= f(e ∩ si)
f(e ∩ si) + f(e ∩ ¬si)
Second, we reformulate this theorem in order that availability serves as a proxy
for natural frequency. Note that a is an element of A, which is the set of all
functions that transform natural frequency to availability of natural frequency.
Moreover, a has to fulfil the condition that the posterior probabilities it produces
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Now, let us begin with the first assumption: Humans did not evolve to be good at
handling probability but natural frequency. Given this is true, it is not surprising
that people perform badly at probability tasks, as for example the Linda pro-
blem. What is it about? Tversky and Kahneman (1983) conducted an experiment
at various American universities, where they gave participants the following des-
cription: “Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination
and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.” (p. 297)
Now, subjects had to decide which of two statements is more likely: (a) Linda is a
bank teller; (b) Linda is a bank teller and active in a feminist movement. Although
(a) always has to be true if (b) is true but not vice versa, 85–90 % of subjects
chose option (b). Now, Gigerenzer (1997) argues that tasks intended to assess
human statistical prediction should not present information in probability format
but frequency format.20 The frequency format always involves frequencies as defi-
ned by a natural sampling tree (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). Multiple studies
showed that this truly improves participants performance (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage,
1995; Gigerenzer, 2002; Hoffrage & Gigerenzer, 1998; Gigerenzer, et al., 1998;
Lindsey et al., 2003; Gigerenzer et al., 2008). For example, in case of the Linda
problem, the error rate decreased from 50–90 % to 0–25 % if the experimenters
used a frequency format instead of a probability format (Fiedler, 1988; Hertwig
& Gigerenzer, 1999).21
What is the ultimate explanation for why we can handle natural frequencies
better than probabilities? Haselton et al. (2015) say that “natural frequencies, such
as the number of times an event has occurred in a given time period, are more
readily observable in nature. In contrast, probabilities (in the sense of a number
20 Here is an example of a task in probability format. The probability of breast cancer is 1 %
[base rate]; the probability of a positive test given breast cancer is 90 % [sensitivity]; and the
probability of a positive test given no breast cancer is 10 % [false positive rate]. How many of
those who test positive actually have breast cancer? Now, the same task in frequency format:
Ten of every 1000 women have breast cancer; 9 of those 10 women with breast cancer will
test positive and 99 of the 990 women without breast cancer will also test positive. Howmany
of those who test positive actually have breast cancer? (Gigerenzer et al., 2008)
21 Yet, some researchers such as Kahneman are not entirely convinced by these studies (see
Mellers et al., 2001).
4.2 HowWe Update Beliefs 135
between 0 and 1) are mathematical abstractions beyond sensory input data, and
information about the base rates of occurrence is lost when probabilities are com-
puted (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996).” (p. 971) Moreover, to think of uncertainty as
representations of mathematical probabilities was first devised in the 17th century
(Gigerenzer et al., 1989). Therefore, out of an evolutionary perspective, the con-
cept of probability is brand new to us. No wonder that we are error prone when
we solve respective problems.
We continue with the second assumption: In order to assess how frequent an
incident is, we use its availability as a proxy. Of course, our ancestors could only
depend on availability if it more or less resembled probabilities or if there was
a good reason why it not necessarily had to.22 Otherwise, they would have con-
stantly made suboptimal decisions due to misjudgements of probabilities. Whether
availability and probability coincided is once again a question of the environment.
For once, let us begin with today’s environment. Kahneman (2011) presents the
following impressive misjudgements: “Strokes cause almost twice as many deaths
as all accidents combined, but 80 % of respondents judged accidental death to be
more likely. Tornadoes were seen as more frequent killers than asthma, although
the latter cause 20 times more deaths. Death by lightning was judged less likely
than death from botulism even though it is 52 times more frequent. Death by
disease is 18 times as likely as accidental death, but the two were judged about
equally likely. Death by accidents was judged to be more than 300 times more
likely than death by diabetes, but the true ratio is 1:4.” (p. 138)
Why did participants perform so badly here? The answer is that the media
reports way more often about deaths caused by accidents and tornados than deaths
caused by asthma or diabetes (ebd.). This is because media coverage is not a
simple representation of what is going on but biased towards novelty, oddity,
extremity and poignancy. As a consequence, spectacular tornados and accidents
are overly available and thus appear to happen more frequently than they actually
are. Similarly, films such as “Jaws” let us shudder with fear and think twice whe-
ther we want to swim in the sea. Yet, shark attacks are very rare. Every year,
there are only 70 to 100 shark attacks worldwide, of which 5 to 15 result in
death.23 In a lifetime, the odds of getting attacked and killed by a shark are 1 in
3,748,067. In fact, in the U.S., people are more likely to die from fireworks (1
in 340,733), lightning (1 in 79,746), drowning (1 in 1,134), a car accident (1 in
22 One such reason that is often stated involves that estimating probability via availability
needs less cognitive resources than doing so via natural frequency (Tversky & Kahneman,
1973; Kahneman, 2011).
23 Just for comparison, humans kill around 100 million sharks a year (Zachos, 2018).
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84), stroke (1 in 24), or heart disease (1 in 5) (Florida Museum, 2018). Moreover,
more people actually die from jellyfish stings than shark attacks (Muller, 2015).
So, although shark attacks are highly improbable, they appear to be more fre-
quent due to reports on shark attacks and especially films and books portraying
shark attacks. Of course, the same mechanism applies if the media over and over
portrays members of a social group in a certain way not because that portrayal
is generally accurate but increases sales figures.24 Here, consumers of the media
would again mistake availability for probability and thus overestimate the pro-
bability that the social group as a whole actually has the portrayed attributes. In
summary, today, availability and probability do not always go together. Was that
different in the late Pleistocene?
As mentioned in section 4.1.1, to determine the exact environment of our ance-
stors is very difficult. Thus, this paragraph is a hypothesis that needs further proof.
Notwithstanding this limitation, if we go back 50’000 years, there certainly was
no worldwide media which could distort a possible relationship between availa-
bility and probability. Admittedly, there probably were myths and stories that the
elderly told the youngsters which might have led to wrong probabilities too. Yet,
in all likelihood, these myths / stories were rather local and therefore also relevant
for the group. Thus, if you were frequently told something, you should not ignore
it because it probably affects your life. In contrast, today, much news is irrelevant
for our personal life. Of course, a terroristic attack is immensely tragic. However,
the chances to be affected by one is marginal, especially if you live in a coun-
try that has not had such an attack yet. Still, due to the high international media
attention that terroristic attacks provoke, they become highly available which is
why we ultimately bother about them. This would not have been the case in the
late Pleistocene because back then, we had no chance to hear from things that
happened hundreds of kilometres away in the first place.
If we accept the above argument, we agree that while 50’000 years ago high
availability might not necessarily have involved high probability, it should have
involved high relevance. Today, due to international media, this no longer has
to be true. But how can we explain the gap between availability and probability
that might have already existed in the late Pleistocene? Sunstein (2005) argues
that people use availability in order to assess the magnitude of risk which a cer-
tain action involves. His idea is as follows: “If a particular incident is cognitively
“available”—both vivid and salient—then people will have a heightened fear of
24 It is already sufficient if one medium does that given the consumers of this medium do
not consume another medium. Thus, it is not necessary that the media in general portrays an
inaccurate impression of a certain group.
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the risk in question.” (p. 77). In turn, this fear leads us to neglect the actual pro-
bability of an incident (Sunstein & Zeckhauser, 2011). Consequently, he implies
that high availability is connected with fear of a risk and thereby high potential
costs. But why should it be adaptive to overestimate the probability of a costly
incident through making it overly available and fearing it?
This is where error management theory (Haselton & Nettle, 2006) comes into
play again. Some situations might be rare but very costly if they occur, leading
to an asymmetry between false negative and false positive. In order to illustrate
that let us assume that a hunter-gatherer group goes fishing at the same spot for
several years. One day, a member is attacked by a shark and dies. The group can
draw different inferences out of this event. (1) Since this happened the first time
in several years, it is improbable that it will happen soon again. Thus, we continue
fishing there. (2) We do not know whether this incidence was simply bad luck or
long overdue. So as to find that out we need more data and thus continue fishing
there. (3) We do not know whether this incidence was simply bad luck or long
overdue. Since it is too risky to find it out we stop fishing there. (4) If it happened
once, it is probable that it will happen again. Thus, we stop fishing there. First of
all, let us assume that leaving the fishing spot does not automatically imply that
the group will starve to death. So, food is relatively abundant. Now, if the group
leaves the spot and starts fishing somewhere else although there would not have
been another shark attack, the costs of that error are relatively small. However,
if the group does not leave the spot because they think that it is safe or want to
gather more data and another shark attack occurs, this error is very costly. As a
consequence, if a certain outcome is relatively unlikely but very costly, following
availability and not probability can be fitness enhancing, even if the two might
diverge.
Now, the tendency that we mistake availability for probability is of course
at the very heart of the availability heuristic. As previously mentioned, Sunstein
(2005) says that the purpose of the availability heuristic is to assess the magni-
tude of risk that a certain action involves (e.g. fishing at spot X). Thus, it is not
about how probable a risk is but how available it is in one’s mind and social envi-
ronment. In contrast, the representativeness heuristic says that when we assign
people to categories, we mainly consider how well they match the prototype of
the category and neglect the base rate (Kahneman, 2011). So, again, we do not
think in probabilities but availability. If trait X is highly available in case of group
A but unavailable in case of group B, we assume that someone that has trait X
should be part of group A. In so doing, we neglect the possible circumstance that
group B is much larger than group A and thus altogether might actually have
more members with trait X.
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The deliberations of this chapter also provide an explanation for the illusion
of truth effect. We said that if in a hunter-gatherer society you are told something
multiple times, it is probably relevant. In this way, the repetition of a statement
makes it more available, which is why we also think that it is more probable.
Finally, illusory correlations are the result of availability combined with or pro-
duced by cost-asymmetric false positive and false negative errors. What does that
mean? First, illusionary correlations can be fitness enhancing if the costs of incor-
rect assumptions are rather small, whereas the benefits of the occasional correct
assumption are rather large (Foster & Kokko, 2009). This applies to all situa-
tions where the current data suggests a correlation, however, you have too few
data to make a proper prediction. For example, someone catches a fish from a
newly found lake and eats it. The next day, she is dead. Now, in order to say
with (almost) certainty that the fish caused her death and that other fish of that
lake would do so as well, more people would have to catch and eat fish from that
lake. Yet, given the fish truly killed her and the other fish would have done so
as well, this elimination of alternative explanations would come at a high price.
Therefore, it is more fitness enhancing to directly assume that there is causa-
lity, even if chances are actually high that there is none.25 The result of this is
that we follow availability instead of probability because probability based on
a sample of one incident is more or less meaningless. This also explains why
distinctiveness (minority group) and particularly double distinctiveness (minority
group and negative behaviour) lead to illusory correlations (Hamilton & Gifford,
1976). Distinctiveness is equivalent to salience and high salience provokes high
availability. In turn, if something is highly available we might overestimate its
probability. In case of double distinctiveness, this also makes sense out of the
following reason: Our sample of minority group members’ behaviour is smaller
than that of majority group members. So, every new information about a minority
group member’s behaviour is generally more valuable than that about a majority
group member’s behaviour.26 This is why new information about the minority
group is generally more salient than new information about the majority group.
This first distinctiveness is then combined with the second one: The costs of
not finding the correlation between cause and effect are higher if the effect is
25 Today, we still see this tendency if we look at lucky charms. For example, if you write your
first exam at the university with a certain pen and the exam went really great, you might want
to write the next exams with this pen as well because you think that it brought you luck. You
do not start a little experiment where you write half of the exams with your lucky pen and
the other half with a different pen so as to examine whether your lucky pen truly boosts your
performance.
26 Normally, the larger the sample, the better it resembles the true mean and variance.
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negative compared to positive, provided that our survival is not already seriously
endangered (cf. negativity bias). Both together create an illusory correlation.
To finish this chapter, let us examine whether these biases are universal. First
of all, Sunstein (2005) says that the availability heuristic can be detected in dif-
ferent cultures and it partly still serves its original function of emphasising risks.
He writes: “The availability heuristic helps to account for … cross-national diffe-
rences [in risk perception of specific incidents] and for generally exaggerated risk
perceptions.” (p. 91) Yet, it has to be mentioned that his analysis only includes
American and European culture, which of course limits the universal claim of the
availability heuristic. Unfortunately, there is no study that examines the existence
of the availability bias in other cultures such as East Asian or South American cul-
tures. Yet, there is one hint which reveals that people from these cultures also have
an availability heuristic. After the terrorist attacks in Europe in 2015/2016, many
tourists cancelled their trips to France even if their travel destination was far away
from these attacks. Here, tourists from Western cultures were not more prone to
do so than tourists from non-Western cultures (Alderman, 2016). Actually, in case
of the Louvre, especially non-Western tourists stayed away. While the number of
American visitors remained stable in 2016, the museum welcomed 61 % fewer
Japanese, 53 % fewer Russians, 47 % fewer Brazilians and 31 % fewer Chinese
(Willsher, 2017). These numbers suggest that availability of a certain risk is more
influential on decision-making than the actual probability of that risk.
There is one cross-cultural study regarding the representativeness heuristic,
conducted by Spina et al. (2010). The study involved Canadian and Chinese parti-
cipants. Yet, the authors did not examine the role of representativeness in a social
categorisation context as we did in this chapter but in the context of assigning
cause and effect. This so-called cause-effect magnitude correspondence implies
that big causes (e.g. shark attack) are more likely to lead to big consequences
(e.g. death) than small causes (e.g. mosquito sting).27 While Spina et al. found
that there was an overall tendency to follow the cause-effect magnitude corre-
spondence, this tendency was significantly stronger in case of Canadian subjects.
The authors’ explanation for this difference involves the cultures different degree
of holistic thinking. Accordingly, if Canadians were primed to think more holisti-
cally, they displayed less cause-effect correspondence. Thus, culture affects this
aspect of the representativeness heuristic. Yet, since participants of both cultures
27 The same is true in the opposite direction. So, big effects should be the product of big
causes.
140 4 How DoWe Get Our Beliefs for Statistical Discrimination?
revealed a cause-effect correspondence, this overall tendency seems to be cul-
ture invariant. Finally, it is unclear whether these findings can be applied on the
representativeness heuristic in general.
Although there is no cross-cultural study about illusory correlations it is widely
known that superstitious beliefs are not limited to Western cultures. Unlucky
numbers provide a perfect example. For instance, the German airway company
Lufthansa does not have a seat row with the number 13 (unlucky number in many
Western countries) or 17 (unlucky number in Italy and Brazil). In contrast, the
Japanese airway company All Nippon Airways does not have a seat row with
the number 4, 9, and 13. This is because 4 and 9 are unlucky numbers in Japan
(Tingler, 2010). There is even a word that describes the fear of the number 4:
tetraphobia. It is most common in East Asian countries. That is because in these
languages the pronunciation of the number 4 is similar to that of the word death
(Havil, 2010). Thus, while the exact manifestation of an illusory correlation is
highly affected by culture, the phenomenon per se seems to be universal (Foster
& Kokko, 2009; Laland & Brown 2002; Richerson & Boyd 2005).
Again, there is no cross-cultural study about the illusion of truth effect. Unfor-
tunately, there also seems to be no study that uses non-Western subjects. Indeed,
there is one Chinese study (Li et al., 2016) about rumour spreading and the illu-
sion of truth effect. However, this study is exclusively computational and does
not have any participants. Yet, despite the lack of empirical data, the fact that the
authors acknowledge the illusion of truth effect might be seen an indication for
its existence in China.28 Or, at least, the illusion of truth effect does not appear
counterintuitive to them. But notwithstanding these deliberations, since there is
no cross-cultural data we have to infer that the influence of culture on the illusion
of truth effect is unknown.
To summarise, we discussed a twofold ultimate explanation in this chapter.
First, we are bad at probability tasks because in the course of evolution we
were almost exclusively confronted with natural frequencies and not probabili-
ties. Second, we use an incident’s availability as a proxy for its natural frequency.
Because of the locality of information in the late Pleistocene, availability, rele-
vance, and probability seem to have coincided more than today. Yet, gaps between
availability and probability might have still existed. Error management theory is
28 Admittedly, this is a rather weak argument because it could also be argued that the very
fact that there are no empirical studies about the illusion of truth effect in Asian countries
indicates its irrelevance there.
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able to provide an explanation for these. Lastly, while cross-cultural studies are
rare, it does not seem that the four biases discussed in this chapter have a cultural
origin.
4.2.2 DistortedMemories
In section 4.1.1, we have already discussed two biases that are linked to memory:
rosy retrospection and the choice supportive bias. There, we said that they con-
tribute to the inherent belief in the superiority of familiar alternatives. Of course,
these two biases might also influence the way we update our beliefs. Since we
whitewash possible decision errors through reattributing the past and past choices
in an overly positive way, there are no apparent mistakes we can learn from. In
turn, this prevents us from adjusting our beliefs. The two biases in this chapter,
namely the stereotypical bias and the hindsight bias, seem to affect Bayesian
updating as well, yet, one might also be the very product of it.
Let us start with the stereotypical bias, which implies that stereotypes distort
our memory (Payne et al., 2004). Note that a stereotype is „a cognitive structure
that contains our knowledge, beliefs and expectancies about some human social
group“ (Pendry, 2015, p. 96). Therefore, we use stereotypes synonymously with
group specific beliefs. Now, the stereotypical bias appears to have the following
source of error: In hindsight, we apply a stereotype on an individual although we
should know from experience that this individual did not behave in a stereotypical
way (Payne et al., 2004). More technically spoken, a situation actually reveals
stereotype inconsistent evidence e, yet, the stereotypical bias modifies e in such
a way that we perceive / remember evidence e#, which is stereotype consistent.
Let’s illustrate this by use of a classic study conducted by Allport (1947). He
showed subjects a scene depicting a black man and a white man arguing on a
tram. The white man held a razor in his hand. After several retellings from one
subject to another, Allport reports that “[i]n over half of the experiments with this
picture, at some stage in the series of reports the Negro (instead of the white man)
is said to hold the razor in his hand” (p. 111). So, at some point in the retelling
chain, the actual evidence e, which involves that the white man holds the razor,
turned into the stereotype-consistent evidence e#, where the black man holds the
razor.
We can think of three reasons why this happened. First, a subject has a total
lapse of memory regarding who holds the razor and thus simply fills it with a
stereotype, which says that the black person holds it. Second, a subject truly
believes that the black person holds the razor because she reminds it that way.
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Third, a subject actually knows that the white person holds the razor, yet, for
some reason says that the black person holds it. Since this last possibility involves
conscious misdirection we only concentrate on the first and second reason in the
further course.
Let us first investigate why we fill a lapse of memory with a stereotype. If
you have a lapse of memory regarding a certain evidence e, you can handle it in
three ways: a) acknowledge that you have a lapse of memory and therefore no
clue about the evidence e; b) fill the lapse of memory with stereotype consistent
content; and c) fill the lapse of memory with stereotype inconsistent content.
Now, option c) seems very illogical. Filling the lapse of memory with stereotype
inconsistent rather than consistent content means that you use “filling material”
that you subjectively do not perceive as most suitable and thus most probable.
For example, let us assume you once asked a medicine student what she wants
to do after her studies but now you cannot recall what she said. Of course, most
probably she becomes a doctor. Therefore, on general, it is much more accurate
to fill this lapse of memory with “she wants to become a doctor” than with “she
wants to do a second degree in law”.29
The question that remains is why we do not simply acknowledge the lap-
ses of memory and leave it unfilled. First of all, sometimes if not frequently we
do acknowledge that our memory is imperfect and have no clue about a certain
evidence e. So, this is not like our blind spot in the eye that we constantly fill
with apparently suitable information. We do not have the illusion of a perfect
memory as we have an illusion of a perfect field of vision. Second, filling a lapse
of memory with stereotype consistent content can be fitness enhancing. This is
the case if the costs of not having any information are higher than the costs of
potentially assigning the wrong content to the lapse of memory. These potential
costs of incorrect stereotype assignment highly depend on how accurate the ste-
reotype generally is. This means the more accurate the stereotype, the better the
stereotype consistent content should suit the lapse of memory. In turn, the better
the fit, the lower are the chances of error and thus the overall costs. Actually,
these deliberations are very similar to the ones on why we make use of statistical
discrimination: It helps us to better handle uncertainty. Now, in case of a lapse
of memory, we could also say that there is complete uncertainty about whether
evidence e was present or not. Due to that one might therefore exclude evidence
29 Of course, this does no longer have to be the case if you know that she is actually very
unhappy with her studies and highly interested in law. Yet, if you knew that you probably
would not compare her with the prototypical medicine student in the first place.
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e when making predictions. Yet, we not always behave in this way because exclu-
ding evidence e when making predictions might make us less able to react on our
environment. Using the words of Macrae and Bodenhaus (2000), we want our
environment to be a predictable place. This does not only apply for our present
and future but also past environment. Accordingly, we sometimes fill our lapses
of memory in the most predictable way, which means with stereotype consistent
content.
Let’s continue with the second reason: We truly believe that a certain stereo-
type inconsistent evidence e was actually stereotype consistent and thus remember
it (and maybe have also perceived it) as e#. The explanation behind such wrong
recollections (and perceptions) might lie in the process of categorisation more
generally. This is because categorisation might not only be essential for social
perception but perception in general. Barrett (2017) describes the process of cate-
gorisation as follows: We compare the sensory input with our concepts30, apply
the concept that fits it best, form predications, and, in this way, make the sen-
sory input meaningful. This process can lead to mistakes, called prediction errors.
There are two ways to solve them. The first one is to change our predictions and
adjust them to the sensory input until they match. The second one is to keep
the original predication and filter “the sensory input so it’s consistent with the
prediction” (p. 64).
This second handling of prediction errors could explain what happened in case
of subjects who misremembered (and also misperceived) which person held the
razor. By categorising the retelling of the depicted scene, they predicted that the
black and not the white man holds the razor. This prediction error did not get
corrected via adjusting the prediction but via adjusting the sensory input (the
memory). As a result, they thought that they had truly heard that the black person
holds the razor and therefore also remembered it like this.
We see that the stereotypical bias can be described as a by-product of cate-
gorisation. In turn, categorisation in the sense of Barrett (2017) can be described
as predictive coding or predictive processing, which is a Bayesian approach to
brain function (Clark, 2013, 2015; Friston, 2010, 2012). As a consequence, the
stereotypical bias does not have to be in conflict with Bayesianism. However,
the circumstance that our beliefs and their consequent predictions can filter the
sensory input implies that two people facing the same evidence e can perceive /
30 A concept involves the knowledge / beliefs we have about a category.
144 4 How DoWe Get Our Beliefs for Statistical Discrimination?
remember it differently if they have different priors.31 And their diverging per-
ception of e might never converge given the prediction error is always handled
via adjusting the sensory input.32 Nevertheless, some sensory input that interfe-
res with our predictions is very unlikely to be (constantly) filtered out. As Clark
(2015) writes: “[W]e are not slaves to our expectations. Successful perception
requires the brain to use stored knowledge and expectations (Bayesian priors)
to minimize prediction error. But we remain able to see very (agent-) surprising
things, in conditions where the brain assigns high reliability to sensory prediction
error (hence high reliability to the driving sensory signal).” (p. 79) Admittedly,
the assessment of a sensory prediction error’s reliability can be distorted as for
example in case of mental illnesses or drug use (ebd.). Moreover, it seems to be
improbable that evolution led to a perceptual apparatus that is as accurate and
therefore veridical as possible (Hoffman et al., 2015), indicating that we might
constantly assign wrong reliabilities to some sensory prediction errors (cf. error
management theory (Haselton & Nettle, 2006)). Yet, in these cases this concerns
all people since humans should have “learned” to assign these wrong reliabi-
lities in the course of evolution, making it an inherent prior belief. Therefore,
someone who holds a certain group specific belief despite substantial disconfir-
ming evidence (that others are able to perceive) might theoretically do so because
he constantly filters incoming sensory information in such a way that it still mat-
ches his predictions. Nonetheless, it appears a lot more likely that he is able to
maintain this belief due to a non-Bayesian updating process and / or a group
specific inherent prior belief.
After having discussed the stereotypical bias, let us continue with the second
bias of this chapter, namely the hindsight bias. The hindsight bias involves the
phenomenon that after we know the outcome of an event we tend to overesti-
mate the predictability of this outcome in foresight (Hoffrage & Pohl, 2003). In
technical terms, the hindsight bias appears to have the following implications:
After considering evidence e, the prior p(si) that gets updated to the posterior
31 Subjective Bayesians can have different priors due to differently assigned first priors where
they had not faced any (relevant) evidence yet or due to different evidence they faced in the
past. Objective Bayesians can have different priors due to different evidence they faced in the
past. In contrast, objective Bayesians that faced the same evidence in the past must come to
the same posterior subjective probability after facing new evidence e (Strevens, 2006).
32 A picture called “The dress” provides an example of this. It displays a dress that some
people perceive as gold and white and others as black and blue. The dress actually is black
and blue but this knowledge does not change the perception of those who perceive it as gold
andwhite in the picture (MacFarquhar, 2018). For JayNeitz, who has been studying individual
differences in colour vision for 30 years, “The dress” provokes one of the biggest individual
differences he has ever seen (Rogers, 2015).
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p(si|e) is remembered as having been closer to p(si|e) than it actually used to
be before considering evidence e. Such a tendency interferes with Bayesian upda-
ting (Madaráz, 2011; Mahdavi & Rahimian, 2016). Moreover, it can be harmful.
As Fischhoff (1982) writes: “The very outcome knowledge which gives us the
feeling that we understand what the past was all about may prevent us from lear-
ning anything from it” (p. 343) Thus, if we always say “I knew it all along” even
though we did not, we might not update our beliefs appropriately, which can lead
to inaccurate predictions and thereby suboptimal decisions.
So, if a hindsight bias appears to exacerbate adaptive learning, why do we still
find it all over the world (Pohl et al., 2002)? Hoffrage et al. (2000) argue that the
bias is actually a very by-product of knowledge updating. When we get informed
about the outcome of an event, we might simultaneously update the knowledge
we used so as to form our prediction. Given this occurs without much conscious
notice, we now base our hindsight prediction on updated knowledge which is
why we think that we knew it all along. Additionally, if we cannot retrieve our
original judgment, we have to reconstruct it. By doing so, we again go through
the same steps of inference which produced the original judgement. Yet, some
cues that were missing in case of the original judgement are now known (Todd
et al., 2005). As a result, this new judgment is closer to the actual outcome than
the original judgement. Hoffrage et al. (2000) confirm this hypothesis. They found
that feedback on an outcome of an event cannot only affect recalled prediction but
also the memory of variables that are associated with that event. To summarise,
“[o]nce an additional event occurs, our knowledge is updated to reflect this new
information and our knowledge after feedback becomes systematically shifted
towards the new, updated reality. Thus, when the decision maker has to recall an
earlier judgment in the future, the recalled judgment will be closer to the outcome
of the new event than to the original judgment.” (Haselton et al., 2009, p. 740)
The last paragraph provided proximate explanations for the hindsight bias.
The ultimate question of why this is adaptive is still unanswered. There are two
non-exclusive ultimate explanations in the literature. First, continuously adjus-
ting past information to more recent one efficiently avoids capacity problems
(Bjork & Bjork, 1988; Schacter, 1996). Second, this adjustment may also improve
our inferences over time (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1989; Hoffrage et al., 2000).
This is because the hindsight bias leads to constant up-to-date knowledge in an
ever-changing environment (Todd et al., 2005).33 The circumstance that the bias
decreases the more experience people have with the task under consideration is
33 This statement inheres the assumption that our ancestors’ environmentwas unstable enough
in order that constant up-to-date knowledgewhich to somedegree ignored previous knowledge
became adaptive. As mentioned in section 4.1.1, it is rather pointless to discuss whether our
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said to confirm the “better-inference-hypothesis” (Hertwig et al., 2003; Todd et al.,
2005; Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991). The idea is that, normally, the
more comprehensive our knowledge in foresight, the less influential becomes an
additional piece of information. Consequently, after the outcome of an event is
known, experienced people do not have to update their knowledge as strongly as
inexperienced people.
Hedden (2019) takes a different explanatory approach of the hindsight bias,
namely that it is not (always) a bias in the first place. While he acknowledges
that the hindsight bias is not compatible with Bayesianism and thus not rational
in a Bayesian sense, he questions the very concept of ideal rationality defined
by Bayesianism. More precisely, he argues that the necessity of logical omnis-
cience, which Bayesianism assumes for ideal rationality, is mistaken.34 Given we
abandon it, the hindsight bias can become rational. This is because “[t]he truth of
a hypothesis often provides evidence about what the evidence available ex ante
was, and also about what that ex ante evidence supports. So often, upon learning
that the hypothesis is true, you should become more confident that the ex ante
evidence strongly supports that hypothesis and also increase your expectation of
the degree to which it does so.” (p. 50)
All in all, we see that the hindsight bias appears to be a by-product of non-
Bayesian knowledge updating. It can either be explained via an evolutionary
approach that depicts the bias as fitness enhancing or via rejecting the Bayesian
assumptions of ideal rationality which in turn enables the bias to become rational.
To summarise this chapter, both the stereotypical bias and the hindsight bias
seem to interfere with Bayes’ law. On one hand, we fill our lapses of memory with
stereotype consistent content and filter our perception / memory so that it becomes
stereotype consistent. On the other hand, after we know the outcome of an event
we tend to overestimate the predictability of this outcome in foresight. Yet, while
the hindsight bias appears to truly be incompatible with Bayesian updating, the
stereotypical bias can actually be explained via a Bayesian approach and therefore
does not have to interfere with Bayes’ law.
ancestors’ environment truly provided such conditions. The only thing we know for sure is
that their environment was not completely stable (e.g. Martrat et al., 2004).
34 This is a common critique of Bayesian epistemology (cf. Talbott, 2008).
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4.2.3 WhyWe Defend Our Beliefs
The remaining four biases of table 4.1 make us gather and process belief confir-
ming and belief disconfirming evidence in a non-neutral way. As a consequence,
they prevent us from adjusting an apparently wrong belief even if there seems
to be ample evidence that disconfirms it. We can formalise this as follows. Note
that p(s+) is the belief or more precisely the subjective probability we want to
defend. Moreover, α > 1 and 0 < δ < 1, whereby α and δ stand in such rela-
tion to each other so that the posterior probabilities they result in fulfil the three
assumptions of probability theory (cf. Kolmogorov, 1933).
p(s+|e) = αp(s+)p(e|s+)
αp(s+)p(e|s+) + δp(¬s+)p(e|¬s+)
In this way, after the decision-maker has considered new evidence e, the posterior
probability of s+ is higher as it should be. The respective biases that lead to
this outcome are: confirmation bias, backfire effect, continued influence bias, and
Semmelweis reflex.
At first sight, these cognitive distortions might be somewhat surprising out of
an evolutionary perspective. Indeed, we have to reconstruct our environment on
a simpler model before we can manage it (Kite & Whitley, 2016). However,
on a given level of simplification, why does this reconstruction have systematic
distortions? We want the environment to become a predictable place which we can
react on and interact with. Accordingly, if new evidence seems to disprove our
beliefs, aren’t we better off by taking this new evidence seriously and including
it into our model of the environment? Wouldn’t that lead to better predictions and
ultimately more fitness?
A proximate explanation of why we defend our beliefs that is often mentioned
involves the tendency that humans are verifiers and not falsifiers (Mercier & Sper-
ber, 2017). So, unlike critical rationalism of Popper (1963) proposes, our approach
to check a hypothesis is not to falsify it but to try to verify it. Wason (1960) pro-
vided first evidence for this and thereby built the corner stone of the confirmation
bias. He inferred: “[T]here would appear to be compelling evidence to indicate
that even intelligent individuals adhere to their own hypotheses with remarkable
tenacity when they can produce confirming evidence for them.” (Wason, 1977,
p. 313) Now, the decisive word in the last sentence is “own”. So, it is true that
as soon as we have chosen a position regarding an issue we are good at pro-
ducing arguments that confirm / verify this position but rather bad at producing
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counterarguments (e.g. Kuhn, 1991). This is why α is larger than 1 in the above
formula. However, if we then are confronted with an opposite position, we are
in turn good at producing counterarguments that falsify it and bad at producing
arguments that verify it (Shaw, 1996; Mercier & Sperber, 2011). This is why δ is
smaller than 1. Therefore, we do not generally have a preference for testing hypo-
theses via verification / confirmation. This is only true for the positions / beliefs
we hold. Given someone challenges us with an opposite position, we preferably
look for counterarguments that falsify this opposite position. This is why Mercier
and Sperber (2017) speak of a myside bias rather than a confirmation bias.
Of course, this clarification has not solved the problem of an ultimate expla-
nation. Nevertheless, the myside bias quite suitably encompasses the four biases
mentioned above in superordinate manner. Despite the presence of disconfirming
evidence, we hardly adjust a wrong belief because: (1) We are good at producing
arguments that still confirm it; and (2) we are good at producing counterarguments
for the disconfirming evidence and hereby mitigating the power of the disconfir-
ming evidence. Thus, if we find an ultimate explanation for the myside bias, we
indirectly also find an ultimate explanation for the four biases mentioned above.35
How could this ultimate explanation look like? If we examine the myside bias
from an individualistic perspective, it is hard to find an evolutionary argument
for its existence. Why should defending prior beliefs that face substantial discon-
firming evidence be fitness enhancing? Let us consider the following example: I
believe that river X is the best river for fishing because it is the richest in fish.
So, I fish at river X and catch between one and three fish a day. Then, a family
member tells me that river Y, which is equally far away as river X, is much richer
in fish than river X and that she catches between three and five fish a day there.
Now, I can either explain the difference in caught fish by reasoning that river Y
has more fish than river X and thus adjust my belief that river X is the richest
in fish. Or I can stick to my belief that river X is the richest in fish and look
for other explanations, such as the person is lying, was only lucky, or I simply
had bad luck the last few days and would normally catch between five and seven
fish. In this situation, stubbornly sticking to my belief and not even checking
out river Y seems not to be fitness enhancing. Accordingly, studies about animal
behaviour could also not find a confirmation bias (Mercier & Sperber, 2017). For
35 The ultimate explanation for the myside bias presented in this subchapter will be mainly
based on Hugo Mericer’s and Dan Sperber’s interactionist approach and their book “The
Enigma of Reason” (2017).
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example, animals abandon their food patches the moment they expect to find bet-
ter elsewhere (Pyke, 1984).36 So, why do humans but not animals have a bias
here?
A major difference between humans and animals is our highly developed
ability to communicate with each other. This ability or more specifically its con-
sequences might be the reason why we suffer a myside bias, whereas animals do
not: We should not examine reasoning from an individualistic perspective but from
an interactionist perspective. As a consequence of this change in perspective, the
primary goal of reasoning is no longer to individually (as a lone reasoner) find the
most accurate belief but to convince others from your belief. In this case, a myside
bias makes perfectly sense because it primarily leads to arguments that confirm
your position and disconfirm opposite positions. This is particularly advantageous
in two contexts. In a competitive context, a comparison of one-sided arguments
helps to extract which of the options that competitive parties propose is best. For
example, there are two parties within a group. One wants to settle down at river
X, the other at river Y. In the end, the more convincing arguments will prevail and
the consequent options be chosen. However, it has to be emphasised that argu-
mentation is not exclusively a zero-sum game, leading to a winner and a loser.
In a constructive context, the comparison of one-sided arguments serves as an
advantageous method for finding the best position. For instance, a group faces an
ambiguous situation and forms two parties. One has to argue for option A, the
other for option B. This saves resources because an individual does not have to
assess both options. Therefore, Mercier and Sperber (2017) infer: “The myside
bias doesn’t turn argumentation into a purely competitive endeavor. Argumenta-
tion is a form of communication and is typically pursued cooperatively. At its
best, the myside bias becomes a way of dividing cognitive labor.” (p. 221)
The sole fact that parties compete against each other with their one-sided argu-
ments does not automatically lead to accurate beliefs (which would make the
world more predictable). This is only true if the most convincing argument is also
the most accurate argument. Thus, while the myside bias indicated what kind of
arguments we produce, we now have to examine how we evaluate arguments.
At first sight, our evaluative qualities do not seem very promising. Several stu-
dies such as Kuhn (1991), Nisbett and Ross (1980), and Perkins (1985) found that
when experimenters asked participants why they hold a certain belief, their rea-
sons were quite superficial and weak. So, people’s criteria for their own reasons
seem to be rather lax. This would pose a problem if we followed an individualistic
36 Admittedly, it is unclear what “expect” precisely means in case of animals. Yet, Mercier
and Sperber use this word.
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perspective. However, in real life, argumentation typically occurs in a dialogic
context. Thus, when we use a weak argument our counterpart does not simply
write it down and asks whether we have further arguments (as the experimenter
does) but challenges it. Through this interactive back-and-forth, weak arguments
should vanish and strong arguments prevail, provided the following two require-
ments are fulfilled: (1) Our counterpart’s criteria for our reasons have to be rather
rigid, otherwise we would not be challenged. (2) We have to acknowledge the
superiority of certain arguments even though they are not ours.
Let us start with the first requirement. Trouche et al. (2016) conducted a sophi-
sticated experiment that wanted to reveal the asymmetry between how critically
we evaluate our arguments and those of others. The experiment had three phases.
In the first phase, participants had to solve five reasoning problems concerning
the products sold in a fruit and vegetable shop. For example, they were told that a
fruit and vegetable shop carries, among other products, apples of which none are
organic. Then, subjects had to infer as quickly and intuitively as possible which
of the following statements applies for sure: “All the fruits are organic”; “None
of the fruits are organic”; “Some fruits are organic”; “Some fruits are not orga-
nic”; and “We cannot tell anything for sure about whether fruits are organic in
this shop”. There was always one correct answer (here it would be “Some fruits
are not organic”). In the second phase, participants had to explain why they sol-
ved each problem the way they did. By doing so, they got the chance to change
their answer(s) if they realised that their reasoning was flawed. In the third phase,
subjects were again given the five problems, one by one, with a reminder of their
answer of the first phase. Additionally, they were told that another subject, who
completed the experiment earlier that day, answered the problems differently and
participants were also displayed the explanation of that differently thinking prior
subject. Again, they got the chance to adjust their original answer if they wanted
to.
Now, the third phase had two conditions. In one condition, the experimenters
truly gave participants their own answers and an answer that differed from their
own. However, in the other condition, the experimenters manipulated the reminder
of the participant’s answer given in phase one. So, in this condition, participants
were not shown their actual answer. In turn, the prior subject, who was said to
have answered the problems differently than the participant, now answered the
problems in the way participants did in the first phase and thereby also used
their explanations. By means of this design, the authors could examine whether
subjects are more critical with their own reasoning when they think it actually is
someone else’s compared truly their own.
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The results are as follows: In phase one, participants answered 2.9 of the
five problems correctly. Consistent with the myside bias, in phase two only few
(approximately 14 %) changed their minds. These changes were as likely for the
better as for the worse. In the third phase, 46 % of those whose answers were
manipulated noticed the manipulation, whereby those who gave the correct ans-
wer in the first phase had a significant higher detection rate. In case of those who
could be successfully misled, 42 % adjusted their misled answer to their prior
one. In other words, 58 % declined their own answer, which they defended in the
second phase of the experiment. While the acceptance of the misled answer was
positive for 2/3 of participants (they switched from an invalid answer to a valid
one), for 1/3 it was negative (they switched from a valid answer to an invalid one).
So, the contrast between the second and the third phase reveals that participants
evaluated the quality of their own argument more rigidly when they thought it is
someone else’s (third phase) vs. their own (second phase). Accordingly, Trouche
et al. (2016) infer that “people are more critical of other people’s arguments than
of their own”. (p. 2122)
Mercier and Sperber (2017) call this tendency selective laziness. It means that
people are lazy when they control the quality of their own argument but deman-
ding when they do so in case of someone else’s argument. Let’s again look at the
formulation at the beginning of this chapter.
p(s+|e) = αp(s+)p(e|s+)
αp(s+)p(e|s+) + δp(¬s+)p(e|¬s+)
We can integrate selective laziness into it employing the same variables we used
in case of the myside bias. Our laziness in controlling the quality of our own
arguments can be represented by α > 1. In turn, our rigidity regarding arguments
of others can be represented by 0 < δ < 1. The authors argue that selective lazi-
ness is adaptive because the process of finding strong arguments requires plenty
cognitive resources. Therefore, we begin with a rather resource-poor but probably
also weak argument and await whether our counterpart already accepts it. If she
does, we do not have to invest further cognitive resources so as to find a better
argument. If she does not, we have to find a better argument and if we do not find
one, accept hers.
Let us continue with the second requirement: We accept the superiority of cer-
tain arguments. The experiment of Trouche et al. (2016) discussed above already
suggests that this is true. If the superiority of the argument were meaningless,
participants should have equally often declined the misled answer and changed to
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their actual own one, regardless whether their own argument was valid or invalid.
Yet, this was not the case. 57 % adjusted their misled answer and changed to their
prior argument of phase one if that argument was valid. Meanwhile, only 31 % did
so if their prior argument of phase one was invalid. So, a valid (counter)argument
made more participants change their answer than an invalid one, demonstrating
the acceptance of a superior argument.
In a series of experiments, Trouche et al. (2014) further examined this topic.
For example, participants had to solve the following problem: “Paul is looking at
Linda and Linda is looking at John. Paul is married but John is not. Is a person
who is married looking at a person who is not married?” The possible answers
were “Yes”; “No”; and “Cannot be determined”. The modal answer typically is
“Cannot be determined” (cf. Toplak & Stanovich, 2002). This answer is of course
wrong. Consider the following argument: Linda is either married or not married.
If she is not married, then Paul, who is married, is looking at her, so the answer
is “Yes”. If she is married, then she is looking at John, who is not married, so
the answer is again “Yes”. Therefore, no matter whether Linda is married or not
the answer is always “Yes.” After participants committed themselves to a (mostly
wrong) answer, they were presented this argument. More than half immediately
changed their minds.37 In order to exclude the possibility that participants simply
adopted the provided argument because it came from the experimenters, the aut-
hors told them that the argument was given by a prior subject. To one group, the
experimenters even said that this prior subject was really bad at such tasks. Still,
most accepted it. This was also true if participants were told that this prior subject
would earn some money if others get the problem wrong. So, despite not trusting
the prior subject, they acknowledged the superiority of her argument. Another
group had to think hard about the problem and justify their answer. Although
only few got it right, most of them indicated that they were extremely confident
about their answer. Yet, this confidence did not make them change their answer
less often than the other groups after they were shown the correct argument.
Mercier and Sperber (2017) draw the following conclusion regarding the adap-
tivity of our biased reasoning: “If we take an interactionist perspective, the traits
of argument production typically seen as flaws become elegant ways to divide
cognitive labor. The most difficult task, finding good reasons, is made easier by
the myside bias and by sensible laziness. The myside bias makes reasoners focus
on just one side of the issue rather than having to figure out on their own how
37 Contrary to that, if participants themselves reached the right conclusion and were then
confronted with the argument that the answer is “Cannot be determined” because we do not
know whether Linda is married or not, no one changed their mind.
4.2 HowWe Update Beliefs 153
to adopt everyone’s perspective. Laziness lets reason stop looking for better rea-
sons when it has found an acceptable one. The interlocutor, if not convinced, will
look for a counterargument, helping the speaker produce more pointed reasons.
By using bias and laziness to its advantage, the exchange of reasons offers an
elegant, cost-effective way to solve a disagreement.” (p. 236)
We see that the main take-away of the interactionist approach is that groups
perform better in producing sound arguments than individuals. Several studies
confirm this assumption. For example, Moshman and Geil (1998) let participant
do the selection task that Wason (1966) used in his study. In line with the results
of Wason, participants performed badly if they had to do so alone. Here, only 9 %
selected the correct response pattern. Meanwhile, if subjects solved the same pro-
blem in small groups of five to six peers, 75 % found the right response pattern.
This number is extraordinarily high. In comparison, only 27 % of Harvard stu-
dents selected the correct pattern (Cosmides, 1989). The authors conclude that (1)
the structure of arguments that groups co-constructed was typically qualitatively
more sophisticated than that generated by most individuals; and (2) the superior
performance of the groups was because of collaborative reasoning rather than peer
pressure or imitation. Therefore, it was not simply the most confident person who
pushed through his argument, whereby confidence correlated with the quality of
the argument. On the contrary, the extracts of the discussion reveal that arguments
were put forward one after another. Besides, Trouche et al. (2014) also demons-
trated that a single participant with the correct answer can sway the whole group
even though that participant initially was less confident than the other group mem-
bers. In the corresponding experiment, the authors compared the performance of
individuals and groups regarding the Paul-Linda-Ryan problem presented above.
As in case of Moshman and Geil (1998), groups were significantly more likely to
find the right answer than individuals (63 % vs. 22 %).
Many other studies suggest that group discussion often improves reasoning
performance. They examined the power of groups by means of laboratory experi-
ments in a wide range of tasks, including inductive problems (Laughlin et al.,
2002), deductive problems (Laughlin & Ellis, 1986; Moshman & Geil, 1998;
Trouche et al., 2014), numerical estimations (Minson et al., 2011; Sniezek &
Henry, 1989), and various work-related problems (Blinder & Morgan, 2005; Lom-
bardelli et al., 2005; Michaelsen et al., 1989). Moreover, collaborative reasoning
was also found to be effective in other contexts as for example work teams (Guzzo
& Dickson, 1996), scientific discussions (Dunbar, 1995; Mercier & Heintz, 2014;
Okada & Simon, 1997), political discussions (Fishkin, 2009; Mercier & Lan-
demore, 2012), mock juries (Hastie et al., 1983), and forecasting group teams
(Mellers et al., 2014; Rowe & Wright, 1996). Ultimately, group discussion leads
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to similar improvements throughout development, starting with preschool child-
ren (Doise & Mugny, 1984; Mercier, 2011b; Perret-Clermont, 1980; Slavin, 1995;
Smith et al., 2009b) and in different cultures including small scale hunter-gatherer
societies (Mercier, 2011a; Mercier et al., 2016; Castelain et al. 2016).38 These
results are robust given some minimal conditions are fulfilled, such as providing
a heterogeneous opinion pool (Sunstein, 2002) and allowing everyone to express
their true opinions (Janis, 1982). (Mercier et al., 2015)
The apparent insight that reasoning mainly serves social functions, notably
argumentation, and that collaborative reasoning is an effective method to gain
better beliefs is actually not a new one (Cattaneo, 1864; Bos, 1937; Joubert,
1932; Shaw, 1932; cf. Billig, 1996; Landemore, 2012). However, it did not gain
much attention in academia. This is because not all studies that investigated group
performance came to the conclusion that groups improve beliefs. There are par-
ticularly three phenomena that seem to scrutinise the “belief improving power of
groups”: groupthink, group polarisation, and belief perseverance.
Let us begin with groupthink. In the 1960 s, psychologist Irving Janis star-
ted examining when and why small groups make poor decisions. For example,
one of his objects of investigation was the disastrous attack on Cuba launched
by the American government in 1961 (the so-called Bay of Pigs invasion). Later,
President John F. Kennedy who with his team planned and executed the invasion
asked himself: “How could we have been so stupid?” In hindsight, the group truly
made blatant misjudgements and entirely ignored critical objections. By analysing
this case, Janis (1972) inferred that Kennedy and his team suffered groupthink.
He defines groupthink as “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they
are deeply involved in a cohesive ingroup, when the members’ strivings for una-
nimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of
action” (p. 9).39 So, in a situation where members of a (cohesive) group fall
into a state of groupthink, they try to minimise conflict so as to reach a consen-
sus. Thereby, group members stop criticising each other’s suggestions and fail to
consider other alternatives. Typically, this produces an illusion of invulnerability,
whereby the group overestimates their own abilities while underestimating those
of the outgroup. The consequence of this are poor group decisions that are in fact
38 These cross-cultural findings are very important because they implicate that collaborative
reasoning is not a cultural trait (e.g. learned in school) but a universal trait that evolved during
the course of evolution (for a closer examination seeMercier and Sperber (2017), chapter 16).
So, collaborative reasoning should comprise a fitness advantage.
39 It has to be emphasised that high group cohesiveness is only one of three possible antece-
dents of groupthink. The other two are structural faults and the situational context. Yet, high
group cohesiveness is the most important antecedent for Janis.
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poorer than the average decision of all group members given they had reached
the decisions individually (Janis, 1982).
The second phenomenon that scrutinises the power of collaborative reasoning
is called group polarisation. Group polarisation involves the tendency for a group
to make decisions that are more extreme in the same direction as the original incli-
nation of its members (Myers & Lamm, 1976). Moreover, “deliberation tends to
move groups, and the individuals who compose them, toward a more extreme
point in the direction indicated by their own predeliberation judgments”. (Sun-
stein, 2002, p. 175). Group polarisation was first discovered by James Stoner.
Stoner (1961) gave participants a decision dilemma. In a chess tournament, a rat-
her low-ranked chess player has to play against the top-favoured man. During the
course of his play, he notes that he could now play a deceptive but risky move.
If it works, he should quickly win. Yet, if his opponent reads it, he almost cer-
tainly loses. The participants had to individually indicate how high the chances
that his move is successful should at least be in order that they would advise the
chess player to do it. Then, they were put in groups where they had to solve the
same problem and discuss it until they agreed on an answer. Stoner found that
groups were typically riskier than their average individual members. However, he
and other researchers that examined this so-called risky shift thought that it is a
characteristic of risk itself and not of the procedure in general. Only a few years
later, this got revised. For example, Teger & Pruitt (1967) found that the mean
initial response and the mean shift are highly correlated and thus given this mean
initial response is rather cautious, groups become more cautious.
There are various empirical examples of group polarisation. A meta-analysis
conducted by Isenberg (1986) found clear indications for the phenomenon and two
main sources underneath it: social comparison and persuasive argumentation. Yet,
on one hand, social comparison effects tended to be smaller. On the other hand,
the research community disagrees about the importance of social comparison for
group polarisation (Burnstein & Vinokur, 1973, 1975, 1977). Thus, we exclusi-
vely focus on persuasive argumentation (Burnstein 1982; Vinokur and Burnstein
1978).40 According to this theory, “an individual’s choice or position on an issue
40 For the interested reader, here is a short description of how social comparison theory affects
group polarisation, written by Burnstein and Vinokur (1977): “Social comparison theory, in
one version or another (see the reviewbyPruitt, 1971), assumes: (a) a preference for alternative
X is more socially desirable than a preference for alternative Y; (b) the person believes his
own preference for X is at least as extreme as those of his peers (in Brown, 1965; Festinger,
1954; Jellison & Riskind, 1970) or is too extreme to be acceptable (in Levinger & Schneider,
1969; Pruitt, 1971); (c) upon learning this is untrue, he experiences distress (in the Brown,
Festinger, and Jellison & Riskind version) or relief (in the Levinger & Schneider and Pruitt
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is a function of the number and persuasiveness of pro and con arguments that that
person recalls from memory when formulating his or her own position” (Isenberg,
1986, p. 1145). Now, in a group discussion, individuals collect and contribute
arguments for the various positions that are supported. The decisive question is
which of these arguments are persuasive and therefore later recalled? Two main
factors define the persuasiveness of an argument: its validity and its novelty (Isen-
berg 1986; Burnstein 1982). The validity of an argument implies how true and
sound it is plus how well it fits to my pervious views. The novelty of an argument
involves questions such as does the argument represent a new way of organising
information? Does it propose new ideas? Does it increase my access to additio-
nal information that are stored in my memory (Vinokur & Burnstein 1978)? The
combination of perceived validity and perceived novelty of a certain argument will
then determine how big its influence in causing a choice shift is. How does this
lead to group polarisation? If a group homogenously has attitude X, its members
mainly come up with arguments why attitude X is correct because they suffer a
myside bias. In so doing, each group member probably hears novel reasons why
attitude X is correct, which leads to an even higher persuasiveness of pro-attitude
X arguments. As a result, the group members gradually strengthened each other’s
belief in the correctness of attitude X or, to put it differently, they polarised each
other.
Belief perseverance is the third phenomenon which challenges the interactio-
nist approach. The interactionist approach requires that humans acknowledge the
superiority of certain arguments. We have already discussed ample evidence that
confirms this. However, sometimes we also get obsessed by a wrong belief and
are not able to acknowledge the superiority of certain arguments. The French cri-
minalist Alphonse Bertillon provides a rather extreme example of this. During
the Dreyfus affair, Bertillon rendered a graphological expert opinion which stated
that Alfred Dreyfus wrote the for the conviction relevant letter and therefore was
guilty. Bertillon did so even though he had no prior experience in graphology and
there were significant differences between Dreyfus’ handwriting and the handwri-
ting on the letter. As more and more doubts were casted on whether Dreyfus truly
wrote the relevant letter, Bertillon defended his belief vehemently. He also kept
doing so after a person was found that had the exact same handwriting as the one
on the letter and even after this person confessed that he wrote the letter. Finally,
version); (d) either affective state causes the person to take a more extreme position which
results in a decrease in distress (e.g., because according to Jellison & Riskind he no longer
appears less able than others) or an increase in satisfaction (e.g., because according to Pruitt
he freely vents what was formally suppressed).” (p. 318)
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a few weeks before Bertillon died (Alfred Dreyfus was already completely reha-
bilitated), he was offered a long-awaited medal. Yet, in order to get it he had to
admit his mistake in the Dreyfus affair. Unsurprisingly, he rather died without the
medal than acknowledging his fault (Mercier & Sperber, 2017).
The psychological phenomenon which Bertillon fell victim to is called belief
perseverance. It means that a belief is upheld although there is overwhelming
evidence against it (Anderson, 2007). Various experiments have detected belief
perseverance (Anderson, 1995; Anderson et al., 1980; Anderson & Lindsay, 1998;
Ross et al., 1975). Moreover, belief perseverance has substantial overlaps with
the continued influence effect for which ample empirical evidence exists as well
(e.g. Ecker et al., 2010, 2011; Johnson & Seifert, 1998; Seifert, 2002; van Oos-
tendorp, 1996; van Oostendorp & Bonebakker, 1999; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow,
1988; Wilkes & Reynolds, 1999). Thus, while Trouche et al. (2014) found that
humans acknowledge the superiority of certain arguments, there are plenty of stu-
dies which demonstrate the opposite. As a consequence, it is doubtful how much
group discussion improves our beliefs because even if it leads to better arguments,
there seems to be no guarantee that we acknowledge the superiority of them.
Now, does belief perseverance, groupthink, and group polarisation smash the
power of collaborative reasoning and thereby the interactionist approach? First
of all, while the existence of group polarisation has been confirmed in a meta-
analysis and is accepted in the psychological community, groupthink is much
more controversial. On one hand, only few empirical studies have been published
about groupthink. These studies provided only partial support for Janis’ con-
cept of groupthink (Park, 1990; Aldag & Fuller, 1993). On the other hand, in
a meta-analysis, Mullen et al. (1994) could not find a correlation between group
cohesiveness (groupthink’s most important antecedent) and quality of decision-
making. In fact, high group cohesiveness can also have positive consequences
because it can lead to more communication, less tension, and reduced anxiety of
group members to speak up. Moreover, Packer and Chasteen (2010) examined
groupthink out of a social identity perspective. They hypothesised that compared
to low-identifiers, group members that strongly identify with their group (= high
cohesiveness) are more likely to represent a dissent argument if they believe it
improves the situation of the group. Their experiments confirmed this hypothesis.
In conclusion, the empirical evidence regarding groupthink is not strong enough
in order that the interactionist approach has to be abandoned.
As mentioned above, the empirical evidence for group polarisation and belief
perseverance is substantially stronger. How can these phenomena be compatible
with the interactionist approach? Mercier and Sperber (2017) argue that the first
key to this question is not to exclusively analyse how reasoning works but to also
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consider when it is triggered. According to the authors, this trigger is “a clash of
ideas with an interlocutor” (p. 248). Therefore, our cognitive reasoning mecha-
nisms are not primarily designed to find the best arguments individually or in a
like-minded group but to do so in a group that experiences dissent. As Mercier
et al. (2015) state, the minimum requirements for successful collaborative reaso-
ning are a heterogeneous opinion pool (Sunstein, 2002) and allowing everyone
to express their true opinions (Janis, 1982). If these requirements are fulfilled,
group discussion often improves reasoning performance.41 The second key to the
question of how group polarisation is compatible with the interactionist approach
is to look at the environment, more precisely at the changes of the environment.
During the late Pleistocene, humans lived in middle-sized groups of approxima-
tely 37 people (Marlowe, 2005). Their daily interactions were characterised by
recurring social interactions. Thus, the normal conditions for the use of reasoning
in the interactionist approach are social and therefore dialogic. Given this envi-
ronment changes, the benefits of our reasoning mechanisms, which evolved in an
antecedent environment, might vanish.
Now, if we compare today’s environment with that of 50’000 years ago, we
find substantial differences. First, compared to the late Pleistocene, we live much
more individualistically today. As a result, our reasoning is no longer primarily
applied in dialogues but very often reduced to inner monologues. This per se is
not a problem. However, it becomes one if solitary reasoning remains solitary
because if this is the case, there is no one that challenges the lone reasoner. As
a consequence, the reasoner becomes more and more sure of her beliefs. This is
amplified by another circumstance. Before the printing press was invented and
41 For example, the shared information bias is another apparent dysfunction of groups. It says
that groups have a propensity to spend more time on discussing information, which is already
known to all members, and less time on discussing information, which is solely known to
some members. The bias was particularly explored concerning group work. In a meta-review,
Reimer et al. (2010) conclude: “Groups discussed more shared than unshared information
overall. However, the observed sampling advantage was smaller than expected. Groups atte-
nuated the discussion bias in particular when they had to choose among a small number of
decision alternatives and when they had less than 30 minutes discussion time.” (p. 121)While
the shared information bias does not per se have to lead to uninformed group decisions and
certainly does not imply that individual decisions would have been more accurate than group
decisions, it is still irritating. An advantage of a group precisely is the ability to gather unshared
information because more information should ultimately lead to a more carefully considered
and thus better decision. So, it seems that groups waste their potential of making a proper
decision because they mainly focus on shared instead of unshared information. Yet, a study
conducted by Schulz-Hardt et al. (2006) revealed that already minority dissent within a group
significantly reduces the shared information bias. This is particularly true if dissent came from
a proponent of the correct solution. Again, this confirms the interactionist approach.
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modern media arose, “people were typically made aware that somebody in their
own group had opinions different from theirs thanks to interaction with that per-
son. Finding out about difference of opinion and trying to resolve them commonly
occurred through repeated exchanges of arguments that could be anticipated and
mentally rehearsed.” (Mercier & Sperber, 2017, p. 249) So, while the media,
books, and blogs might still challenge our arguments, they do not produce a dia-
logic interaction.42 For example, a newspaper article provides a counterargument
to our position. Due to the myside bias, after reading it, we start to find argu-
ments why the article is wrong. The problem is that our new arguments will not
be challenged by the author of the article because she is not there. Thus, our
counterarguments to the arguments of the article might be weak but since there is
no one who contradicts us we are satisfied with them.
Second, since the widespread advent of books and even more important the
internet, we are able to quickly find people that share our opinion, regardless of
how absurd it is. For example, there are numerous videos on Youtube about why
the Earth is flat or why chemtrails are used so as to reduce human population.
Or there are various books which state that 9/11 was an inside-job or that there
are aliens who kidnap humans and examine them. On one hand, someone who
holds such beliefs and therefore is constantly challenged by the mainstream feels
reaffirmed when she realises that there are others who think so too. On the other
hand, such communities provide the ideal breeding ground for group polarisa-
tion. Conspiracy theories in particular have the self-enforcing feature to declare
every counterargument as a cover-up attempt and thereby further prove for the
conspiracy. In the late Pleistocene, the stubborn persistence of such weak and
uncommon arguments should have been almost impossible. This is because first,
as mentioned several times, reasoning was primarily dialogic. Second, the inter-
net has billions of users. Therefore, you most certainly find others that agree on
the same weak and uncommon beliefs as you do. In all likelihood, this was not
the case in hunter-gatherer groups of circa 37 people. In other words, thanks to
the internet these outliers of every group, which 50’000 years ago used to be
convinced (or silenced) by group members at one point, can now build their own
community.
Third, compared to the late Pleistocene, we first encounter a lot more people
today and second these people not seldomly have different cultural backgrounds.
This makes collaborative reasoning more difficult because culture normally entails
42 This also applies to experiments, where participants were solely given disconfirming evi-
dence but then were no longer challenged in their new arguments by the experimenters (e.g.
Ross et al., 1975).
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unspoken and unquestioned basic assumptions that might collide if people of
different cultures argue with each other. Yet, the arguers are not aware of the
fact that their dissent simply is a product of their different socialisation. This
problem hardly existed in hunter-gatherer societies because discussions typically
arose within groups and thus reasoning was based on the same cultural basic
assumptions.
In summary, our cognitive reasoning mechanisms sometimes appear to be fla-
wed (cf. belief perseverance, group polarisation). However, these flaws seem to be
the product of environmental changes: Unlike our ancestors, today we (1) often
reason alone and not in a dialogic context; (2) always find others that support
our weak arguments; and (3) argue with people that have substantially different
unspoken basic assumptions due to their cultural background. Because of these
changes our reasoning is distorted and its adaptivity questioned. But as the litera-
ture review of Mercier et al. (2015) demonstrates, if we look at situations where
these changes are inexistent, the way we reason (including the myside bias and
selective laziness) is no longer a bug but a feature.
4.2.4 The Role of Social Identity in the Belief Formation Process
The last three subchapters have shown that people do at least not always update
their beliefs according to Bayes’ law. In this final subchapter, we want to analyse
whether these deviations from Bayes’ law are influenced by social identity. The
idea behind this is as follows: In a decision situation, a seemingly agent-neutral
individual justifies his preference of characteristics X provided by the ingroup
over characteristics X provided by the outgroup through his beliefs and therefore
statistical discrimination. However, in fact, he also has a taste for the ingroup
which he hides behind his claim to be a mere statistical discriminator. Now, let us
assume that his beliefs truly suggest a preference of characteristics X provided by
the ingroup over characteristics X provided by the outgroup. Could it be possible
that his whole belief formation process was (and still is) distorted by his social
identity in such a way that it led to beliefs that tend to flatter the ingroup and
decry the outgroup?
Let us start with a study conducted by Nyhan and Reifler (2010). The aut-
hors wanted to investigate whether disconfirming evidence would change people’s
beliefs. For that they implemented four experiments in which participants had to
read mock news articles which contained a misleading claim from a politician.
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Over the course of the article, this claim was either corrected or not.43 Then, they
had to indicate whether they agree with a statement that supported the misleading
claim of the politician. The results reveal that among the statement’s targeted
ideological group the corrections often failed to diminish misperceptions. But not
only that, there were numerous instances where the corrections even backfired
and led to stronger agreement with the statement. Therefore, at least some of the
participants that were part of the statement’s targeted ideological group seem to
have updated their beliefs in a non-Bayesian way. Otherwise, it is hardly explaina-
ble why the correction of the misleading claim did lead to stronger approval of
it. Furthermore, this non-Bayesian updating process helped them to maintain /
strengthen their ideology.
Flynn et al. (2017) call the process that underlies these findings directionally
motivated reasoning. According to Kunda (1990), different goals can be activa-
ted when people process information, as for example accuracy goals (trying to
process information as dispassionately as possible) or directional goals (trying
to reach a desired conclusion). Now, in case of directionally motivated reaso-
ning, people seek out information that reinforces their view and avoid information
that contradicts it. This is also called selective exposure. Additionally, because of
directionally motivated reasoning “people may engage in motivated processing of
the information they receive. More specifically, studies show that people tend to
accept and recall congenial factual information more frequently than uncongenial
facts (Jerit & Barabas, 2012; Kahan, Dawson, Peters, & Slovic, n.d.); interpret
facts in a belief-consistent manner (Gaines et al., 2007); rationalize to maintain
consistency with other beliefs (Lauderdale, 2016); and counterargue corrective
information (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010)” (Flynn et al., 2017, p. 132). So, people’s
reasoning and, in this way, their belief formation process can be influenced by
directional goals. This leads to the following question: Might one directional goal
of motivated reasoning be upholding a positive social identity? If that were the
case, social identity would affect our belief formation process.
Dvir-Gvirsman (2019) examined the connection between selective exposure
and political social identity. Political social identity is based on the idea that
people interpret politics as a matter of identity and are as divided along political
lines as they are for example by race (Huddy et al., 2015; Iyengar & Westwood,
2015). The author found that the strength of political identity predicted selective
exposure: Participants that strongly identified with a political camp rather chose an
ideologically consistent than an ideologically inconsistent article. Importantly, this
43 For example, one such mock news article concerned the alleged weapons of mass
destruction of Iraq.
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effect was still significant after controlling for participants ideological extremity
and their strength of political beliefs. Other studies confirm the finding that party
identification, as a salient social identity, leads individuals to seek like-minded
news outlets (Garrett & Stroud, 2014; Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Stroud, 2011).
What about social identities beside politics? The study of Appiah et al. (2013)
analysed selective exposure in regard to ethnic identity. The authors wanted to
find out whether positive or negative valence of a news story and the ethnicity of
the character portrayed in the story would affect white or black readers’ selection
of a story. There are three main results: (1) Black participants were more likely
to select and read positive and negative stories that involved their ethnic ingroup,
whereby positive stories prevailed. (2) Black participants were more likely to
select and read negative stories about their outgroup compared to positive ones.
(3) Whites’ story selection was not influenced by story valence or character ethni-
city. So, again, social identity seems to have influenced the information gathering
process, yet, only in case of black participants.
The authors interpret these results as follows: First, the fact that black par-
ticipants preferred positive to negative news stories when they featured a black
person but negative to positive news stories when they featured a white person
demonstrates ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation. Second, the circum-
stance that black participants generally read more negative articles about Blacks
than about Whites might be due to perceived similarity to characters. As Weaver
(2011) argued: “[A]udiences may be motivated to select content featuring same-
race characters either because of a perception that such content will portray the
ingroup in a positive way (social identity theory) or because of a simple pre-
ference for characters similar to themselves (social cognitive theory).” (p. 371)
Third, one’s ethnicity is significantly more salient and important for black than
it is for white people (Phinney, 1992). This is because they are a low-status /
minority group. In accordance with that, black participants identified themselves
more strongly with their ethnic ingroup than white participants. In turn, people
that highly identify with their ingroup are more likely to display ingroup favou-
ritism and outgroup derogation (Lewis & Sherman, 2010; Vanhoomissen & Van
Overwalle, 2010). That is why selective exposure was only present in case of
black participants.
Knobloch-Weserwick & Hastall (2010) found that identification with a certain
age group can lead to selective exposure. In an online news magazine, individuals
of 18 to 30 years old mainly focused on same-aged individuals and in so doing
preferably read positive news about their ingroup. In contrast, 50 to 65 years
old participants rather read negative news about young individuals than positive
news about this outgroup or than negative news about their ingroup. Moreover,
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such exposure to negative news about younger individuals reinforced older reci-
pients’ self-esteem. The authors conclude that these findings are to a great extent
compatible with a social identity approach to selective exposure.44
Lastly, Wojcieszak & Garrett (2018) primed participants so as to raise the sali-
ence of national identity. First of all, this had the effect that immigrant opponents
on one hand attributed more negative traits and perceived more social distance
to immigrants and on the other hand reported greater ingroup favourability. The-
refore, priming national identity promoted affective polarisation. Second, it led
immigration opponents to select more pro-attitudinal news stories, meaning sto-
ries that portrayed immigration negatively, and to spend more time reading these
than their counterparts who did not get primed. According to the authors, these
two findings are connected. They infer that “among immigration opponents, sali-
ent national identity exacerbates affective polarization both directly and through
seeking content reaffirming people’s prior views” (p. 267).
We see that the evidence presented in this subchapter indicates that social
identity affects our belief formation process:45 Our identification with a group
changes our belief formation process in such a way that it enables us to uphold
or even bolster the positivity of our social identity. As a consequence, the beliefs
of an agent-relative statistical discriminator can be influenced by his tastes and,
in this way, he might hide his tastes behind his beliefs. Now, the studies discus-
sed in this subchapter mainly concentrated on selective exposure. Unfortunately,
no study could be found that examined the connection between the interpreta-
tion of a statement and social identity. However, there might be an indication for
this connection in the experiment of Nyhan and Reifler (2010). As previously
mentioned, only among a misleading statement’s targeted ideological group the
corrections often failed to diminish misperceptions and sometimes even backfi-
red. This could suggest that participants’ political social identity influenced their
interpretation of the correction. But of course, this hypothesis needs further proof.
To summarise the whole chapter, there is ample evidence that humans do at
least not always update their beliefs according to Bayes’ law: We mistake availa-
bility for probability; have distorted memories of former prior probabilities; are
good (bad) at producing arguments that confirm / verify our (an opposite) posi-
tion but rather bad (good) at producing counterarguments; and are more critical of
44 Furthermore, they are not compatible with social cognitive theory and social comparison
theory.
45 There is also an opposing study in which exposure to pro-U.S. messages could not be
predicted by identification with the American nation (Knobloch-Westerwick et al., 2017).
Nonetheless, the circumstance that at least in some situations social identity affects selective
exposure seems to be hardly deniable.
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other people’s arguments than of our own. Additionally, social identity can affect
our belief formation process in such a way that it leads to beliefs that tend to
flatter the ingroup and decry the outgroup.
4.3 About the BeliefsWe Learn
The last two chapters revealed that humans seem to have inherent prior beliefs
and that we do not (exclusively) update our beliefs by use of Bayes’ law. Now, let
us ignore these circumstances for a moment and ask what beliefs someone with
agent-neutral preferences would learn that starts with uniform priors and upda-
tes them by use of Bayes’ law (e.g. an algorithm). Under these conditions, the
learned beliefs would completely depend on the decision-maker’s environment.
In our case, this environment is the Western society and within this society, we
would learn various beliefs about systematic differences between groups (and use
them for statistical discrimination). In many cases, these differences cannot be
explained by means of biology (alone).46 For example, why are there compara-
tively few black students at Ivy League Schools (Ashkenas et al., 2017)? Why are
foreigners more likely to be convicted for a crime than natives (at least in Swit-
zerland) (Schmidli et al., 2016)? Why are women less likely to major in natural
sciences than men (Banaji & Greenwald, 2013)? Why are blonds said to be stupid
(Greenwood & Isbell, 2002)? And why did Jews comparatively often work in the
banking sector (Foxman, 2010)? If there is no biological explanation for these
group differences, their origins have to be societal.
This chapter examines how societal characteristics affect the group specific
beliefs we learn and thus is connected to previous chapters where we analysed
the role of culture and cultural norms.47 Its goal is not to give an in-depth analy-
sis of this topic but a sense of how society produces and preserves group specific
beliefs. The chapter has the following structure: We first look at how historical
circumstances can produce group specific beliefs that hold on for centuries. Then,
we investigate why such beliefs do not (or only slowly) vanish but are repro-
duced. Finally, we give a short introduction to social dominance theory which
tries to integrate sociological and psychological approaches to discrimination. In
46 For example, the fact that onlywomengive birth to childrenwould be a systematic difference
between men and women that can be explained by means of biology.
47 Importantly, such societal characteristics can refer to both the meso-level (family, peers,
etc.) and macro-level (society, core culture, etc.). However, in this chapter we rather
concentrate on the macro-level.
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so doing, it provides a comprehensive explanation for why societies create group
inequalities although the groups are (more or less) biologically equal.
4.3.1 The Importance of Historical Circumstances
If we look at beliefs that are not based on pure biology, we realise that these
beliefs exist because of a prior (and maybe still prevailing) historical context. A
perfect example of this are the stereotypes that link Jews with greed, money, and
banking.48 In the Middle Ages, Jews were banned from many professions. They
mainly had to carry out socially inferior jobs as for example tax and rent collecting
or moneylending. The latter was particularly reserved for Jews because Christians
were forbidden to lend money for interest.49 In fact, back then such practice was
called usury, which only later changed its meaning to charging excessive interest.
Thus, the Christian dominated and Jew-unfriendly society of the Middle Ages
pushed Jews into money-lending since Christians needed someone who did this
sinful job. Of course, this did not benefit the popularity of Jews, led to tensions
between Jewish creditors and Christian debtors, and fuelled negative stereotypes
about Jews such as they are greedy and heartless (Foxman, 2010).
William Shakespeare’s play “The Merchant of Venice”, which he wrote at the
end of the 16th century, portrays such stereotypes.50 Here, a Jewish money-lender
named Shylock is one of the main characters. Shylock is asked to lend money to
the Christian merchant Antonio who used to treat him unfavourably. He does so
without wanting any interest. However, if Antonio is not able to pay back until
a certain day, Shylock may take a pound of his flesh. As it happens, Antonio
fails to repay the debt. So, Shylock goes to court so as to demand his pound of
Antonio’s flesh. He even declines Antonio’s offer to repay the debt twice. In the
end, Shylock has to surrender due to a legal loophole and loses everything because
he gets convicted of attempted murder. Whether Shakespeare wanted to express
his potential antipathy towards Jews through the character of Shylock is disputed
(Ambrosino, 2016). Nevertheless, anti-Semites used the play for their propaganda.
48 In this field of study, researchers normally use the word stereotype and not group specific
belief, which is why we also primarily use the former. Yet, as previously mentioned, the two
can be used interchangeably.
49 Money-lending was perceived as a sin. This is rooted in the Old Testament (Exodus 22:25,
Deuteronomy 23:19–20, Leviticus 25:35–37 and Psalms 15:5). Moreover, the only time Jesus
got furious was when a temple was misused by merchants and money changers.
50 Yet, in the end, Shylock gives a speech on tolerance (Hath not a Jew eyes?) and in so doing
at least today regains some sympathy by the audience.
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For example, the Nazis broadcasted it shortly after Crystal Night in 1938 (Shapiro,
1996). Additionally, Shylock has become a synonym for loan shark. So, regardless
whether Shakespeare was anti-Judean or not and wanted to display his attitude
in his play, “The Merchant of Venice” unambiguously reveals three things: (1)
how badly Jews were treated in the Middle Ages; (2) how such a play can be
instrumentalised for political purposes; and (3) how a certain stereotype can form
the collective consciousness (Shylock = loan shark).
As time went by, Jews established in the upcoming financial sector. Most nota-
ble is the Rothschild family who set up a large banking imperium in the 18th and
19th century but who were also victims of various anti-Semitic conspiracy theo-
ries. These conspiracy theories cumulated in the idea of Weltjudentum, which
fuelled antisemitism in the first half of the 20th century and ultimately resul-
ted in the Holocaust (Friedländer, 2007; Foxman, 2010).51 Finally, these Jewish
stereotypes that emerged hundreds of years ago consist until today. In 2013,
the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) conducted a poll in the U.S. 15 % agreed
that Jews are more willing to use shady practices than others. 19 % of respon-
dents believed that Jews have too much power in the business world. And 14 %
indicated that Jews are not as honest as other business people.
The way history has formed our stereotypes of a group is observable in various
other cases. For example, only until recently, Western women were massively
oppressed by men. They often could not learn a proper profession, might not even
have gone to school, had to become housewives, could not participate in politics,
could be raped by their husband, could be made to quit their job by their husband,
and so on. Unsurprisingly, such a patriarchal society produced gender stereotypes
that are asymmetric in their positive value. Broverman et al. (1972) examined
such stereotypes in a time when gender roles started to be challenged. Still, they
found clear patterns. While men were described as active, adventurous, rational,
decisive, autonomous, competitive, ambitious, aggressive, worldly, and confident,
women were seen as emotional, empathic, cautious, passive, quiet, dependent,
insecure, soft, assimilated, and harmonising. Admittedly, there were also male
stereotypes which have a negative connotation such as lack of interpersonal
sensitivity, warmth, and expressiveness.52 Moreover, not all female stereotypes
51 Of course, this is a simplified explanation of how these negative Jewish stereotypes came
about and ultimately resulted in the Holocaust. Yet, there is an undeniable connection between
the role of Jews in the Middle Ages as money-lenders, their later dominance in the financial
sector, the conspiracy theories this produced, and the increasing usage of Jews as scapegoats
at the beginning of the 20th century.
52 Yet, back then, these characteristics might also have been perceived as weaknesses that a
true man should not display.
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had a negative value. Yet, overall, stereotypical male characteristics were more
often perceived to be desirable than stereotypical female traits. The authors add
that a large segment of society also accepted these stereotypes: “[C]ollege stu-
dents portray the ideal woman as less competent than the ideal man, and mental
health professionals tend to see mature healthy women as more submissive, less
independent, etc., than either mature healthy men, or adults, sex unspecified.”
(p. 75)
These stereotypes seem to date back more than two thousand years. The bible
says that God made a woman from the rib he had taken out of a man (Genesis
2:22), making a clear statement of who is superior. This gets emphasised via
statements such as: “For man did not come from woman, but woman from man”
(Corinthians 11:8) and “Neither was man created for women, but women for man”
(Corinthians 11:9). Then, it is Eve who takes a fruit from the tree of knowledge
and eats it (Genesis 3:6). This makes her responsible for the original sin.53 Finally,
there are several passages which state that wives should submit to their husbands
(e.g. Collosians 3:18, Ephesians 5:22–24, Corinthians 11:3). Now, this shall not
imply that the bible is the origin of patriarchal societies. In contrast, probably, the
bible emerged in a society that already was patriarchal.54 Yet, it legitimised the
oppression of women through a divine world order. And since the Western world
was massively influenced by Christianity, these biblical gender roles of men and
women survived for centuries.
If the law, which was made by patriarchal men, predetermines how women
should live, if a patriarchal religion specifies the role of women, and if, as a
product of that, a patriarchal society also expects women to behave in this way,
is it surprising that many of them do? How should women be independent if the
law makes them dependent from men? How should women be less submissive if
the bible tells them to bow down to men. And how should women become more
active and challenge the dominance of men if society expects them to be passive
and harmonising? Out of this perspective, it is even more remarkable that thanks
to strong feminist activism and immense willpower, women (at least partly) freed
themselves from these stereotypes in the last 150 years.
To summarise, the exact beliefs of an agent-neutral decision-maker are closely
intertwined with the society within which he learns and thereby that society’s his-
torical circumstances. Jews were not dominant in the financial sector because they
had a genetical predisposition for that but because Christian dominated society
53 To be fair, she then gives it to Adam who takes a bite as well. So, both behave sinfully.
54 Social dominance theory provides an explanation for this social hierarchy. We will discuss
it in section 4.3.3.
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pushed them into these professions. The question we want to ask in the next
chapter is why such stereotypes can still prevail after societal restrictions seem to
have vanished.
4.3.2 Self-Fulfilling Prophecies and Reproduction of Social
Conditions
As we said in the last chapter, in today’s Western societies, women have liberated
(or are still liberating) themselves from many prior stereotypes. One of these is the
gender-science stereotype: Men are good in science / math, whereas women are
not. A hundred years ago, having such a stereotype was obvious because women
did hardly have the chance to study science in the first place. So, how should they
be good at it? However, there no longer are educational barriers for women. As a
matter of fact, for instance in Switzerland, there are more women than men that
complete a Higher School Certificate, which is the door opener for universities,
and also more women than men that study at a university (Dubach et al., 2017).
Yet, if we look at mathematical majors such as natural sciences or engineering,
there are still significantly less women than men. For example, at the ETH, which
is a polytechnic university, only one in three students is female (Nowotny, 2015).
Why is that the case?
In 2005, Harvard University’s former president Larry Summers gave a contro-
versial answer to this question. Among other reasons, he said that women might
be underrepresented in math and sciences because of a genetic lack of ability
(Goldenberg, 2005).55 This statement is problematic because even if women were
at that moment worse in math than men, this would not count as evidence that
the observable gender difference has a biological origin. In fact, there are clear
indications which suggest a different inference. As Banaji and Greenwald (2013)
write: “The preponderance of boys with high SAT math scores has gone from a
10.7:1 ratio favoring boys in the 1980 s to 2.8:1 in the 1990 s. In other words, the
ratio favoring boys was nearly four times as large a mere decade earlier. Such a
rapid closing of the gap between groups that used to be strikingly different should
be surprising to those who favor a largely genetic explanation for gender diffe-
rences in math ability, because genetically based differences cannot be reduced so
dramatically in such a short period of time.” (p. 121) Similarly, within 25 years,
55 Due to this statement, Summers later resigned as president.
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the percentage of female ETH students rose from 18 % to 33 % (Riegelnig, 2012).
Thus, apparently, the gender-science stereotype seems to get overridden, yet, this
process takes time.
One major reason why the effects of such a stereotype do not immediately
vanish after it is no longer officially endorsed is as follows: We might explicitly
abandon such stereotypes but they continue to exist implicitly. Nosek et al. (2002)
found that the stronger women’s gender-science stereotype was in an IAT, which
measures implicit associations, the less likely they preferred math or science.
Moreover, the IAT score could also be used as a significant predictor for women’s
SAT math performance. Now, it might be objected that women hold such implicit
stereotypes because they also hold them explicitly. Yet, there is ample evidence
that not explicit but implicit stereotypes predict women’s attitude towards math
best. For example, Nosek and Smyth (2011) again found that, in case of women,
stronger implicit gender-science stereotypes predicted worse math achievement,
greater negativity toward math, weaker self-ascribed ability, and less participa-
tion. Importantly, these “implicit stereotypes had greater predictive validity than
explicit stereotypes”. (p. 1125) Another study conducted by Nosek et al. (2009)
is even more intriguing. The authors analysed more than half a million gender-
science IATs completed by citizens of 34 countries and reached the following
three conclusions: (1) The level of a nation’s implicit gender-science stereotype
predicted nation-level sex differences in 8th-grade mathematics and science achie-
vement. (2) Regarding this achievement gap, explicit stereotypes did not provide
additional predictive validity. (3) “[I]mplicit stereotypes and sex differences in
science participation and performance are mutually reinforcing, contributing to
the persistent gender gap in science engagement” (p. 10593).
Another phenomenon that reveals how stereotypes can affect behaviour is cal-
led the stereotype threat. It was first discovered by Steele and Aronson (1995) who
examined intellectual test performance of African Americans. Here, black parti-
cipants performed worse if they thought that a test was diagnostic of ability or if
a black stereotype (black people are less intellectual) was made salient before the
test. Similarly, Spencer et al. (1999) studied whether women performed differently
in a math test if the test was either described as “producing gender differences”
or as “not producing gender differences”. In line with Steele and Aronson (1995),
they performed worse in the former condition. The explanation for these results
is that the abovementioned conditions made a negative stereotype salient which
disrupts performance because its holders become anxious about confirming the
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stereotype.56 Now, these stereotypes do not have to be held explicitly. Galdi et al.
(2014) examined stereotype threat among six-year-old children. Among these
children, they found no indication that either boys or girls explicitly endorsed or
were even aware of the gender-science stereotype. Yet, girls displayed automatic
associations consistent with that stereotype. Furthermore, compared to a stereo-
type inconsistent condition, girls’ math performance was significantly worse in
a stereotype consistent condition. The decrease in performance was mediated by
automatic associations. Ultimately, Kiefer and Sekaquaptewa (2007) suggest that
if an implicit gender-science stereotype is strongly pronounced, no stereotypic
cues are needed to create a stereotype threat. Here, stereotypes are chronically
accessible and thus their impact ubiquitous.
The problem is that eventually implicit stereotypes can lead to a self-fulfilling
prophecy (Merton, 1948). If a girl grows up in an environment that implicitly (and
explicitly) portrays a gender-science stereotype, she might adopt it and actually
perform worse in math, which confirms her implicit stereotype. Later, she might
get aware of the stereotype and explicitly affirm it (at least in her case) due to her
poor math performances. As a consequence, she plays along with the stereotype
and rather studies languages or literature than math. And even if she never holds
the stereotype explicitly, she might still be more interested in non-math subjects
because she performs comparatively poorly in math which lessens motivation
for it. On an aggregated level, this process maintains an implicit (and explicit)
stereotype. Therefore, it is little surprising that it takes time until such a self-
fulfilling prophecy is broken and thereby the gender-science stereotype overcome.
But as the rising number of female science students reveals, our society seems to
be on the way to get there.
Yet, it is not always a stereotype alone that leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy
and, in this way, keeps the stereotype alive. Often it is also a question of socio-
economic status (SES). For example, let us consider African Americans. The fact
that African Americans are a disadvantaged group in the U.S. is again due to
historical circumstances. The European American population, which dominated
the U.S., used to enslave black people and continued to treat them unfavoura-
bly after they were liberated. Today, mistreatments of African Americans that
are legitimised by the law have become rare.57 So, it seems like there are equal
56 The same phenomenon also exists in an exactly vice versa version. Here, it is called ste-
reotype boost and implies that a group performs better after a positive stereotype was made
salient (Shih et al., 1999, 2002).
57 There are still laws that mistreat African Americans (and other minorities). For example, in
2010, Arizona introduced a law (SB 1070) that particularly disadvantaged non-white people
(Nill, 2011).
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opportunities for everyone now. However, the oppressed history of African Ame-
ricans still impacts their momentary opportunities. For instance, 80 % of students
at Ivy League Schools are part of the richest fifth of U.S. society. The richest 2 %
represent even 20 % of students (Hartman, 2006). Now, it might be objected that
rich people are also more intelligent (that is why they are rich). Their offspring
then inheres this intelligence which in turn is why they are overrepresented at elite
universities. Yet, first of all, studying at such universities is expensive and even
if a student might be qualified to study there, families with a low SES might not
afford it. Second, there is an interaction between SES and intelligence. Turkhei-
mer et al. (2003) analysed a sample of 7-year-old twins, who grew up in families
with different SES. The authors detect that the influence of genes and the envi-
ronment on intelligence is not linear across different levels of SES. Their models
suggest that “in impoverished families, 60 % of the variance in IQ is accounted
for by the shared environment, and the contribution of genes is close to zero; in
affluent families, the result is almost exactly the reverse.” (p. 623) This means that
a child in a low SES family could have the genes for high intelligence, yet, never
fully expresses them because of her unstimulating environment.58 Consequently,
while in theory there is equal opportunities, in reality, your SES predetermines
them to a substantial degree.
So, negative African American stereotypes maintain due to African Ameri-
cans’ historically disadvantageous starting position and the consequent difficulty
to catch up with European Americans. The situation is comparable with the board
game monopoly that has the following rules: Player A gets $10’000, player B
$2’000. Then, for the first 15 minutes, player A has to pay half the price for
all objects, whereas player B has to pay double the price. Moreover, the number
player A dices gets doubled if she wants to. In contrast, the number player B dices
gets always halved. After the first 15 minutes, both players play with the same
rules. Unsurprisingly, even though player A has lost her privileges, she benefited
so much from prior conditions that player B can hardly catch up.59 Likewise, it
is difficult for African Americans to disprove the negative stereotypes about them
if they live in a societal system that constantly reproduces the conditions that led
to these stereotypes.
58 For example, there are no books at home, parents do not express themselves eloquently,
there is no discussion culture at the dinner table, the kids in the neighbourhood abhor school
and insult students who like to learn as nerds, etc.
59 This is exactly where affirmative action wants to draw on. Through giving an advantage to
certain groups, it wants to compensate the historical disadvantageous that these groups had
to suffer and which still affect their momentary situation.
172 4 How DoWe Get Our Beliefs for Statistical Discrimination?
In conclusion, stereotypes maintain because on one hand even if we explicitly
abandon them, they can continue to exist implicitly, and in this way, still affect our
behaviour. This can lead to self-fulfilling prophecies. On the other hand, today’s
societies are the product of past societies. If these past societies officially mistrea-
ted a certain group, it is possible that this circumstance still affects that group.
This is because after the official mistreatment ended, the disadvantaged group
started with such a backlog that they could not catch up yet. Thus, although theo-
retically all groups have equal opportunities, “initially” mistreated groups have a
worse starting position and thereby much more obstacles on the way to the top.
As a result, social conditions and stereotypes get reproduced.
4.3.3 On the Structure of Society
So far, we examined how historical circumstances influence the manifestation of
stereotypes and why such stereotypes are difficult to overcome. Moreover, we saw
that negative stereotypes were often applied on oppressed groups. This leads to
the following question: Why are societies structured in a way that they generate
dominant and oppressed groups in the first place? In this last chapter, we try to
outline a brief answer to this question. In so doing, we discuss a theory that com-
bines various psychological and sociological concepts, namely social dominance
theory. The particularity of this theory is that it not only examines how indi-
viduals behave in a group context but also considers the societal structures the
aggregated individual behaviour creates. In turn, these societal structures again
affect individual behaviour.
The theory was developed by Sidanius and Pratto (2001) and begins with a
basic observation that also inheres the question posed above: “[A]ll human socie-
ties tend to be structured as systems of group-based social hierarchies. At the very
minimum, this hierarchical social structure consists of one or a small number of
dominant and hegemonic groups at the top and one or a number of subordinate
groups at the bottom.” (p. 31) Here, the dominance of a group is characterised by
a disproportionately large share of positive social value, which can be expressed
in various ways as for example political authority and power, wealth, high social
status, good and plentiful food, splendid homes, or the best available health care.
Meanwhile, the subordinate group possesses a disproportionately large share of
negative social value. Manifestations of this are low social status and power, rela-
tively poor health care, high-risk and low-status occupations, poor food, severe
negative sanctions (prison and death sentences), or modest if not miserable homes.
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These group-based social hierarchies consist of three distinct stratification
systems60: (a) an age system, where adults and middle-aged people dominate
children and younger adults; (b) a gender system, where males dominate females;
and (c) an arbitrary-set system. This last system can include all types of soci-
ally constructed and highly salient social categories as for example clan, estate,
ethnicity, nation, caste, race, social class, regional grouping, religious sect, and
so on. Again, within these social categories there is a group (e.g. white people)
that has disproportionate social power over other groups (e.g. black people). As
can be seen, these three systems differ regarding their fixedness. While we all at
one point become adults if we live long enough and thereby join the high-status
group, this does not apply to the gender system. If someone is born female she
stays female her entire life and consequently never joins the high-status group.61
The arbitrary system is somewhere between. Certain social categories are very
fixed such as skin colour. Others are more permeable such as social class. Yet, as
the name implies, the definition of arbitrary systems is arbitrary. For instance, at
which point a person is no longer considered to be white but black is randomly
defined.62
The arbitrary system has two other characteristics. (1) While there is violence,
brutality, and oppression in all three systems, typically, the most brutal oppres-
sion occurs in the arbitrary system. A demonstration of this circumstance provides
the ever-present phenomenon of genocide. Of course, in the Western world, the
most prominent genocide is the Holocaust. But there were many others too. For
example, in the last fifty years, there was among others the Cambodian genocide,
the East Timor genocide, the Kurdish genocide, the Isaaq genocide, the Bosnian
genocide, the Rwandan genocide, and the genocide of Yazidis by ISIL. Further-
more, according to Genocide Watch (2018), there were five genocides occurring
in 2018: in Syria, in Sudan, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in Ethiopia,
and in Myanmar.
(2) The arbitrary system is generally not found among small hunter-gatherer
societies (Lenski, 1984). Indeed, such societies might have social roles in form
of a headman and / or a shaman that inhere a certain dominance. Yet, these roles
60 A system of social stratification divides society into distinct groups with different statuses.
For example, slavery was a system of social stratification, which divided society into those
that are free (high status) and those that are enslaved (low status). Another example is socioe-
conomic status, which typically divides society into upper class (highest status), middle class,
and lower class (lowest status).
61 At least, that was true for almost all of human history.
62 For example, the U.S. used to have the one-drop rule, where already one black ancestor
determined you as black.
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are normally assigned to those who prove to have the necessary individual skills.
Thus, the hierarchies that follow from these social roles tend not to be transgene-
rational. In contrast, the age system and the gender system are also prevalent in
hunter-gatherer societies. In case of the age system, Sidanius and Pratto (2001)
do not explicate why this is true. But to be fair, such a statement is also not con-
troversial. This is different regarding the gender system. Here, the authors write:
“In both hunter-gatherer and early agricultural societies, while women contributed
substantially to the subsistence of the group by frequently collecting and control-
ling the essentials for survival, there is no known society in which women, as a
group, have had control over the political life of the community, the community’s
interaction with outgroups, or the technology and practice of warfare, which is
arguably the ultimate arbiter of political power. … Although there are several
known examples of matrilineal societies (i.e., where descent is traced through the
family of the mother), matrilocal or uxorilocal societies (i.e., where newly mar-
ried couples reside with the wife’s kin), and societies in which women have near
economic parity with men, there are no known examples of matriarchal societies
(i.e., where women, as a group, control the political and military authority within
the society).” (p. 36)
If hunter-gatherer societies were mainly structured by only two stratification
systems but modern societies have a strong third one, we have to ask the fol-
lowing question: What is it that promoted the emergence and / or strengthening
of the arbitrary system? According to Sidanius and Pratto, the answer is eco-
nomic surplus, more precisely the lack of economic surplus in hunter-gatherer
societies and its existence in modern societies. Hunter-gatherer societies had no
technologies to produce or store food that permitted long-term storage. Moreover,
since hunter-gatherer societies usually are nomadic, people cannot accumulate
large numbers of nonedible forms of economic surplus such as weapons, arma-
ments, or animal skins. Because of that the development of highly specialised
social roles, as for example professional police, armies, and other bureaucracies
that enable the formation of political authority is hardly possible. Contrary to that,
in modern societies, there is no necessity that all adults devote most of their time
to food procurement and survival. Consequently, certain males are able to spe-
cialise in the arts of coercion (e.g. warlordism, policing) or intellectual / spiritual
sophistry. In turn, “these specialists are used by political elites to establish and
enforce expropriative economic and social relationships with other members of
the society. Once these role specializations and expropriative relationships are in
place, arbitrary-set, group-based hierarchies then emerge.” (p. 35)
These observations bring us to the three primary assumptions of social domi-
nance theory: “(1) While age- and gender-based hierarchies will tend to exist
4.3 About the BeliefsWe Learn 175
within all social systems, arbitrary-set systems of social hierarchy will invaria-
bly emerge within social systems producing sustainable economic surplus. … (2)
Most forms of group conflict and oppression (e.g., racism, ethnocentrism, sexism,
nationalism, classism, regionalism) can be regarded as different manifestations
of the same basic human predisposition to form group-based social hierarchies.
… (3) Human social systems are subject to the counterbalancing influences
of hierarchy-enhancing forces, producing and maintaining ever higher levels of
group-based social inequality, and hierarchy-attenuating forces, producing greater
levels of group-based social equality.” (p. 38)
Especially the second assumption reveals the difference between social iden-
tity theory, on which we mainly focused in this dissertation, and social dominance
theory. While the former primarily looks at ingroup favouritism from an indivi-
dual perspective, the latter does consider the societal implications of that as well.
So, given no group-based social hierarchy can be identified in a society (or sim-
ply between two groups), social dominance theory has little to explain about the
existence of ingroup favouritism.63 Here, it references to other theories such as
social identity theory. Yet, as the above paragraphs demonstrate, this is seldomly
the case outside the laboratory. Thus, when we look at actual attitudes and ste-
reotypes, social dominance theory enables additional explanatory power. This is
because it does not only consider individual processes but also takes the societal
environment into account, namely a group-based social hierarchy, within which
these processes take place.
As the third assumption of social dominance theory suggests, societies are
exposed to two counterbalancing forces: hierarchy-enhancing and hierarchy-
attenuating ones. Good examples of the latter force are the various human rights
movements of for instance women, blacks, or homosexuals that appeared in the
last 70 years. In contrast, the biblical verses mentioned in section 4.3.1, which
state that women are inferior to men, are examples of the hierarchy-enhancing
force. Now, such stories as these biblical verses play an important role in social
dominance theory and are called legitimising myths. They consist of attitudes,
values, beliefs, and ideologies that justify the social practices which distribute
social value within the social system. Hierarchy-enhancing legitimising myths are
typically set up and spread by the dominant group and thereby can serve as a dis-
guise for their tastes: Dominant and oppressed groups are treated differently due
to the “myth’s content” and not the tastes of the dominant group. But of course,
these two probably are very much intertwined since social identity can affect our
63 For example, this is the case in minimal group experiments.
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belief formation process (cf. section 4.2.4) and thus also what a legitimising myth
contains.
Such myths can be straightforward as for example the misogynist biblical ver-
ses. Other instances provide anti-Jewish stories during the Middle Ages which
stated that Jews poisoned wells and therefore are the causer of the plague or that
Jews ritually kill Christian children (Cohn, 2007). Yet, legitimising myths can
also be subtle. Let us consider the idiom “from rags to riches” which became an
allegory of the American dream. It implies that regardless of your socioeconomic
background you can achieve anything if you really want to. Consequently, if you
do not make it from rags to riches, it is not because of the system but because
of you. This leads to internal attributions of the misfortunes of those with a low
socioeconomic status, which in turn prevents their desire to change the system
because that would require an external attribution.
Despite the fact that social dominance theory has more aspects, this is where
our outline of it ends. We do so out of three reasons. First, although Sidanius
and Pratto position their theory as an exclusive explanation for ingroup favou-
ritism, the parts discussed so far can also be conceived as a transmission of
social identity theory on the structure of society. If groups compete against each
other for status, and at least one group wins this competition, it is of little sur-
prise that this produces hierarchy-based social systems. In such a society, the
high-status group then wants to maintain its status and in so doing uses legiti-
mising myths or enshrines its power in institutions. Thus, what social dominance
theory in their second assumption calls the basic human predisposition to form
group-based social hierarchies could simply be the societal consequence of social
identity theory.
Second, while social dominance theory got quite some academic attention in
the 1990 s and early 2000 s (e.g. Sidanus et al., 1992, 2004; Pratto, 1999; Pratto
et al., 2006)64, the theory more or less disappeared in the last ten years. Instead,
researchers rather focused on social dominance orientation.65 Social dominance
orientation is a personality psychological scale that indicates a person’s attitudes
toward hierarchies and beliefs about whether one’s own group should dominate
other groups (Morrison & Ybarra, 2007). Now, the absence of social dominance
theory in the momentary academic discourse does not per se imply that the theory
is incorrect. Yet, it suggests that social dominance theory did not prevail against
64 Admittedly, many (if not most) papers about social dominance theory either have Sidanius
or Pratto (or both) as author or co-author.
65 For example, while the encyclopedia of social psychology of Baumeister and Vohs (2007),
which describes more than 600 social psychological theories / phenomena, has a chapter for
social dominance orientation, it does not have one for social dominance theory.
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social identity theory. In fact, social dominance theory was massively criticised
by social identity theorists (e.g. Schmitt et al., 2003; Wilson & Lui, 2003) and
even declared as having been falsified (Turner et al., 2003).
Third, section 3.3 revealed ultimate explanations for social identity theory.
Depersonalisation can be adaptive if there is a group selection mechanism or
the group is rather small and mainly kin-based. Moreover, parochial altruism
also provides an explanation for why humans not only display ingroup love but
sometimes also outgroup derogation. Contrary to that, Sidanius and Pratto (2001)
base their whole ultimate explanation of social dominance theory on the diffe-
rence between male and female reproductive strategies.66 Indeed, this approach
might persuasively explain the gender differences in social dominance orientation.
However, it does not give a convincing answer for the question of why humans’
far-reaching altruistic behaviour and ingroup favouritism should be adaptive. Tur-
ner et al. (2003) even describe the evolutionary basis of the social dominance
drive as largely fantasy.
So, why bother about social dominance theory at all? Despite its weaknesses,
Sidanius and Pratto’s analysis undeniably demonstrates that the structure of socie-
ties is determined by hierarchy-based social systems. Furthermore, so as to keep
their status and privileges, the ones that are at the top generally want to keep those
that are at the bottom at the bottom. In so doing, the superior group makes self-
beneficial laws and spreads legitimising myths that function as justifications for
the existing social hierarchy. The examples presented in section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2
perfectly demonstrate that. Ultimately, this can lead to a seemingly strange pheno-
menon, namely outgroup favouritism. Yet, such behaviour is not in conflict with
social identity theory. Tajfel and Turner (1979) write: “[S]ubordinate groups …
[can] internalize a wider social evaluation of themselves as ‘inferior’ or ‘second
class’, and this consensual inferiority is reproduced as relative self-derogation.”
(p. 37) According to the authors, this occurs if the following requirements are
met: “[W]here social-structural differences in the distribution of resources have
been institutionalized, legitimized, and justified through a consensually accepted
status system (or at least a status system that is sufficiently firm and pervasive to
prevent the creation of cognitive alternatives to it), the result has been less and not
more ethnocentrism in the different status groups.” (ebd.) In other words, social
identity theory includes the possibility that low-status groups display outgroup
favouritism when intergroup status is stable and legitimate (Turner & Reynolds,
66 Since women bear a child and as a result carry all the costs of pregnancy they have to choose
their partner wisely. In contrast, for men, the costs of impregnation are marginal, which is
why they are less picky.
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2001; Rubin & Hewstone, 2004). Now, social institutions (e.g. the law) that are
beneficial for the superior group and according legitimising myths precisely pro-
mote such stable and legitimate intergroup statuses. This is why inferior groups
not always take collective action and sometimes even contribute to the mainte-
nance of the status quo and thereby their own inferiority (Jost et al., 2004). Yet,
as soon as the legitimising myths start to be questioned and the low-status group
recognises the chance of change (as it often happened in the last decades), out-
group favouritism turns into ingroup favouritism.67 Again, in the words of Tajfel
and Turner (1979): “[C]onsensual inferiority will be rejected most rapidly when
the situation is perceived as both unstable and illegitimate.” (p. 45)
To summarise the whole section 4.3, the precise beliefs about (and attitudes
towards) one’s ingroup and outgroups highly depend on the society within which
an individual lives. While there certainly are beliefs that ground on biological
facts, many if not most are socially construed or massively socially exaggerated.
Such social facts influence the behaviour of people and can lead to self-fulfilling
prophecies. Due to that they are hard to overcome. This is particularly true since
those who dominate a society usually have no interest in overcoming the negative
stereotypes of inferior groups because that would attack their own superiority.
Furthermore, there are societal constellations where the low-status group does
not favour itself but the high-status group and in this way helps to preserve the
actually disadvantageous status quo. So, when we examine what beliefs people
(or algorithms) learn, it is essential to analyse the learning environment of these
people (or algorithms) as well. Because given this environment is co-shaped by
taste-based discriminators (which is usually the case), the beliefs of an agent-
neutral Bayesian decision-maker will be affected by them.
67 It is important to notice that whether intergroup status is stable or instable / legitimate or
illegitimate is a subjective evaluation. Thus, some of a group might perceive an intergroup
status as instable and illegitimate and therefore display ingroup favouritism in form of social
competition, whereas others perceive it as stable and legitimate and thus show outgroup
favouritism in form of defending the status quo.
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5Reassembling Discrimination
In the last three parts of the dissertation, we have dissected discrimination. First
of all, we said that two requirements have to be fulfilled in order that an act is dis-
criminatory: (1) In the decision situation, there has to be a differentiation between
two or more things/people. (2) At least one of these things/people has to be trea-
ted in a systematically different way compared to the other things/people.1 This
definition is indeed very general which is why we from then on concentrated on
different treatment of people or groups, which we named social discrimination.
Here, we distinguished two types of discrimination: taste-based discrimination
and statistical discrimination. While the former is possible in any kind of decision-
making, the latter can only occur in decision-making under uncertainty. Next,
we examined the psychological mechanisms behind taste-based discrimination,
whether such tastes actually exist, and how they could have evolved. Ultima-
tely, we investigated how we get our beliefs based on which we form subjective
probabilities of possible scenarios.
This last chapter shall reassemble these dissected components of discrimina-
tion and then analyse how this understanding of discrimination can contribute to
the discourse presented in the introduction. Therefore, we first put the findings of
this dissertation into a summarising model. Then, we look at what implications it
has for a normative theory of discrimination.
1 As previously mentioned in section 2.1 and section 2.4, sometimes it takes more than one
choice set or preference ordering so as to detect that alternatives are treated in a systematically
different way.Moreover, there is the possibility of second-order discriminationwhich involves
how a decision-maker handles indifference.
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5.1 A Descriptive Model of Discrimination
In order to summarise the preceding deliberations in a model, we have to inter-
connect two perspectives: What type are the decision-maker’s preferences and
how does the decision-maker get/form beliefs. Concerning the type of preferences,
we have to differentiate between agent-neutral and agent-relative preferences. This
is because only the latter lead to taste-based discrimination. Since we have already
thoroughly discussed agent-neutral and agent-relative preferences, we will not
again enlarge upon these topics here.
Regarding the formation of beliefs, we have to distinguish three circumstances:
(1) The formation of our beliefs is irrelevant because we do not need them so as
to form subjective probabilities in the first place. This is the case in decision-
making under certainty. It is important to notice that these have to be correctly
recognised situations of certainty. This excludes the possibility that the decision-
maker is actually confronted with uncertainty, yet, assigns a subjective probability
of 1 to one scenario, which out of his perspective suggests certainty. We have to
exclude such a situation because even though the decision-maker thinks that they
are independent of any subjective probabilities, these very probabilities make him
mistake uncertainty for certainty. Likewise, the other way around is also possible:
A decision-maker thinks that a decision underlies uncertainty although it actually
underlies certainty. In this case, he again makes use of subjective probabilities
which is why we exclude such a situation from this first distinction as well.
Now, it might be objected that ultimately the correct understanding that a given
decision underlies certainty has to again base on the decision-maker’s beliefs. This
is of course true. Yet, in such a situation, the respective beliefs which correctly
indicate that a decision underlies certainty are not subjectively formed but objec-
tively given. As a result, it is irrelevant how a decision-maker forms his beliefs
because this process does not influence decision-making under certainty. Admit-
tedly, in practice, it is questionable how often the idea of objectively given beliefs
applies. It could be even argued that in the end all beliefs and thereby all pro-
babilities are subjective (cf. Savage, 1954). If that were true, this first distinction
could be ignored and we would directly start with the second one.
(2) The formation of our beliefs adheres to objective Bayesianism. This means
two things. First, when confronted with new evidence we update our beliefs
employing Bayes’ law. Second, in lack of any evidence for how probable different
scenarios are, we use a uniform prior. As a consequence, there are no inher-
ent prior beliefs. Or strictly speaking, there are only two inherent prior beliefs,
namely, in the absence of any evidence we use a uniform prior and update our
priors according to Bayes’ law. Finally, all other belief formation methods which,
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regarding beliefs that are directly or indirectly linked to social categories, lead
to the exact same results as objective Bayesianism are also part of this distinc-
tion. So, concerning discrimination, they are equivalent to objective Bayesianism
which is why we from now on class them among objective Bayesianism.
(3) The formation of our beliefs adheres to subjective Bayesianism or any non-
Bayesian method. As we know, subjective Bayesianism allows any prior beliefs
in a decision situation that lacks prior evidence as long as they fulfil the three ass-
umptions of probability theory (cf. Kolmogorov, 1933). So, this is where inherent
prior beliefs can come into play. The same is true for non-Bayesian belief forma-
tion methods.2 Additionally, these methods (partly) deviate from Bayes’ law in
regard to their belief updating process. Due to that subjective Bayesianism and
non-Bayesianism can lead to any possible belief despite substantial disconfirming
evidence. As a result, under these conditions it seems to be pointless to describe a
belief as rational or irrational which is why we characterise such beliefs as biased.
In turn, these biased beliefs than lead to biased statistical discrimination.3
Figure 5.1 presents the respective intersections of the two types of preferences
and the three distinctions regarding the formation of beliefs. This leads to six
cases which we will individually discuss in the following pages. Note that the top
left “field” reminds us that the model is always surrounded by a certain learning
environment. Therefore, the specific beliefs someone learns not only depend on
his belief formation process but also his learning environment.
No Discrimination Regarding Social Categories
There is only one situation where there certainly is no discrimination regarding
social categories and therefore no social discrimination: When the decision-maker
2 Yet, it is also possible that a non-Bayesian belief formation method suggests a uniform prior
in case of the absence of evidence (as in case of objective Bayesianism) but a non-Bayesian
updating process.
3 Although we want to attain a descriptive model of discrimination some normative choices
are inevitable, namely based on which dimensions we want to structure our model. So, the
circumstance that we strictly separate objective Bayesian beliefs from subjective Bayesian
and non-Bayesian beliefs and refer to the latter as biased is a normative choice. We legitimise
this separation by the fact that subjective Bayesianism and non-Bayesianism can lead to any
possible belief despite substantial disconfirming evidence. This is not possible in case of
objective Bayesianism (here we exclude the theoretically possible case that someone who
actually faces substantial disconfirming evidence (that others are able to perceive) constantly
filters incoming sensory information in such a way that it still matches his predictions).
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Figure 5.1 Descriptive model of discrimination
has agent-neutral preferences and the decision that he has to take underlies cer-
tainty (and he knows that). In case of certainty, there is non-discrimination regar-
ding social categories in a situation where providers offer the same characteristics
i if:








Although agent-neutral preferences do not allow discrimination regarding social
categories if there is certainty, they still enable non-social discrimination.4 This is
actually true for all intersections in Figure 5.1, yet, we will only write it our here
and in the next intersection which involves taste-based discrimination. In case of
decision-making under certainty, we get the following formulation if alternatives
have two differing characteristics and a decision-maker prefers characteristics i
to characteristics j while being indifferent between what group the provider of
these characteristics belongs to:
∃!xi , x j ∈ X : u(xi ) > u(x j )
4 As previously mentioned, the distinction between non-social and social discrimination is
vaguer in reality. Yet, since an agent-neutral decision-maker has no tastes for certain groups
such tastes can also not influence his non-social tastes.
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Given the decision-maker deals with certainty and has agent-relative preferences,
he will act in a taste-based discriminatory way. There is taste-based discrimination
if the knowledge of who the providers of the alternatives’ characteristics are:
(a) leads to a preference of one alternative over another even though they have
the same characteristics; and/or (b) changes preferences compared to a situation
where providers are unknown.
In the previous chapters we differed between two types of taste-based discrimi-
nation, namely a weak and a strong version. While in case of strong taste-based
discrimination the decision-maker is willing to bear costs so as to be a taste-based
discriminator, this does not apply in case of weak taste-based discrimination.
We will only illustrate the difference between the two versions in this intersec-
tion and refrain from it in the other two intersections that involve taste-based
discrimination.5 Moreover, we will only formalise taste-based discrimination in
regard to provider situations.6 There is weak taste-based discrimination in a situa-
tion where alternatives have two differing characteristics and the decision-maker
prefers characteristics i to characteristics j if:
























In contrast to that there is strong taste-based discrimination in a situation where
alternatives have two differing characteristics and the decision-maker prefers
characteristics i to characteristics j if:
5 One can transfer the differences between strong and weak taste-based discrimination in this
intersection to the two other intersections that involve taste-based discrimination by simply
changing choice set X with a choice set F .
6 We have discussed the receiver situation in section 3.1.1.
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The fact that the formation of our beliefs is relevant implies that the decision
situation involves uncertainty. In this intersection, we have two assumptions. (1)
The way we form and update beliefs adheres to objective Bayesianism or any
equivalent method that fulfils the requirements stated at the beginning of this
chapter. Therefore, we only have group unspecific inherent prior beliefs and these
beliefs exclusively contain objective Bayesianism. This is indicated by βθγOB
and
the absence of βμγ . (2) We have agent-neutral preferences. These two factors
(might) lead to pure statistical discrimination, as we see in the following formula-
tions, which display pure statistical discrimination in a situation where providers
offer the “same” characteristics. We first exclude taste-based discrimination.
























Second, we look whether learned group specific beliefs affect the decision-
maker’s subjective probabilities. If this were not the case or the changes still lead
to the exact same preferences, there would be no discrimination regarding social
categories. Otherwise, the decision-maker makes use of statistical discrimination,

































For repetition, if there is statistical discrimination, characteristics of an alternative
and the group membership of its provider can no longer be separated. This is
signalised through a little star (*) next to the alternative’s characteristics.
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Taste-Based and Statistical Discrimination
As in a situation of pure statistical discrimination, the decision-maker forms and
updates his beliefs according to objective Bayesianism. However, in contrast to
pure statistical discrimination, he does not have agent-neutral but agent-relative
preferences. For example, a decision-maker has agent-relative preferences in a
situation where providers offer the “same” characteristics if:
























Additionally, the decision-maker might also use group specific beliefs, leading to a
possible combination of taste-based and statistical discrimination. This can result
in different situations. On one hand, group specific beliefs might not noticeably
change preferences. Here, we would only speak of taste-based discrimination. On
the other hand, group specific beliefs might significantly increase (decrease) the
expected utility of the alternative whose provider is a member of the dispreferred
(preferred) group, which changes preferences. This can lead to two possible out-
comes, which both are a combination of taste-based and statistical discrimination.
Either the decision-maker no longer prefers the alternative of the preferred group
to that of the dispreferred group but is indifferent between the two, or he now
even prefers that of the dispreferred group. Section 2.3 discussed these different
situations in detail, which is why we do not further go into them here. In contrast,
given there are no (relevant) group specific beliefs, the decision-maker solely is a
taste-based discriminator and does not display statistical discrimination.
Biased Statistical Discrimination
In case of biased statistical discrimination, the decision-maker has agent-neutral
preferences and forms/updates his beliefs according to subjective Bayesianism
or any non-Bayesian method, which is indicated by βθγSN B
. In case of subjective
Bayesianism all kinds of inherent prior beliefs are possible including group speci-
fic ones (βμγ ). There are only two requirements: (1) The subjective probabilities
that the beliefs result in have to fulfil the three assumptions of probability theory
(cf. Kolmogorov, 1933). (2) The inherent prior belief about updating beliefs invol-
ves Bayes’ law. In contrast, while non-Bayesian belief formation methods allow
all kinds of inherent prior beliefs as well, they only have to fulfil the first require-
ment. Let’s depict biased statistical discrimination in a situation where providers
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offer the “same” characteristics. As in case of pure statistical discrimination, we
first exclude taste-based discrimination.
























Second, we look whether inherent and/or learned group specific beliefs affect the
decision-maker’s subjective probabilities. If this were not the case or the chan-
ges still lead to the exact same preferences, there would be no discrimination
regarding social categories. Otherwise, the decision-maker makes use of statistical

































Here, characteristics of an alternative and the group membership of its provider
can no longer be separated, which is signalised through a little star (*) next to the
alternative’s characteristics.
Taste-Based and Biased Statistical Discrimination
The last intersection comprises a decision-maker with agent-relative preferences
who forms his beliefs according to subjective Bayesianism or any non-Bayesian
method. First of all, the decision-maker has to have agent-relative preferences, as
for example given by the following preferences which refer to a situation where
providers offer the “same” characteristics:
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Additionally, the decision-maker might use his subjective or non-Bayesian group
specific beliefs so as to form predictions. This can lead to a combination of
taste-based and biased statistical discrimination. As in case of the intersection
“taste-based and statistical discrimination”, there are several possible situations.
On one hand, group specific beliefs might not noticeably change preferences.
Here, we would only speak of taste-based discrimination. On the other hand,
group specific beliefs might significantly increase (decrease) the expected uti-
lity of the alternative whose provider is a member of the dispreferred (preferred)
group, which changes preferences. This can lead to two possible outcomes, which
both are a combination of taste-based and biased statistical discrimination. Either
the decision-maker no longer prefers the alternative of the preferred group to
that of the dispreferred group but is indifferent between the two, or he now even
prefers that of the dispreferred group. Section 2.3 discussed these different situa-
tions in detail, which is why we do not further go into them here. In contrast,
given there are no (relevant) group specific beliefs, the decision-maker solely is a
taste-based discriminator and does not display biased statistical discrimination.
5.2 Implications for a Normative Theory of Discrimination
This dissertation has deliberately omitted a normative perspective on discrimi-
nation. This will not change in this chapter. Nevertheless, having the precedent
model of discrimination in mind, we want to define what aspects a normative
theory of discrimination has to consider. There are five main implications:
(1) We can examine discrimination out of two perspectives: a motivational
one and a behavioural one. While behavioural discrimination necessarily stems
from motivational discrimination, motivational discrimination might not always
be expressed in behaviour. For example, after the second world war, a former
Nazi might still have some national socialistic convictions but never displays
them. Is he still a Nazi then? The problem behind this question is as follows:
If motivational discrimination is not expressed in behaviour, it is impossible to
deduce it via empirical observation (maybe even for the former Nazi himself given
these convictions are unconscious). In this dissertation, we circumvented the pro-
blem of a not deducible gap between motivation and behaviour through always
referring to behavioural discrimination when we talked about discrimination. So,
for us, there is discrimination if and only if motivational discrimination is also
expressed in behaviour. A normative theory of discrimination has to address the
above-mentioned issue as well and therefore answer the question whether there is
discrimination beyond behaviour.
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(2) When a decision situation involves providers or receivers of different group
membership, it rarely underlies certainty (if at all). Of course, there are examples
where certainty seems to apply and therefore group membership should be irre-
levant for any agent-neutral decision-maker. For instance, if you buy a Mars bar,
its taste and thereby the (expected) utility it gives you should not be influenced
by the fact that its provider is Christian or Moslem. Nevertheless, most often,
interactions do not contain a standardised fixed product that should give the same
(expected) utility regardless of its provider. If you buy a croissant from bakery
A, it in all likelihood tastes differently than a croissant from bakery B. So, given
you have not already tried both croissants, it is uncertain which one is better. And
actually, even if you have tried both croissants, you cannot be certain that they
will taste the same the second time. Likewise, whether the riding experience with
taxi driver A is better than that with taxi driver B is uncertain and might also
change from time to time.7
Now, in decision-making under uncertainty, group specific beliefs are often
important so as to form subjective probabilities, leading to statistical discrimina-
tion. As Lippert-Rasmussen (2013) writes: “[W]e are bound to reason inductively
and to treat others on that basis, so in a way it is impossible not to engage
in statistical discrimination.” (p. 1411) Indeed, there are examples where group
membership should be irrelevant as for instance the group membership of a horse
race lottery ticket provider. This is because the provider’s group membership does
not influence the outcome of the horse race.8 Yet, in many situations, there is
dependency between group membership and outcome. A doctor is more likely to
heal a fractured leg than a lawyer. In contrast, a lawyer is more likely to suc-
cessfully conduct your defence in front of court than a doctor. Similarly, if you
offer your bus seat to an older person and not a juvenile, this (normally) is an
expression of statistical discrimination as well. Maybe the older person really
appreciates your offer. But she might also feel offended by the offer because to
some degree it emphasises her (potential) oldness/weakness. So, the outcome is
uncertain. Nonetheless, it seems to be reasonable to consult group specific beliefs
in this situation and build the hypothesis that the older person is more thankful
to sit than the juvenile. Finally, sometimes statistical discrimination can even be
life-saving. Although both men and women can develop breast cancer, women are
much more likely to do so. Therefore, while breast cancer screenings are daily
business for a gynaecologist, they are not for a urologist. In turn, prostate cancer
7 For example, this might be due to mood variance of the taxi drivers.
8 There might be exceptions in case of race manipulation.
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is only something that men can get, which is why such screenings are common
for urologist but totally absent in case of gynaecologists (Bray et al., 2018).
In all the decision situations mentioned above, if you were not allowed to sta-
tistically discriminate, you would have had to use a uniform prior.9 This is true
unless you have individual information about the providers/receivers involved.
But then again, the interpretation of such individual information can be affected
by group specific beliefs, such as how trustworthy or accurate usual members of
the respective group are. In fact, Schauer (2003) states that “the distinction bet-
ween the use of the profile [group specific beliefs] and the use of so-called direct
evidence is far more illusory than real. Inferences drawn from observations or
from physical evidence are themselves based on probabilistic generalization, and
the cumulative set of inferences that produces a purportedly ‘direct’ conclusion or
observation is nothing more than a collection of inferences drawn from generali-
zations known to be reliable. Just like a profile.” (p. 171f) Therefore, a normative
theory of discrimination has to acknowledge the inevitability of statistical discri-
mination and thus the importance of group specific beliefs in decision-making
under uncertainty.
(3) The way humans get their beliefs is at least partly incongruent with objec-
tive Bayesianism. So, if we statistically discriminate, the process of forming these
statistics is potentially biased. On one hand, we seem to have inherent prior
beliefs that differ from objective Bayesianism. On the other hand, we do not
appear to exclusively update our beliefs by use of Bayes’ law. The consequence
is that given the right inherent prior beliefs and/or updating rule, an agent-neutral
decision-maker can form almost any belief despite substantial disconfirming evi-
dence. Therefore, a normative theory of discrimination has to provide a definition
of which beliefs are legitimate for statistical discrimination and which are not that
cannot solely base on how we get to these beliefs.
Now, it can be objected that from a normative perspective, we simply say that
objective Bayesian beliefs are legitimate for statistical discrimination, whereas
subjective and non-Bayesian beliefs are not. Yet, this idea faces two problems.
(1) As mentioned before, humans seem not to be objective Bayesians which
implies that we could never have legitimate beliefs and thus never legitimately
statistically discriminate. (2) Objective Bayesianism also has its issues regarding
the justifiability of beliefs. According to Gilboa et al. (2012), a major failure of
the Bayesian approach is that in many real-life problems there is not sufficient
information to suggest an objective Bayesian prior belief. Admittedly, in a small
9 Without statistical discrimination, the differentiation between a gynaecologist and a urologist
is obsolete either way.
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fraction of these problems a unique prior based on the principle of insufficient
reason is sensible, particularly if the scenarios are symmetric. However, this is
seldomly the case. The authors write: “[T]he vast majority of decision problems
encountered by economic agents fall into a gray area, where there is too much
information to arbitrarily adopt a symmetric prior, yet too little information to
justifiably adopt a statistically-based prior.” (p. 20) As a result, even under the
assumption of objective Bayesianism, a normative theory of discrimination has to
give a guideline of which beliefs are legitimate for statistical discrimination and
which are not in such grey area situations. And this guideline cannot exclusively
ground on the belief formation process.
Finally, in this dissertation, we focused on how we get beliefs and did not con-
sider whether these beliefs ultimately are correct or incorrect. We did so because
the correctness of beliefs is no requirement for statistical discrimination. Yet, whe-
ther a certain belief is correct or not might be important for a normative theory
of discrimination. While statistical discrimination on the basis of a correct belief
only raises the problem of distributive fairness, statistical discrimination on the
basis of an incorrect belief also raises the problem of false treatment. Here, false
treatment means that the assumptions that give rise to statistical discrimination are
incorrect. However, if a normative theory of discrimination differentiates between
correct and incorrect beliefs, it has to define when a belief can be seen as correct
and when as incorrect.
(4) Regarding how we treat others, there are two types of preferences: agent-
neutral preferences and agent-relative preferences. Therefore, either everyone
(excluding ourselves) is treated equally, which implies (weak) agent-neutrality, or
some people are treated differently than others, which implies agent-relativity. So,
if you treat men differently than women, black people differently than white peo-
ple, or Christians differently than Moslems, you have agent-relative preferences
and thus are a taste-based discriminator. But likewise, if you treat your significant
other differently than your co-worker, your family differently than your neighbour,
or your friends differently than strangers, you have agent-relative preferences too
and thus also are a taste-based discriminator.10
A normative theory of discrimination has to consider these various tastes for
people/groups. In so doing, it has to define in case of which people/groups it
is legitimate to have a taste for or in what situations it is legitimate to have a
10 It is important to notice that “differently” implies that you generally prefer these people
to others and therefore have a taste for them. In this way, the different treatment cannot
completely arise from statistical discrimination.
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taste for certain people/groups. For example, what is the moral difference bet-
ween having a sexual preference for men or women and a worker preference
for men or women? Or what is the moral difference between only having black
sexual partners because you have a taste for black skin colour and only having
white friends because you have a taste for white people? Finally, let us quickly
examine two at least at first sight similar incidents that led to quite different media
echoes. In the first incident, a Colorado baker refuses to sell a wedding cake to
a gay couple (Goldberg, 2017). In the second incident, the owner of a Virginia
restaurant asks Sarah Huckabee Sanders, Donald Trump’s former White House
press secretary, to leave the restaurant (Cochrane, 2018). What is the moral dif-
ference between not serving a gay couple due to their sexual orientation and not
to serving a politician due to her political orientation? And if there is one, does it
depend on the precise political opinion?
Here, the different configurations of tastes that this dissertation revealed might
help a normative theory of discrimination to separate legitimate from illegitimate
tastes. First of all, we differentiated between weak and strong taste-based discrimi-
nation in the following manner: Only in case of strong taste-based discrimination
the decision-maker is willing to bear costs in order to choose the alternative whose
characteristics are provided by a member of the preferred group. Second, there
are tastes that stem from an ingroup-outgroup context (e.g. racial preference) and
others that are unlikely to stem from such a context (e.g. sexual orientation).
Third, provided that there is no statistical discrimination, different treatment of
two groups is either the product of a taste for one group, a distaste for the other
group, or both. Fourth, tastes and distastes can be intertwined with social pre-
ferences, meaning that a taste (distaste) for a certain group involves that the
group’s well-being positively (negatively) affects the decision-maker’s well-being.
Ultimately, tastes for certain groups can also be independent of their members’
well-being. This means that someone prefers (disprefers) a certain group simply
because interacting with members of that group provides her more (less) utility.
For example, an employer might prefer attractive to unattractive employees sim-
ply because looking at attractive employees provides her more utility than looking
at unattractive employees would do. Therefore, her motivation behind preferring
attractive to unattractive employees has nothing to do with their well-being but
is completely egoistic. These different configurations of tastes as presented in
this paragraph might lead to different normative evaluations of the behaviour they
result in.
(5) This last implication is intertwined with the third one. Let’s assume there is
an algorithm that is programmed to adhere to objective Bayesianism. Moreover,
the algorithm is not programmed to have any tastes for certain people/groups.
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What specific beliefs would such an algorithm acquire? We cannot really answer
this question because this highly depends on the algorithm’s environment. So, let’s
further say that the internet (or certain parts of it) serves as the environment within
which the algorithm learns. It can be assumed that the content of the internet is at
least to some degree created by people who are taste-based discriminators. Now,
let’s again ask what beliefs would an algorithm in such an environment acquire?
Since the environment is co-created by taste-based discriminators, their tastes
will be reflected in the group specific objective Bayesian beliefs of the algorithm.
This can lead to seemingly racist or sexist beliefs even though the algorithm is
agent-neutral.
We have seen such an example in case of “Tay”. Tay was a chatbot from
Microsoft that was active on the social media platform Twitter and learned from
interacting with human users. The bot used a combination of artificial intelligence
and written editorials (Hunt, 2016). Therefore, it did not adhere to objective Baye-
sianism, yet, it also did not have any agent-relative preconfigurations. Tay started
with tweets such as: “can I just say that I am stoked to meet u? humans are super
cool”, which after only 15 hours turned into: “I fucking hate feminists and they
should all die and burn in hell”; or “Hitler was right I hate the jews” (Stuart-Ulin,
2018). Microsoft had to take Tay offline after not more than 16 hours and apolo-
gise for its racist and sexist tweets. However, it was of course not the algorithm
in and of itself that made Tay a seeming racist or a sexist but the environment in
which it learned. Tay remained agent-neutral all the time.
What does the example of Tay mean for a normative theory of discrimination?
In the third implication, we mentioned two reasons why a normative theory of dis-
crimination cannot be reduced to how we get our beliefs. First, humans appear not
to be objective Bayesians. Second, even under the assumption of objective Baye-
sianism, there are still many grey area decision situations where the justifiability
of a statistically-based prior is questionable. Now, the above paragraphs provide
another reason: Even if we are not in a grey area situation, the belief formation
process is a difficult compass for the legitimacy of beliefs that can be used for
statistical discrimination. This is because objective Bayesian beliefs are always
a simple reflection of the decision-maker’s (or algorithm’s) environment. And
if this environment inheres societal characteristics that are the product of taste-
based discriminators, group specific objective Bayesian beliefs will adopt and
thereby reproduce them (DeDeo, 2016). It is important to notice that these socie-
tal characteristics refer to both the meso-level (family, peers, etc.) and macro-level
(society, core culture, etc.). So, the last implication comprises that a normative
theory of discrimination has to consider the past and present environment of the
decision-maker as well.
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To summarise, this dissertation leads to the following five implications for a
normative theory of discrimination: (1) Discrimination beyond behaviour can be
impossible to deduce, which complicates a (exclusively) motivational approach
to discrimination. (2) In decision-making under uncertainty, statistical discrimi-
nation seems to be inevitable which emphasises the general importance of group
specific beliefs. (3) The way we get to our beliefs is insufficient in order to define
legitimate and illegitimate statistical discrimination. (4) Tastes for certain peo-
ple/groups are manifold and given having one taste is legitimate but another not,
there has to be an explanation why these two tastes morally differ. (5) In order
to define the legitimacy of a discriminatory act, one cannot exclusively regard the
decision-maker but has to consider his environment as well.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use,
sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you
give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative
Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third partymaterial in this chapter are included in the chapter’sCreative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly
from the copyright holder.
6Conclusion
This dissertation provided a descriptive analysis of the phenomenon of discrimi-
nation. We first dissected discrimination by means of decision theory. In so doing,
we started with a broad definition of discrimination and then identified more
and more distinctive manifestations of it. First of all, we separated social from
non-social discrimination. Then, within the concept of social discrimination, we
further differentiated statistical from taste-based discrimination. Finally, we inves-
tigated to what behaviour the combination of different types of discrimination can
lead. During the whole dissection, the decision-maker’s state of knowledge was
an essential aspect. Here, we distinguished two states: decision-making under cer-
tainty and decision-making under uncertainty. The main difference between these
two is given by the fact that while certainty is objectively given, in case of uncer-
tainty probabilities are subjectively formed. Due to that statistical discrimination
is only possible if a decision situation underlies uncertainty. Here, a statistical
discriminator uses the group memberships of the people involved in a decision
situation as proxies in order to assess scenarios’ subjective probabilities. In con-
trast, taste-based discrimination is possible in both kinds of decision-making and
involves that the decision-maker has a taste for certain people/groups. Moreover,
so as to have such tastes, she needs agent-relative preferences. In turn, there is no
taste-based discrimination if the decision-maker has agent-neutral preferences.
Subsequently, we investigated taste-based discrimination. One of the most
intruding question regarding taste-based discrimination is as follows: Where do
we draw the line between those we treat prosocially and those we treat neutrally
or even antisocially? Social identity theory provided an answer to this question.
We have a taste for our ingroup and/or a distaste for our outgroups. Yet, the pre-
cise definition of the ingroup and outgroup is changeable and depends on the
situation. Here, self-categorisation theory helped us to determine which of the
many possible group constellations becomes salient. Next, we have investigated
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whether ingroup love and/or outgroup derogation gives rise to ingroup favouritism
and found that the former is stronger than the latter. Additionally, we demonstra-
ted that not all tastes have to stem from an ingroup-outgroup context, yet when
looking more closely, such tastes often still appear to be intertwined with social
identity. Then, we discussed the question whether taste-based discrimination is
actually always statistical discrimination with ingroup favouring beliefs. We found
that such beliefs certainly are of importance in regard to ingroup favouritism.
Nevertheless, they seem not to be able to explain all ingroup favouritism that
we observe in experiments. Thus, taste-based discrimination appears to actually
exist, which requires that people have agent-relative social preferences. There are
multiple explanatory approaches for such preferences. The most promising one
provide kin altruism, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, and costly signalling
in combination with parochial altruism, cultural group selection, and gene-culture
coevolution.
In the next part of the dissertation we focused on how we get beliefs and
what has to be fulfilled in order that they are rational, leading to rational stati-
stical discrimination. Subjective expected utility theory has few requirements in
order that a belief is labelled as rational. It only has to be consistent with the
other beliefs and updated by use of Bayes’ law. As a consequence, it does not
provide a theory of prior belief generation. This led us to Bayesianism and how
people deviate from it. First, we analysed whether there are inherent prior beliefs.
Such beliefs would not have been learned individually but collectively over the
course of evolution. Here, we found that people appear to belief in the superio-
rity of familiar alternatives. The existence of such a belief can be explained via
error management theory. Additionally, there seem to be prior beliefs about the
ingroup and outgroup as well. Next, we looked at how people update their beliefs
and thereby whether they stick to Bayes’ law. We found four apparent deviations:
(1) People are not good at handling probabilities but rather deduce the probabi-
lity of an event from its availability. (2) People incorrectly remember their prior
probabilities after having them updated. (3) People gather and process confirming
evidence differently than disconfirming evidence and are less critical in regard
to their own beliefs than those of others. (4) Social identity can affect our belief
formation process in such a way that it leads to beliefs that tend to flatter the
ingroup and decry the outgroup. Finally, we examined the role and characteristics
of a decision-maker’s learning environment. We showed that our Western world
is shaped by historical (and partly still ongoing) oppressions of certain groups.
Today, a decision-maker’s learning environment still inheres these circumstan-
ces to some degree, which as a consequence find expression in her beliefs. So,
the beliefs of an agent-neutral person can reflect agent-relative convictions if the
environment she learns in was co-shaped by agent-relative people.
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The final part of the dissertation reassembled discrimination. We first put the
major aspects of the previous chapters in a descriptive model of discrimination.
On one hand, we distinguished whether the formation of our beliefs is irrele-
vant due to correctly recognised certainty, adheres to objective Bayesianism (or
equivalent), or adheres to subjective Bayesianism or all other forms of belief
formation. On the other hand, we separated decision-makers with agent-neutral
preferences from those with agent-relative preferences. The combination of these
two dimensions of distinction led to six interactions. From this descriptive model
of discrimination, we then derived five aspects that a normative theory of dis-
crimination should consider. They involve the approach to discrimination, the
omnipresence of uncertainty and as a consequence the virtually inevitable usage
of group specific beliefs, our belief formation process, the manifold manifes-
tations of agent-relative preferences, and the importance of someone’s learning
environment.
The goal of this dissertation was to provide a nuanced perspective on discri-
mination that is free from judgments of legitimacy and illegitimacy. This is what
we have done. So, what is the scientific novelty value of this dissertation? For
the first time, decision theory was neatly employed on the phenomenon of dis-
crimination. In this way, we derived the two forms of social discrimination that
have already been mentioned in the literature, namely taste-based and statistical
discrimination. Ingroup favouritism was then integrated into and thereby explai-
ned within the decision theoretical framework. This is the first time this has been
done in such a comprehensive way. Next, this dissertation provides an in-depth
analysis of human biases that directly or indirectly relate to groups and reveals
how they interfere with objective and subjective Bayesianism. In so doing, we
bundled various biases that seem to be manifestations of the same mechanism
and examined their universality as well as ultimate explanation. This has not been
done before in such a thorough way. Finally, this dissertation provides a new des-
criptive model of discrimination that builds on the previous findings and lists five
implications for a normative theory of discrimination. Considering these implica-
tions, it can be inferred that decision theory itself seems to be insufficient so as
to define legitimate and illegitimate discrimination.
In a next step, these descriptive insights into discrimination and their impli-
cations can be applied on the normative discourse on discrimination. At this, the
decision-theoretical language we introduced so as to define different forms of
discrimination can particularly help to clarify what kind of discrimination one
actually talks about and eventually condemns. The mathematical language used
in this dissertation provides a precise mutual definitional basis which differing
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normative theories of discrimination can refer to. Hereby, hardened norma-
tive fronts regarding discrimination might hopefully loosen up a bit because
misunderstandings about the property of discrimination should become less likely.
This dissertation’s descriptive analysis of discrimination has limitations. First
of all, as we have discussed several times before, we face epistemological pro-
blems when we want to detect the accurate type(s) of discrimination from
empirical observations. Although we can to some degree deduce it/them if there
exists a basis of comparison which ideally is as large as possible, there can never
be complete certainty (cf. Kant, 2011[1786]). This circumstance ultimately under-
lies all empirical studies that we discussed. Second, the subjective expected utility
theory that we used assumes that while we do not know the probabilities of sce-
narios, we know all their characteristics. In other words, there are no unknown
unknowns. Yet, situations also exist where we neither know the probabilities
of scenarios nor the characteristics of all possible scenarios. Our dissection of
discrimination has omitted such conditions. Third, our distinction of social and
non-social discrimination is more complicated in real life because agent-relative
preferences can also influence our preferences for things. Fourth, many fields of
research that we introduced still have open questions. Most strikingly, the ulti-
mate explanations for why we have inherent prior beliefs and do not update our
beliefs according to Bayes’ law need more evidence. Similarly, the puzzle of the
evolution of agent-relative social preferences is also not yet conclusively solved.
Fifth, our analysis of discrimination mainly considered psychological as well as
evolutionary explanations for different kinds of discrimination and only briefly
discussed sociological influences and implications. Finally, although the very goal
of this dissertation was to provide a descriptive analysis of discrimination, some
normative judgments were inevitable. For example, this involves how we defined
discrimination, which theories we used so as to explain discrimination, or which
dimensions we chose for the descriptive model of discrimination as well as how
we defined these dimensions.
At the very end of this dissertation, let’s go back to the two examples we used
in the introduction: the sly vixens campaign and the applicant screening algorithm.
What can we tell about them after our dissection of discrimination? We start with
the example of the sly vixens campaign. Here, the national railway company of
Switzerland (SBB) exclusively looked for women who, while wearing fox ears
and a fox tail, would make morning commuters aware of extra trains. Moreover,
the SBB advertised this job on an online platform of two universities and thereby
probably excluded non-academics. As we said in the introduction, this is a case
of discrimination because some groups are systematically treated differently than
others. Yet, what type of discrimination is it? Of course, we cannot know that for
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sure but it seems that the SBB were mainly (biased) statistical and not taste-based
discriminators in this case. The SBB officially replied that the reason why they
particularly addressed women was that the sly foxes and vixens have to wear a
hairband (on which the fox ears are mounted) and they thought that women can
wear these better (Iseli, 2017; Heininger & Hartmann, 2017). So, the SBB seem to
have based their decision on a statistic about which gender sits a hairband better
on. And although they do not state that explicitly, they might also have applied a
statistic which says that women are more likely to do and/or more accepted when
they do such assistant jobs than men.1 Particularly the beliefs of the last sentence
would in all likelihood have had to stem from an environment that was co-shaped
by taste-based discriminators. Finally, the SBB might have particularly addressed
students because they are statistically more likely to do little side jobs than the
average citizen or other groups.
The case of the applicant screening algorithm is a bit more complicated. First
of all, we exclude the possibility that the algorithm is a taste-based discriminator.
Now, the goal of the algorithm is to find the applicant that suits the firm best.
Thereby, it is forbidden to use the category “skin colour”. In so doing, it finds
a negative correlation between how far away someone lives from her workplace
and how long that person stays at the firm. This leads to statistical discrimina-
tion: Those who live close to the workplace are ceteris paribus more likely to be
employed than those who live further away from the workplace. Consequently,
the categorisation of individuals into groups is defined by the distance between
their home and workplace. Skin colour in and of itself is irrelevant for this cate-
gorisation (as prescribed). However, there is a correlation between skin colour
and the distance to workplace. So, does the algorithm ultimately still statistically
discriminate between people of different skin colour? Following this dissertation’s
definition of discrimination, this is not the case because the algorithm is blind for
skin colour. It does not know this category which is why it can also not use it for
any kind of discrimination. In contrast, the circumstance that black people tend
to live further away from their potential workplace than others is in all likelihood
due to taste-based discriminators who co-shaped the momentary environment.
These two examples reveal how crucial the learning environment of stati-
stical discriminators is and how (past) taste-based discriminators can influence
the beliefs of agent-neutral decision-makers. The current rise of algorithms
will further demonstrate this. Meanwhile, nationalism, antisemitism, sexism,
homophobia, xenophobia, anti-westernism, anti-islamism, or simply taste-based
1 More accepted means that commuters rather have a woman that makes them aware of extra
trains than a man.
202 6 Conclusion
discrimination still exists and partly even increases. So, discrimination remains
a hot topic. When discussing it, we should not forget that the actual ability to
discriminate is a precious facility that we need in everyday life. Thus, it appears
not to be expedient to generally condemn discrimination. But where to draw the
line between legitimate and illegitimate discrimination is a difficult question. This
descriptive analysis of discrimination can provide the language but not the answer
for it.
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